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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1936, the Robinson-Patman Act1 was enacted as an amend-
ment to section 2 of the Clayton Act.2 Subject to technical require-
ments and defined defenses, these enactments prohibit primary-3 and 
secondary-line price discrimination4 practices by which a seller 
charges different prices to different buyers for the same commodity.5 
 
 1. Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–13b (1994). For brief 
discussions of the legislative history surrounding the Robinson-Patman Act, see 1 ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH 4, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND 
LAW 8–19 (1980) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH]; FREDERICK M. 
ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 3–23 (1962). For an 
extended discussion of the legislative history that critiques the underlying economic and policy 
assumptions as well as the ability of the Robinson-Patman Act to achieve its goals, see UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 101–250 
(1977). 
 2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 
(1994)). For a brief discussion of the legislative history surrounding the price discrimination 
provision of the Clayton Act, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 5–
8. 
 3. In primary-line discrimination, the competitive injury occurs or is threatened to 
competitors of the price discriminating seller. For example, a seller charges a high price in a 
noncompetitive area to generate revenues so that it can drive out (or unfairly compete against) 
competition by subsidizing a low price in a competitive area. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993) (“This type of injury, which harms 
direct competitors of the discriminating seller, is known as primary-line injury.”); UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 5 (“Where the price discrimination alleg-
edly injures the competitors of the seller granting it, there is said to be ‘primary line injury.’”). 
 4. In secondary-line discrimination, the competitive injury occurs or is threatened to 
price-disfavored purchasers of the price discriminating seller. For example, a buyer who pays a 
lower price is thereby able to drive out (or unfairly compete against) competition from buyers 
who pay a higher price. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558 n.15 (1990) (“[T]he 
probable impact . . . on the favored and disfavored buyers [is] (second-line injury)”); UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 5 (“Where the effect of the price discrimi-
nation is alleged to injure the competitors of the buyer receiving the preferential discriminatory 
price, there is said to be ‘secondary line injury.’”). If the competitive injury occurs or is threat-
ened to customers of a price-disfavored purchaser of the price discriminating seller, it is called 
third-line or tertiary-line discrimination. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. at 558 n.15. (“The probable 
impact [is] . . . on the customers of [the secondary-line purchaser] (third-line injury).”). Falls 
City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 436 (1983) (“[The] injury component of a 
Robinson-Patman Act violation is not limited to the injury to competition between the favored 
and the disfavored purchaser; it also encompasses the injury to competition between their cus-
tomers.”); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647 (1969) (noting that the Court of 
Appeals found a “fourth level” injury due to “impaired competition with a customer . . . of a 
customer . . . of the favored purchaser” of the price discriminating seller). 
 5. Defined instances of price discrimination, whether at the primary, secondary, or ter-
tiary level, are prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, which contains the following basic 
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The Robinson-Patman Act, which added the prohibition of secon-
dary-line price discrimination to protect price-disfavored purchasers 
of a discriminating seller,6 was meant to counter the perceived mar-
ket power of large retail chains that enabled those chains to extract 
price favors from suppliers.7 Those without market power, the small 
retailers, were at a disadvantage because they paid higher prices for 
the commodities that they resold in competition with the larger 
chains.8 These concerns resonated well with the then-prevailing anti-
trust policy, which had a populist bias aimed at preserving “small 
 
provisions. Section 2(a) of the Act, which is the most frequently used, prohibits a seller from 
discriminating in price between different buyers when the discrimination adversely affects com-
petition. Section 2(a) also establishes the cost justification defense and the changing conditions 
defense. Section 2(b) establishes the affirmative defense of meeting competition. Section 2(c) 
prohibits a seller from achieving price discrimination by way of commissions or brokerage fees 
that are paid to favored buyers, except for services actually provided. Section 2(d) and 2(e) 
prohibit a seller from achieving price discrimination by way of providing promotion or adver-
tising services to favored buyers, unless equivalent benefits are provided to all competing buy-
ers. Section 2(f) makes it unlawful for a buyer “knowingly to induce or receive” a discrimina-
tory price prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 3 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13a 
(1994)) provides criminal sanctions for unreasonably low pricing. Section 4 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 13b (1994)) exempts a cooperative association’s returns of its net earnings to its 
members but not the receipt of discriminatory prices or the activities that generate those earn-
ings. Additionally, the Nonprofit Institutions Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13c 1994)), enacted 
in 1938, provides an exemption for defined institutions who operate not-for-profit and pur-
chase supplies for their own use. In this article, the focus is upon price discrimination that may 
be unlawful under section 2(a) and the exemption provided by the Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
 6. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 5 (“The chief objective 
of the Robinson-Patman Act, however, was not to prohibit primary line injury; that situation 
was already covered by the Clayton and Sherman Acts. Rather, the Act’s main purpose was to 
prohibit price differentials which affected competition at the secondary line.”). 
 7. “The major legislative purpose behind the Robinson-Patman Act was to provide 
some measure of protection to small independent retailers and their independent suppliers 
from what was thought to be unfair competition from vertically integrated, multi-location 
chain stores.” In re Boise Cascade Corp., 107 F.T.C. 76, 210 (1986), rev’d on other grounds, 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988), subsequent 
proceeding, Boise Cascade Corp., 113 F.T.C. 956 (1990); see also Aimee M.W. Pollak, Note, 
Should the Exemption from the Robinson-Patman Act Apply to Pharmaceutical Purchases by 
Nonprofit HMOs?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 968–71 (1998) (Robinson-Patman Act meant to 
protect independent merchants from large chain stores by preventing suppliers from favoring 
chain stores). F.M. Scherer, How US Antitrust Can Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription 
Drug Litigation, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 239, 244 (1997) [hereinafter Scherer, Prescription 
Drug Litigation] (“Passage of the Robinson-Patman Act was led by ‘mom and pop’ grocers, 
but the National Association of Retail Druggists (NARD), unlike most other business interests, 
also supported its enactment.”). 
 8. Perhaps surprisingly, a 1934 Federal Trade Commission Report “indicated that only 
between 15 and 20 percent of the difference in retail prices was attributable to the chains’ ad-
vantages in buying prices.” ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 10. 
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dealers and worthy men”9 as well as the deconcentrated industries in 
which they can survive.10 
Today, antitrust commentators question the prohibition of price 
discrimination,11 largely because antitrust policy has shifted toward 
the goal of consumer welfare and the concomitant goal of encourag-
ing suppliers to maximize output.12 Economic theory teaches that 
 
 9. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). The 
quote in the text is taken from one of the earliest Sherman Act cases, and this language has led 
to numerous statements to the effect that antitrust serves populist goals. See, e.g., Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (interpreting Congressional intent as “desire 
to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses . . . 
[even though] occasional higher costs and prices might result”); United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (indicating that the antitrust purpose is “to 
perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of indus-
try in small units”). For those who champion a different view of antitrust policy, the original 
phrase, taken from Trans-Missouri, was, at best, unfortunate dictum. See ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 25 (2d ed. 1993) (“We shall hear more of these ‘small dealers and 
worthy men’ that Peckham loosed upon us, for they are the widows and orphans of antitrust 
debate, and they may yet sweep the field.”). 
 10. Requiring large retailers to pay the same price for commodities as small retailers 
does not necessarily assure that retail markets will remain deconcentrated. If large retailers are 
more efficient than small retailers, the retail market will tend toward concentration, not be-
cause of lower prices paid by large retailers for supplies, but because large retailers perform dis-
tribution services at a lower cost. Compare Scherer, Prescription Drug Litigation, supra note 7, 
at 246 (suggesting that, since fair trade was abolished in 1975, retail pharmacies have been 
slow to innovate), with Roy Weinstein & John Culbertson, How U.S. Antitrust Can Be on 
Target: The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 257, 263 
(1997) (pointing out that without discounts, retail pharmacies have no incentive to invest in 
new retailing methods). 
 11. In fact, the questioning has been legion and almost uniformly scathing: “The fact is 
that no other antitrust statute has been subjected to so steady a barrage of hostile commentary 
as the Robinson-Patman Act. Indeed, the scholarly and professional literature on the statute 
resembles a cascade of vituperation.” BORK, supra note 9, at 385. For representative bibliogra-
phies, see ABA ANTITRUST DIVISION MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 21 n.86; ROWE, supra 
note 1, at 551–56 & nn.69, 80. For a book-length criticism, see UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 1. 
 12. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of this view of antitrust policy is 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (2d ed. 1993), the first edition of which was 
published in 1978. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976) (book length eco-
nomic analysis of antitrust law). For a Supreme Court opinion that adopts this view, see Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (“[D]eparture from the 
rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect.”). After the publi-
cation of the just-cited works and Supreme Court opinion, the debate about the appropriate 
goals of antitrust law has continued. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Origi-
nal and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS 
L.J. 65 (1982) (antitrust law meant to prevent wealth transfer from consumers to monopo-
lists); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979) 
(suggesting that where economic analysis is indeterminate, political concerns can and should 
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where a supplier can successfully price discriminate by charging dif-
ferent prices to groups of consumers with different demand charac-
teristics, the supplier can expand beyond the profit-maximizing out-
put associated with a single price.13 Indeed, in the modern context of 
utility regulation, economic analysis, supported by a history of suc-
cessful results, has shown that, by charging different prices to groups 
of purchasers with different demand characteristics, suppliers can 
provide more services to more consumers.14 Nonetheless, an impor-
tant and historically consistent theme of the antitrust laws, of which 
 
should be taken into account); Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals 
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979) (contending that non-economic goals of anti-
trust should predominate); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilib-
rium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981) (explaining that socio-political values coincide with 
efficiency goals and should continue to guide antitrust); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy 
After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985) (Chicago School model of efficiency will be re-
placed by new economic model). For symposia on the goals of antitrust, see Symposium, The 
Antitrust Alternative, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 931 (1987) and Symposium, Symposium on Anti-
trust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918 (1979). 
 13. See generally WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 100–05 
(1973) (explaining how a patentee can expand output through price discrimination); Scherer, 
Prescription Drug Litigation, supra note 7, at 250–54 (1997) (discussing welfare and profit 
effects of price discrimination in the pharmaceutical industry). 
As these sources indicate, economic or market power is necessary for a price discriminat-
ing seller to charge a higher price to price-disfavored customers. Drug manufacturers seem to 
have the requisite power. See F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 99 (1993) [hereinafter Scherer, Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry] (“The combination of physician decision-making, imperfect information, and 
third-party payment makes drug demand stronger and less price-elastic than it might otherwise 
be, conferring considerable monopoly power upon the sellers of well-accepted drugs.”); F.M. 
SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 389–90 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE] (“Pharmaceutical producers enjoy substantial monopoly 
power in setting the prices of significant new products, in part because of patent and regulatory 
barriers to competitive entry and partly, after patents expire, because habit and the fear that 
generic copies will be less effective lead physicians to prescribe first-moving brands.”); 
Weinstein & Culbertson, supra note 10, at 259–60 (“The relevant product market for most 
brand-name drugs is highly concentrated, generally with only a small number of competitors in 
each therapeutic class. . . . As a result of promotional practice of drug companies discussed 
above and characteristics of demand for drugs, demand faced by brand-name drug manufac-
turers is relatively inelastic, even at prices substantially in excess of incremental cost.”) 
 14. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ECONOMIC REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 133–42 (1994) (discussing Ramsey pricing in context of utility regulation); 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 
(4th ed. 1999) (same). Moreover, there are fact situations where, because the technical re-
quirements of a Robinson-Patman Act violation are not met, suppliers may freely increase prof-
its and maximize output by engaging in price discrimination. For example, the price discrimi-
nation practiced by the airline industry does not come within the purview of the Robinson-
Patman Act because the airlines sell a service and not a commodity. See infra note 87. 
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the Robinson-Patman Act is a part, is to curb the abuse of market 
power. In the context of utility regulation, price regulation prevents 
the abuse of market power by suppliers. 
What is perhaps less appreciated is that, when the Robinson-
Patman Act was enacted, there were concerns that the prohibition of 
price discrimination might reach too far.15 At that time, the govern-
ment was able to secure price favors from suppliers who actively 
sought potentially large and lucrative government contracts.16 As it 
continues to do today, the government provided goods and services, 
such as education and health care, to consumers who otherwise 
might not be able to obtain those goods and services from private 
industry.17 Suppliers who granted price favors to the government but 
charged higher prices to private industry might be seen as putting 
private industry at a disadvantage when selling goods and services 
also provided by the government.18 Consequently, some feared that 
the Robinson-Patman Act would force the government to pay higher 
prices to its suppliers, all to the detriment of the public policy goals 
that government pursues.19 
A second concern, voiced on behalf of eleemosynary institutions, 
 
 15. Pollak, supra note 7, at 972 (“broad sweep of the Robinson-Patman Act had en-
gendered confusion about its application”). 
 16. More recently, not every industry has sought government contracts through lower 
prices. A preface to a recent study of pricing in the pharmaceutical industry, implying that the 
pharmaceutical industry now seeks to charge high prices to the government, noted the follow-
ing change to the pricing environment: “The federal government further complicated the 
working environment by granting itself access to the best prices the pharmaceutical companies 
made available, effectively penalizing drug firms and their customers.” E.M. KOLASSA, 
ELEMENTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING xi (1997). 
 17. See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 2354d, at 200 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST] (“[A] school may be owned by a school district, which is a 
governmental subdivision; the same might be said of a public college, university, library, or 
hospital.”). 
 18. But see id. at 200–01 (“While the statute itself is silent about sales to federal and 
state governments, at least some of the drafters believed that general principles of sovereign 
immunity or statutory construction effectively created an exemption for governmental pur-
chases.”). 
 19. This concern was addressed just after the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in a 
1936 opinion letter issued by United States Attorney General Homer Cummings. 38 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 539 (1936). That opinion letter, and case law following it, are discussed, infra at 
notes 244–51. For more extended discussions of the so-called governmental entity exemption, 
see HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17; EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 
§ 25.10 (1983). In its pharmaceutical price discrimination statute, Maine explicitly provides an 
exception for “the State and any political subdivision of the State.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
32, § 13804(1) (West 1999). 
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was that the Robinson-Patman Act would prevent suppliers from 
granting price favors to those institutions.20 This concern mirrored 
the one directed at preserving price favors for the government. El-
eemosynary institutions provide goods and services, such as educa-
tion and health care, to consumers who otherwise might not be able 
to obtain those goods and services from private industry. Suppliers 
who granted price favors to eleemosynary institutions but charged 
higher prices to private industry might be seen as putting private in-
dustry at a disadvantage when selling goods and services also pro-
vided by eleemosynary institutions. Here as well, some feared that 
the Robinson-Patman Act would force eleemosynary institutions to 
pay higher prices to their suppliers, all to the detriment of the chari-
table or other worthy goals that eleemosynary institutions pursue.21 
This article focuses upon the second concern and, in particular, 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act which was enacted in 1938 to create a 
Robinson-Patman Act exemption for suppliers who grant price favors 
to eleemosynary institutions.22 The legislative history is remarkably 
brief, but it indicates that Congress was concerned with preserving 
the ability of eleemosynary institutions to pursue their charitable or 
other worthy goals.23 The committee report in the House first noted 
that the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited price discrimination where 
 
 20. See Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) (“[T]he 
legislative history of the Nonprofit Institutions Act [of 1938] indicates clearly that that Act was 
concerned with the suspicion that Robinson-Patman, at the time just recently enacted, actually 
might operate to outlaw price favors that sellers would wish to grant to eleemosynary institu-
tions”); KINTNER, supra note 19, § 25.9, at 464–65 (“Shortly after the passage of the Robin-
son-Patman Act in 1936, some concern was expressed that the new statute might prevent the 
offering of price concessions to educational and other non-profit institutions.”). 
 21. See Pollak, supra note 7, at 972 (“The exemption was meant to restore discounts 
that suppliers apparently had offered to the named institutions in furtherance of their charitable 
work, but which were withdrawn after enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act. . . . [T]he loss 
of discounts severely impacted their ability to function and survive.”). 
 22. Nonprofit Institutions Act of 1938, ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
13c (1994)). This antitrust exemption has received scant attention in the literature. Two lead-
ing treatises do provide extended discussions, but both discuss limited case law and indicate 
that many issues remain unsettled. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 
200 (noting “rather imprecise statutory language”); KINTNER, supra note 19, § 25.9, at 465 
(“This proviso [the Nonprofit Institutions Act] has given rise to several questions of interpreta-
tion.”). 
 23. KINTNER, supra note 19, § 25.9, at 469 (“[It is] clear that this statute is designed to 
perform an important affirmative role: to allow charitable institutions to operate flexibly and 
inexpensively, so that they may receive the benefit of lower prices, and pass them on to the per-
sons they serve.”). 
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“the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition”24 and 
then stated that the Nonprofit Institutions Act would not interfere 
with this purpose by “mak[ing] certain that favors in price which are 
occasionally extended to eleemosynary institutions, because of the 
character of the institution, do not fall under the ban of the [Robin-
son-Patman] Act.”25 Similarly, the committee report in the Senate 
noted, perhaps more directly, that “[t]he purpose of the Robinson-
Patman Act . . . does not seem to apply as to eleemosynary institu-
tions as they are not operated for profit.”26 As evidence that an ex-
emption was needed, both reports attached the same letter from an 
association of approximately two thousand and seven hundred vol-
untary nonprofit hospitals who “care [for] the needy sick.”27 The let-
ter stated that, because of the Robinson-Patman Act, “hospital sup-
ply bills are increasing about 20 percent,” and “many hospitals may 
have to close their doors[, placing] an almost impossible burden on 
Federal, State, and municipal institutions.”28 
With these concerns as background, in 1938 Congress enacted 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act, which provides in full: 
Nothing in the Act approved June 19, 1936, known as the Robin-
son-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, shall apply to purchases of 
their supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, 
public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions not 
operated for profit.29 
 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2161, at 1 (1938) (accompanying H.R. 8148). 
 25. Id. 
 26. S. REP. NO. 75-1769, at 1 (1938) (accompanying H.R. 8148). 
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 75-2161, at 2 (1938) (accompanying H.R. 8148; quoting letter 
from John H. Hayes, President, Hospital Bureau of Standards and Supplies (Dec. 18, 1937)); 
S. REP. NO. 75-1769, at 1–2 (1938) (same). 
 28. See supra note 27. This concern has resurfaced in the past few years, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. At least one commentator believes that the recent and increased competition in 
health care will discourage for-profit hospitals from providing charity care, all to the detriment 
of public hospitals that do. See Henry W. Zaretsky, Comment on: F.M. Scherer, “How U.S. 
Antitrust Can Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation,” 4 INT’L J. ECON. 
BUS. 271, 273 (1997). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1994). In its pharmaceutical industry price discrimination statute, 
Minnesota has a substantively identical provision: “Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to 
purchases for their own use by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospi-
tals or charitable institutions not operated for profit.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.061(i) (West 
1998). By contrast, Maine limits its analogous exception to charitable organizations that are 
“exempt from federal income taxation because [they] meet[] the requirements of the United 
States Internal Revenue Code, Section 501(c)(3) . . . .” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 
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Recently, the stakes have been raised when the Nonprofit Insti-
tutions Act exemption to illegal price discrimination is at issue. Some 
drug manufacturers, seeking to design price-favored distribution 
channels, have required price-favored purchasers to sign “own use” 
clauses by which the purchasers impliedly agree not to resell pharma-
ceutical products to buyers in price-disfavored channels of distribu-
tion, a practice known as “diversion.” Some price-favored purchasers 
who have disregarded these contractual restrictions have been 
charged with criminal violations of federal mail and wire fraud stat-
utes.30 The legality of the “own use” contractual restrictions, and the 
propriety of enforcing those restrictions in civil or criminal actions, 
depend upon a correct understanding of the exemption provided by 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
The discussion continues, in Part II, by briefly describing the 
practice of price discrimination used by some drug companies when 
they sell pharmaceutical products.31 While suppliers in other indus-
 
13804(4) (West 1999). 
 30. See United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Central to the 
charges was the claim that defendants defrauded drug manufacturers by obtaining pharmaceu-
ticals at highly discounted prices by falsely representing that the pharmaceuticals would be used 
solely by nursing home patients, although defendants intended all the while to divert the drugs 
to wholesalers in violation of the own-use restrictions.”); United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 
957, 958 (10th Cir. 1989) (“According to the superseding indictment, the defendant devised 
a scheme to obtain pharmaceuticals from drug manufacturers at reduced prices by representing 
that the drugs were being purchased for use in hospitals, when in fact the defendant intended 
to sell the drugs to various wholesalers.”); United States v. Ferro, No. 99-00180-0104-CR-W-
SOW, 2000 WL 33394614, at *4 (W.D. Mo. May 8, 2000) (order dismissing indictment) 
[hereinafter Ferro I] (“The charges against the defendants in this case stem from an underlying 
premise that defendants defrauded pharmaceutical manufacturers by signing contracts contain-
ing ‘own use’ clauses in which they represented that the discounted pharmaceutical products 
would be dispensed only for nursing home patients and then selling those products to com-
mercial wholesalers.”), rev’d, 252 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Ferro II], cert. de-
nied, 2002 US LEXIS 279 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2002); United States v. Almanza, No. 98-CR-55S, ¶ 
10, at 4–5 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 1998) (alleging that defendants purchased pharmaceutical prod-
ucts at “greatly reduced prices by falsely representing that . . . the purchasing pharmacies ser-
viced institutions such as nursing homes” but then sold those products “to pharmaceutical 
wholesalers for profit”); see also United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (1985) (involving 
RICO and mail fraud allegations where pharmaceutical products were diverted from the export 
market into the domestic market). 
 31. Because this article uses examples from the pharmaceutical industry, the article has 
implications for the ongoing public policy debate surrounding prescription drugs. The article is 
not intended to spawn implications that go beyond price discrimination issues that arise under 
the Robinson-Patman Act and the Nonprofit Institutions Act. For example, the article is not 
concerned with issues that may arise under regulations of the wholesale distribution of drugs 
authorized by the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 21 U.S.C. § 353(e) (1994). See 
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tries have engaged in price discrimination and sought the benefits of 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption,32 the pharmaceutical in-
dustry provides a useful background for the discussion of the exemp-
tion’s statutory requirements in Part III.33 Part IV addresses two ad-
ditional concerns not anticipated by the language of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act. The article concludes in Part V by discussing impli-
cations, not only for those who design distribution systems under the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act, but also for those who ask the courts to 
enforce those distribution systems. 
 
generally Melody Petersen, When Good Drugs Go Gray: Booming Underground Market 
Raises Safety Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at C1. This article is not concerned with 
the issues relating to whether the overall profit margins of pharmaceutical companies are suffi-
cient both to pay for the fixed costs of research and development and to provide adequate in-
centives for further research and development. See KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 21–22 (noting 
that public policy debates surrounding pharmaceutical prices most often focus upon industry’s 
claim of “need to generate research funding”); Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 
13, at 97 (discussing issues in pricing, profit margins, and research and development). This 
article is not concerned with the extent to which patent protection permits discriminatory pric-
ing by the patentee. See Peter Zweifel, Comment on: F.M. Scherer, “How US Antitrust Can 
Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation”, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 277 
(1997) (suggesting benefits of price discrimination by patentee drug manufacturer and that 
organizational innovations should be treated the same). Nor is this article concerned with spe-
cial price discrimination laws or other price regulations that are directed solely to the pharma-
ceutical industry. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT COMMITTEE, 
DRUG PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 17–26 (1996) (fed-
eral proposals and state enactments) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST SECTION COMMITTEE 
REPORT]. For an economic study of a range of issues in the pharmaceutical industry, see 
SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 336–90. 
 32. See Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1967) (bowling 
alley equipment); Students Book Co. v. Wash. Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955) 
(academic books); Bridges v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Me. 
1998) (school portrait photography); Lago & Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood, Inc., No. 92-
200-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12909 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 1994) (milk); Computronics, Inc., v. 
Apple Computer, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (personal computers). 
 33. The pharmaceutical industry provides a unique background to the extent that, in 
addition to antitrust policy, there are other federal and state policies that come into play when 
examining pricing issues in the pharmaceutical industry, especially issues pertaining to prescrip-
tion drugs. See generally ROY LEVY, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF 
CHANGE 9–24 (1999) (reviewing other federal and state policies); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31 (review of other federal and state efforts to regulate price 
discrimination in the pharmaceutical industry); SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 
13, at 82–83 (discussing state and federal laws affecting substitution of generic for branded 
drugs). 
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II. PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
In the pharmaceutical industry, two basic types of distribution 
channels have developed in the domestic market for pharmaceutical 
products.34 One channel is for drugs sold to health care institutions 
for use solely by patients in that institution. This channel oftentimes 
is called a “closed door” distribution channel perhaps because, once 
the drugs are inside the institution, the institution’s doors are closed, 
and the drugs may not be sold in competition with retail outlets or 
 
 34. The distinction in the text segregates channels of distribution into two groups de-
pending upon price differences. Within each group, however, there may be a variety of ways to 
structure a channel of distribution. For an overview of the various entities that may participate 
in a channel of distribution, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
31, at 5–7. Another and distinct channel of distribution is for pharmaceutical products des-
tined for export. Here, drug manufacturers may engage in price discrimination because the 
Robinson-Patman Act, by its own terms, does not apply to commodities destined for export. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994) (limiting coverage to sales in which “such commodities are sold 
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District 
of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United 
States”); see also United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (“By its 
terms, the [Robinson-Patman] Act does not cover sales of goods for export.”). Thus, the Rob-
inson-Patman Act is not offended if a United States drug manufacturer charges a lower price 
for pharmaceutical products that will be exported. For example, in a case where a seller located 
in the United States sold at a lower price to a buyer also located in the United States, the court 
held “that if all the sales by Barmatic to Fimex were for resale abroad, the Robinson-Patman 
Act does not apply regardless of the location of the plaintiff or the defendant.” Fimex Corp. v. 
Barmatic Prods. Co., 429 F. Supp. 978, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
Reports in the popular press indicate that drug manufacturers grant significant price fa-
vors on pharmaceutical products destined for export. See generally Lynette S. Pisone, Com-
ment, The Political Debate Concerning Discriminating Pricing Practices Within Health Care 
Reform, 4 J. PHARM. & L. 63, 73–74 (1994) (noting that although “[d]rug manufacturers 
often come under fire concerning the differentials between the prescription drugs prices of the 
United States and those lower prices offered in other countries,” evidence suggests that any 
price differences turn upon the particular drug and whether the country is industrialized or 
developing); Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 111–12 & 111 n.18 (arguing 
that while lower prices in less developed countries may be due to weaker patent protection, 
“there are hints that demand is more income-elastic in less developed nations and less elastic in 
the more prosperous nations”); SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 385 
(“comparisons showing that identical branded drugs cost much more in the United States than 
in many foreign nations”). When this happens, a price-favored purchaser who obtains pharma-
ceutical products for export might also engage in diversion and sell to domestic buyers who 
otherwise would pay a higher price. At least one group of price-favored purchasers who ob-
tained pharmaceutical products for export but diverted those products have also been con-
victed of criminal violations of federal mail and wire fraud statutes. Weinstein, 762 F.2d at 
1527. 
For a brief overview of the history of retailing in the pharmaceutical industry, see 
Scherer, Prescription Drug Litigation, supra note 7, at 240–46. 
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to customers who are not patients of the institution.35 The other 
channel of distribution is for drugs that are sold to retail outlets 
without any restriction on resale. This channel oftentimes is called an 
“open door” distribution channel perhaps because, once the drugs 
are sold to the retail outlet, the outlet’s doors are open, and the 
drugs may be resold in competition with retail outlets and without 
regard to where customers might be patients.36 
A. Two-Tiered Pricing 
Drug manufacturers typically charge different prices for the same 
pharmaceutical product depending upon the channel of distribu-
tion.37 The “closed door” channel is the price-favored channel be-
 
 35. Ferro I, 2000 WL 33394614, at *2 (“One channel of distribution is called a ‘closed 
door’ channel because once the purchaser receives the pharmaceutical products, its doors are 
closed to any sale in competition with the manufacturer. . . . An example of a ‘closed door’ 
channel would be a pharmacy in a not-for-profit hospital where the pharmacy only dispenses 
drugs to people who are patients in the hospital and would not sell them to walk-in customers 
or others; their doors are closed to any customers who might come in from the outside.”) (ci-
tations to record omitted). 
 36. See id. at *2 (“The other channel of distribution is the ‘open door’ channel. In this 
channel, once the purchaser receives the pharmaceutical products, its doors are open to any 
customer who may walk in. . . . An example of an ‘open door’ channel would be a retail phar-
macy.”) (citations to record omitted). 
 37. “A notable example of differential pricing is the so-called ‘two-tiered pricing struc-
ture’ under which pharmaceutical companies set lower prices to large buyers like hospitals, 
HMOs and PBMs, and charge higher prices to other buyers that include the uninsured and 
independent and chain retail pharmacies.” LEVY, supra note 33, at 75 (footnotes omitted); see 
also Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation: Comments on 
Scherer, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 265, 266 (1997) (stating that in a recent case, “testimony by 
individuals associated with the [drug] manufacturers [was] that a two-tiered pricing system was 
viewed by those in the industry as ‘the appropriate practice’”). 
Two-tiered pricing in the pharmaceutical industry has persisted for some time. See ABA 
ANTITRUST SECTION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 17 n.47 (citing Small Business 
Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Agencies, 90th 
Cong. 197 (1967) and H.R. No. 1983, 90th Cong. 79 (1968) (concluding that price dis-
crimination existed against retail druggists)). There are, of course, other ways to characterize 
the ways that the pharmaceutical industry discriminates in price: “[T]here are, in fact, several 
pharmaceutical markets, each with its own set of prices and pricing methods. There are retail, 
hospital, and managed care markets; branded and generic markets; and chronic and acute mar-
kets. Each is approached somewhat differently.” KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 29–30; see also 
Weinstein, 762 F.2d at 1527 (price differences also distinguish the export from the domestic 
channels of distribution: “[P]harmaceutical manufacturers maintain a bifurcated pricing struc-
ture. . . . A much lower price is quoted for sales to exporters . . . .”). There are a variety of ways 
that drug manufacturers effectively charge different prices. For example, there are “prescription 
drug rebate programs for HMO and PBM organizations, and special prices for Medicaid re-
cipients.” LEVY, supra note 33, at 75. 
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cause drug manufacturers charge lower prices to purchasers in the 
“closed door” channel.38 The “open door” channel is the price-
disfavored channel because drug manufacturers charge higher prices 
to purchasers in the “open door” channel.39 
At times, the different prices diverge to such a degree that the 
difference does not appear to be based upon different costs of pro-
duction, distribution, or marketing.40 For example, one case noted 
that purchasers in the “closed door” channel pay as little as twenty-
five percent of the price charged to purchasers in the “open door” 
channel.41 More recently, the popular press has increasingly reported 
 
Another mechanism for drug companies to charge different prices is by way of forward 
vertical integration when acquiring pharmacy benefit management (PBM) services which ad-
minister prescription drug delivery for health insurance programs. See LEVY, supra note 33, at 
3, 34–36 (March 1999) (discussing vertical integration into PBM market). This presents the 
possibility for a drug manufacturer to charge a lower, internal price to its wholly owned PBM 
than the drug manufacturer charges purchasers in the “open door” distribution channel. See 
also id. at 45 n.107 (“Mail order pharmacies, particularly the pharmacies under the control of 
PBMs, continue to expand in competition with chain and independent retail pharmacies.”) 
PBMs and other health care organizations, however, have integrated information technology 
and, consequently, achieved efficiencies. See id. at 43–71. This mechanism might still raise 
price discrimination concerns because, under the Robinson-Patman Act, a sale by a controlled 
or owned subsidiary may be treated as a sale by the corporate parent. ABA SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 441 & n.76 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS] (“[F]ailure to treat a parent and its subsidiary as the ‘same 
seller’ might enable firms to evade the Robinson-Patman Act by the simple device of selling to 
the disfavored customers through a subsidiary.”) (citing Caribe BMW, Inc. v. BMW, 19 F.3d 
745, 750 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
 38. Ferro I, 2000 WL 33394614, at *2 (“Manufacturers sell at a low price in the ‘closed 
door’ channel.”). 
 39. See id. (“Manufacturers sell their pharmaceutical products at a higher price in the 
‘open door’ channel.”). In addition, within each of the two general types of distribution chan-
nels discussed in the text, there may be further price differences. See Pisone, supra note 34, at 
78 (“Those opposed to the manufacturers’ pricing techniques have taken their stance and they 
do not intend to stop until one manufacturer is no longer able to justify sending out the same 
product, on the same day, with eight to sixteen different prices under the guise of cost-savings, 
classification, or economies of sale.”) (footnote omitted); Weinstein & Culbertson, supra note 
10, at 258 (summarizing judicial findings regarding tiered pricing system in which retail phar-
macies were price-disfavored). 
 40. See also KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 2–3 (“Legislation and litigation have forced 
[pharmaceutical] companies to reconsider the [market] segments they had previously identi-
fied, but few have done more than simply reclassify groups into new segments and establish 
arbitrary guidelines for discounting within each segment.”). 
 41. United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 659 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[D]rug manufactur-
ers sell pharmaceuticals to institutional [“closed door”] pharmacies at prices that may be as low 
as twenty-five percent of the prices at which the companies sell drugs to other [“open door”] 
customers.”) Similarly, one study noted “[t]he common practice whereby the community retail 
pharmacy [“open door” channel] pays prices thirty to ninety percent higher than hospitals, 
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on the dramatic differences in the prices of pharmaceutical products 
sold by retail outlets in the United States and the same products 
from the same manufacturers sold in other contexts. In these con-
texts as well, the dramatic differences in price do not appear based 
upon different costs of production, distribution, or marketing.42 As 
the Supreme Court noted some time ago in an analogous context, 
“The [House] Subcommittee found that the difference between 
drug prices for retailers and government customers ‘is extremely sub-
stantial’ and ‘not always fully explainable by either cost justifiable 
quantity discounts, economies of scale, or other factors inherent in 
bulk distribution.’”43 
There are several reasons why drug manufacturers might charge 
different prices to different purchasers.44 Recent trends in the health 
care industry have created large, institutional purchasers.45 Drug 
 
clinics, HMO’s, mail-order pharmacies and other large purchasers for the same quantity of the 
same product.” Pisone, supra note 34, at 82 (footnote omitted). The same study, at another 
point, noted that, “Prucare, a buying group for hospital pharmacies, on average paid prices 
fifty-nine percent lower than wholesale prices made available to community retail pharmacies 
[“open door” channel] for the exact same product. ‘One-fifth of the prescription drugs were 
priced at 82 percent or more below the average community retail wholesale price.’” Id. at 89 
(quoting Press Release, Newswire Ass’n, Inc., Drug Makers Asked by Retail Pharmacy Coali-
tion to Support Effort to End Discriminatory Prices (Aug. 11, 1993)). 
 42. One study, for example, spoke in terms of “the excessive discounts afforded to the 
HMO’s, hospitals, etc.” Pisone, supra note 34, at 73 (emphasis added). 
 43. Jefferson County Pharm. Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 165 (1983) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 90-1983, at 77 (1968)). 
 44. Regardless of the particular strategy that drives the reason for price differentials, the 
bottom line is that, by charging different prices to different customers, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers can increase profits. See Pisone, supra note 34, at 65 (“Discriminatory pricing prac-
tices, or cost shifting, has made drug manufacturing one of the most lucrative businesses in the 
marketplace.”). 
 45. “The number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the U.S. increased 
from 235 in 1980 to 749 in 1996, and enrollment in these cost-containment organizations 
expanded from 9,100,000 to 77,300,000 over the same period. Pharmacy benefit managers 
(PBMs), which administer prescription drug delivery under health insurance plans, managed 
the drug benefits of some 161 million people according to a 1998 report, up from 60 million 
in 1989. Both HMOs and PBMs utilize a variety of techniques made possible by the advances 
in information technology to contain the costs of prescription drugs, including drug formular-
ies, generic substitution, and therapeutic interchange programs.” LEVY, supra note 33, at 3–4 
(footnotes omitted); see also id. at 25–27 (discussing growth of managed care organizations 
and their cost containment initiatives); Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 98–
99 (“Third-party reimbursement plans operated by the government and private insurers have 
expanded to cover an estimated 44 percent of prescription drug outlays in 1987, up from 28 
percent in 1977.”) (citation omitted); Harrison, supra note 37, at 266 (“Structural changes on 
the buying side of the market occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These changes 
meant that manufacturers were faced with buyers possessing significant buying or monopsony 
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manufacturers may provide price discounts to large, institutional 
purchasers simply because of the bargaining power of large, institu-
tional purchasers.46 Or, drug manufacturers may provide price favors 
 
power.”) 
By way of comparison, a reason cited as to why prescription drug prices in some foreign 
countries are lower than those sold by competitive retail outlets in the United States is that 
some foreign governments act as institutional purchasers for their nationalized health care sys-
tems. Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 108–09 (“Many nations with exten-
sive governmental health care programs bring their substantial purchasing power to bear on 
the prices . . . effect[ively] forcing the drug-makers to price-discriminate across geographic 
markets.”). Seeking to gain a like advantage for its citizens who live just across the border from 
Canada, Maine recently announced that it was exploring the possibility of becoming an institu-
tional buyer of prescription drugs. Id. at 110 (discussing price effects Canadian compulsory 
licensing of drug patents); SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 380–82 
(1996) (discussing price effects of Canadian compulsory licensing and of requirements to sub-
stitute generic drugs). For a discussion of the economic forces that, in the 1980s, led large, 
institutional purchasers to control the rising costs of pharmaceuticals through restrictive 
formularies, drug utilization reviews, and service substitution, see KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 
13–19. 
 46. As one noted economist has summarized: “[D]uring the 1980s new health care or-
ganizations in the United States began exercising countervailing power to wrest appreciable 
price discounts from the producers of patented and branded drug products. Lacking equivalent 
power and perhaps also, at least at first, the incentive to change their formulaic price-setting, 
retail pharmacists were unable to elicit matching discounts.” Scherer, Prescription Drug Litiga-
tion, supra note 7, at 239; see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 31, at 8–9 (“According to one estimate, the number of Americans covered by managed 
pharmacy benefit programs more than doubled from about 57 million in 1989 to 115 million 
in 1994. As of April 1993, more than 50% of prescription drug sales were influenced in some 
way by managed care programs.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 12 (“For example, health plans 
and PBMs [pharmaceutical benefit managers] motivated by cost-containment objectives have 
insisted that manufacturers reduce prices to compete for patients covered by these plans. Many 
manufacturers have offered health plans, PBMs, and hospitals rebates or discounts based on the 
volume of prescriptions written for that manufacturer’s drugs or the volume of that manufac-
turer’s drugs sold through the formulary. In other cases, rebates or discounts are conditioned 
on a certain product (or products) being included on a formulary, in some cases, as the exclu-
sive drugs(s) in particular therapeutic classes.”) (footnotes omitted); Weinstein & Culbertson, 
supra note 10, at 261 (managed care organizations demand discounts for drugs to be included 
in formulary). 
One study has noted that the pharmaceutical companies object to price controls be-
cause, in a competitive environment of negotiations with individual institutions, “the industry 
will have to vie for prized business opportunities such as HMO’s and hospitals.” Pisone, supra 
note 34, at 72. The clear implication is that, through these individual negotiations for large 
accounts, drug manufacturers will grant price favors to obtain contracts with large, institutional 
purchasers. 
The preface to a recent study notes that one of the “major changes” that “sent a shock” 
to the “pricing environment” of pharmaceuticals was “the emergence of managed care and 
hospital buying groups [that] gave rise to new concerns about price sensitivity.” KOLASSA, su-
pra note 16, at xi. One result, noted in the same study, is that, after lowering prices on new 
products, “[n]ational account groups then set to work discounting from these already lower 
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for marketing reasons.47 One case suggested, for example, that drug 
manufacturers charged lower prices to institutional purchasers to ob-
tain brand loyalty by introducing doctors and patients to a branded 
pharmaceutical product in a low-price, institutional setting with the 
hopes that the same doctors and patients will continue to prescribe 
and purchase the same brand in a high-price, non-institutional set-
ting.48 Both of these reasons might explain why drug manufacturers 
 
prices.” Id. The same study later critiques, from a profit-maximizing perspective, the practice 
of granting discounts to “managed care and other buyers perceived to be large and influen-
tial.” Id. at 8; see also Pisone, supra note 34, at 67 (“[M]ail order houses and the like are pur-
chasing pharmaceuticals at unbelievably low prices while the retail pharmacy pays increasingly 
higher prices. . . . [O]rganizations such as hospitals, nursing homes, HMO’s and the mail  
order houses . . . have imperiled the prosperity of the retail pharmacy . . . . ”) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
One result is that retail pharmacies have started to combine into purchasing groups in 
order to obtain the bargaining power of large institutions. Id. at 88–89. For additional indica-
tions that large, institutional buyers receive price favors, see Costanzo, 4 F.3d at 659 (“One 
reason that drug manufacturers offer institutional pharmacies low prices is that manufacturers 
recognize that the amount that insurance companies and the government, which pay for many 
of the patients in institutions, will reimburse for pharmaceuticals is relatively low.”); Scherer, 
Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 106–08 (discussing federal statutory and other ef-
forts to obtain discounts and suppressed prices); see also SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, 
supra note 13, at 378–79 (1996) (“Erosion [of branded drugs’ prices] was greater for drugs 
with particularly high sales to hospitals, which avidly embrace cost-saving opportunities 
through generic purchases, and for the subset of drugs taken by injection, whose use is pre-
ponderantly within hospitals.”); id. at 385–86 (describing rebate and lost containment re-
quirements for drug manufacturers to keep branded drugs eligible for federally supported cost 
reimbursements). Of course, price favors to the government are exempted from the Robinson-
Patman Act by virtue of the so-called government entity exemption. See supra note 19. 
 47. A recent study identified many business rationales that might lead drug manufactur-
ers to discriminate in price, including profit maximization by selling at different prices to cus-
tomers with different elasticities of demand, FTC STUDY, supra note 33, at 74, 82–83; price 
discounts to encourage prescribing physicians to switch from one brand to another, id. at 80; 
price discounts to help introduce new drugs, id. at 84; price discounts to discourage health 
care providers to substitute different therapeutic alternatives, id. at 91–92; and price discounts 
to provide discounts as payment for services, id. at 90–91. The study also quotes from a judi-
cial opinion which suggests that a pharmaceutical seller may have been offered price discounts 
to institutional purchasers so that the seller would not be foreclosed from physicians who can 
only prescribe prescription drugs purchased by the institution. See id. at 90 (quoting In re 
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4335 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 1996)); see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust 
Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A wholesaler is compensated for the warehousing 
and other functions that he performs in the distribution of his drugs through the difference 
between the price that he pays his supplier and the price at which he resells to retailers.”). 
 48. Costanzo, 4 F.3d at 659 (“[D]rug manufacturers [who offer institutional pharma-
cies low prices] want doctors in institutions to be able to prescribe the manufacturer’s drugs, 
since this increases the chances that the doctors will prescribe the same drugs to patients the 
doctor sees in other contexts. . . . [The] manufacturers [also] hope that patients who are 
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charge lower prices to institutional purchasers in the “closed door” 
channel while charging higher prices to purchasers in the “open 
door” channel.49 
Another reason why drug manufacturers might charge different 
prices for prescription drugs is because of different demand charac-
teristics associated with the purchasers typically found in each chan-
nel of distribution.50 If this theory explains the practice, purchasers in 
the “closed door” channel have a relatively elastic demand for drugs, 
that is, they are relatively price sensitive.51 These purchasers will not 
and, perhaps, cannot purchase drugs at higher prices. A typical pur-
chaser in the “closed door” channel would be a not-for-profit insti-
 
treated with a certain drug in an institutional setting will continue to use that particular medi-
cation after they are released from the institution.”) One study suggests that this marketing 
strategy is successful because “the physician is not always aware of the existence of the generic 
substitution” and, consequently, may write a prescription in a way that prohibits the pharma-
cist from providing anything other than the branded product. Pisone, supra note 34, at 87–88 
(noting difference, in 1992, of $57.36 for branded Inderoll and $1.84 for generic equivalent); 
see also Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 98 (“The menu of drugs is so vast 
and complex that few physicians can inform themselves fully about the available alternatives.”); 
SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 373 (after physician prescription and 
pharmacist substitution, “generic substitution occurred in at most 25 percent of the cases for 
which it is feasible”). For a critique, from a view favoring profit-maximizing for drug compa-
nies, of using price discounts to introduce a new pharmaceutical product, see KOLASSA, supra 
note 16, at 2–7. 
Another point to make in this regard is that, where a brand-name prescription drug en-
joys patent protection, after patent protection ends the drug manufacturer may enjoy a first-
mover advantage in the form of a lingering brand preference over generic alternatives. See 
Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 100 (discussing “reputational advantage 
enjoyed by the original [patented] drug”). Of course, a first-mover or reputational advantage 
can be exploited in ways that do not require price discrimination. See also SCHERER, 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 371–72 (evidence that first-mover advantage allows 
pharmaceutical innovator to maintain high prices after low-price generics introduced). 
 49. Another case has suggested that “in many instances pharmaceutical manufacturers 
used nonprofit and export organizations as a ‘dumping-ground’ for pharmaceutical products 
nearing expiration.” United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985). While 
this might identify an added benefit for an established, lower-priced channel of distribution, it 
does not provide a complete explanation for the original decision to establish a lower-priced 
channel of distribution. 
 50. See KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 2–3 (noting that, although different market seg-
ments have different degrees of price sensitivity, “too much attention has been paid to inter-
mediaries in the distributive process that have wrongly been classified as market segments”); 
Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 101 (“[I]t is not too extreme an oversim-
plification to suppose that when generic substitutes exist, the world of drug buyers consists of 
two quite different groups—those who are price-sensitive and those who are not.”). 
 51. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
15 (1996) (“A good for which a small percentage change in price causes a large percentage 
change in quantity demanded is called ‘elastic.’”). 
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tution that cannot pass costs through to the consuming patient and, 
therefore, operates at the lowest cost possible.52 By contrast, pur-
chasers in the “closed door” channel have a relatively inelastic de-
mand for drugs, that is, they are relatively price insensitive.53 These 
purchasers can and will purchase drugs at higher prices provided, of 
course, that they can pass the increased costs through to their cus-
tomers.54 A typical purchaser in the “open door” channel would be a 
retail pharmacy that is a for-profit business that passes its costs 
through to the consuming patient and seeks to maximize profits sub-
ject, of course, to the constraints of competition.55 
If different prices are based upon different demand characteris-
tics, an important point is that the price discrimination strategy is ac-
tually based upon the demand characteristics of the ultimate con-
sumers, the patients.56 The initial purchasers are the pharmacies or 
 
 52. The fact that there are other kinds of institutional purchasers who routinely receive 
price favors from drug manufacturers suggests that this is not the theory followed by drug 
manufacturers when selecting purchasers who receive price discounts. See LEVY, supra note 33, 
at 74 (“Drug companies have also offered larger discounts to hospitals and other managed care 
providers.”). Of course, not all hospitals and managed care providers are operated not for 
profit. 
 53. See SEIDENFELD, supra note 51, at 15 (“A good for which a large percentage 
change in price causes only a small percentage change in quantity demanded is called ‘inelas-
tic.’”). 
 54. A recent study provided some reasons why some patients who purchase in the “open 
door” channel of distribution pay more for prescription drugs: “The economic literature sug-
gests that physicians do not necessarily act in the best interest of consumers when making cost 
effective drug choices. Physicians face information processing limitations that impede their abil-
ity to choose efficiently among available treatment options. Further . . . third-party insurance 
without adequate cost controls makes consumers and others less likely to contain their pre-
scription drug expenditures.” LEVY, supra note 33, at 57 (footnote omitted). 
 55. Of course, there may be intermediaries such as wholesalers and distributors, but 
where these intermediaries are also for-profit organizations, they will not only pass their costs 
on to their purchasers, but also compete with each other with a view to garnering increased 
profits from retail druggists. For a description and chart which shows the potential complexity 
of the arrangements that may be used when prescription drugs are purchased at a retail outlet 
in conjunction with a benefits program, see LEVY, supra note 33, at 45–47. 
 56. One might argue that, because many health care purchasing decisions are made by 
health care institutions, the demand characteristics of patients are less important. See KOLASSA, 
supra note 16, at 23 (“Although the concept of willingness [of patients] to pay is compelling, 
we must admit that, because of the distortions in our health care system due to differences in 
payment sources for health care and the lack of direct decision-making authority for patients, 
such measures may not only be impracticable but also misleading.”) Nonetheless, patients ul-
timately pay for health care and pharmaceuticals, whether through insurance premiums paid 
directly or through wage reductions so that employers purchase insurance on employees’ be-
half. Consequently, at some point, the demand characteristics of patients come into play. See 
also id. at 25 (“Differences in reimbursement status dramatically alter the levels of price sensi-
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other institutions that, in turn, resell or provide pharmaceutical 
products to the ultimate purchasers, the consuming patients. The 
demand characteristics of the initial purchasers are derived from the 
demand characteristics of their consuming patients.57 Initial purchas-
ers in the “closed door” channel do not pay higher prices because 
they cannot pass along higher prices to patients who have a relatively 
elastic demand and are relatively price sensitive. By contrast, initial 
purchasers in the “open door” channel do pay higher prices because 
they can pass along higher prices to patients who have a relatively 
inelastic demand and are relatively price insensitive. If this is the the-
ory, the price discrimination strategy is based, not so much upon as-
signing purchasing institutions to one distribution channel or an-
other, but rather upon segregating purchasing institutions according 
to the different demand characteristics of the kinds of patients to 
whom those institutions resell or provide pharmaceutical products.58 
If drug manufacturers charge different prices because of the dif-
ferent demand characteristics of different kinds of consuming pa-
tients, the manufacturers will increase profits and, at the same time, 
increase consumer welfare by expanding output.59 Consumers with 
different demand characteristics who are asked to pay different prices 
will react differently in terms of the quantity of goods that they pur-
 
tivity and the economic effects of a [pharmaceutical] product.”). 
 57. See 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 813 (1987) 
(“[D]emand for intermediate goods is derived from the demand for the final goods they help 
produce.”). 
 58. This point may not be fully appreciated by the pharmaceutical industry. A recent 
study noted, from a perspective favoring profit-maximizing for drug companies, that, while 
market segments exhibit different degrees of price sensitivity, “intermediaries . . . have wrongly 
been classified as market segments.” KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 2–3. Perhaps this shortcoming 
derives from perception that pharmaceutical consumers are less involved in purchasing deci-
sions than typical consumers. See id. at 22 (“[M]ost pharmaceutical purchases are directed 
purchases and . . . few patients can correctly be considered well-informed consumers.”). 
 59. See generally BORK, supra note 9, at 394–98. Interestingly, this point was made in 
the context of the pharmaceutical industry by noting the impact when the government legis-
lated access to the best prices and thereby disrupted the price discrimination strategy of drug 
manufacturers by apparently leading those manufacturers to raise the price of their discounted 
products: 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 90) effectively penalized 
companies for providing discounts. The government’s attempt to share in those dis-
counts had the effect of changing the economics of discounting, reducing the value 
of many customers when Medicaid rebates were calculated. The net result was the 
significant reduction of discounting activities in the pharmaceutical market, which 
reduced the revenue expected to be generated by the rebates. 
KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 26 (footnote omitted). 
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chase. The twin antitrust goals of consumer welfare and output 
maximization are advanced where those who pay higher prices have a 
relatively inelastic demand and, consequently, are relatively price in-
sensitive. By definition, consumers with a relatively inelastic demand 
and price insensitivity will not significantly change the quantity of 
goods that they purchase if they pay higher prices. They will pur-
chase roughly the same amount even if price increases. Those who 
pay lower prices should have a relatively elastic demand and, conse-
quently, greater price sensitivity. By definition, consumers with a 
relatively elastic demand and price sensitivity will significantly in-
crease the quantity of goods that they purchase if they pay lower 
prices. They will purchase a significant amount more if price de-
creases. If drug manufacturers engage in a strategy of price discrimi-
nation based upon different demand characteristics, these manufac-
turers increase quantity and maximize profits by charging a higher 
price to inelastic and price insensitive purchasers in the “open door” 
channel while charging a lower price to elastic and price sensitive 
purchasers in the “closed door” channel. The price insensitive pur-
chasers will continue to purchase roughly the same amount at a 
higher price, while the price sensitive purchasers will now purchase 
more at a lower price.60 
By contrast, while the other proffered reasons for charging dif-
ferent prices may lead to increased profits, there is no assurance that 
those reasons for charging different prices will increase consumer 
welfare by expanding output. The fact that a large, institutional pur-
 
 60. Robert Bork succinctly explains, 
The basic theory of price discrimination is quite simple. A monopolist faces a sloping 
demand curve. The market demand, however, is likely to be a composite of widely 
differing demands of individual customers. Such demands are said to be relatively 
elastic if price changes result in relatively large changes in the amount of the product 
demanded, and relatively inelastic if price changes produce smaller effects on 
amounts demanded. A monopolist who is moderately thoughtful about his self-
interest will realize that he could increase net revenues if he could segregate his cus-
tomers according to the elasticities of their demands. The reason is obvious. When 
the demand elasticities of customers are different, no single price can extract the 
maximum return from each. If they can be segregated so one class of customers 
cannot resell to the other, the monopolist can charge them different prices and so 
extract the maximum return from each class. 
BORK, supra note 9, at 396–97; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Distribu-
tion and Pricing of Prescription Drugs, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 287, 292 (1997) (describing 
price discrimination in same terms and noting that welfare effects are “an ‘extremely complex’ 
matter” (quoting Scherer, Prescription Drug Litigation, supra note 7, at 253)). 
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chaser has bargaining power does not necessarily imply that the 
large, institutional purchaser sells to consumers who have relatively 
elastic demand characteristics and therefore are relatively price sensi-
tive. In fact, where a large, institutional purchaser operates for profit 
and seeks to maximize profits by, inter alia, raising the price at which 
it resells pharmaceutical products, the implication would seem to be 
that, to generate those profits, consuming patients have relatively 
inelastic demand characteristics and are relatively price insensitive.61 
If different prices are used as a marketing device to gain brand loyalty 
that transfers from one context to another, any consumer welfare jus-
tification seems implausible. Consumers who initially pay a low price 
in an institutional context do not change their demand characteris-
tics simply because those same consumers subsequently find them-
selves in a non-institutional setting and, for that reason, pay a higher 
price. Both proffered reasons fall short of assuring an increase in con-
sumer welfare because a consumer welfare justification turns, not 
upon whether a lower price is charged to institutions, but rather 
upon whether a lower price is charged to those kinds of institutions 
that resell to consumers with relatively elastic demand characteristics. 
B. Arbitrage and “Own Use” Clauses 
Crucial to any system of price discrimination, whether aimed at 
increasing consumer welfare or not, is the need to prevent arbitrage, 
a practice also known as diversion. This is the practice by which a 
purchaser who buys at the lower price is able to resell or divert to 
those who are willing to pay a higher price.62 The reseller who en-
 
 61. This point was made in a recent commentary about price discrimination in the 
pharmaceutical industry: 
A drug manufacturer does not separate its consumers into groups with predisposi-
tions for high or low demand elasticities as is done in the textbook model of mo-
nopolistic third-degree price discrimination. Rather, it is hospitals, HMOs, and 
PBMs who actually separate customers. Moreover, the separation achieved between 
consumers who qualify for low prices and those that do not has nothing to do with 
the underlying demand elasticities of the consumers themselves. Qualifying for low 
prices only has to do with who controls a consumer’s pharmacy benefits. 
Elzinga & Mills, supra note 60, at 292. 
 62. In economic terms, the need to prevent arbitrage arises because the competitive so-
lution does not naturally result in separating equilibria in which consumers pay different prices 
for different product configurations. Such a result happens where there is little, if any, cross 
elasticity between the different product configurations. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ET. AL., 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 154 (1994) (indicating that high-risk insureds purchase higher 
priced insurance policies). Consider, for example, two consumers who are purchasing vehicles. 
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gages in arbitrage will be successful whenever the reseller can cover 
costs and earn a profit while charging less than the supplier charges 
price-disfavored purchasers.63 Those purchasers who were willing to 
pay a higher price to the supplier now pay, instead, a lower price to 
the reseller. If the supplier subsequently responds by competing with 
the reseller, price competition will cause a downward pressure on 
price until every purchaser, in both channels of distribution, pays the 
same, lower price. Thus, a supplier who pursues a price discrimina-
tion strategy must prevent arbitrage for the strategy to be successful 
in the marketplace.64 
Consequently, suppliers who pursue a price discrimination strat-
egy must design distribution systems that prevent arbitrage, or diver-
sion, from the low-price distribution channel into the high-price dis-
tribution channel.65 Contract provisions that prevent such arbitrage 
are integral to the success of the price discrimination strategy. For 
example, drug manufacturers may try to prevent arbitrage by insert-
ing clauses into their contracts with purchasers that prevent purchas-
ers from diverting, that is, selling outside of the lower priced, “closed 
door” channel and into the higher priced, “open door” channel.66 A 
 
One owns a horse ranch and needs a vehicle that can carry hay bales and other feed. This con-
sumer purchases a pickup truck, a relatively lower priced vehicle. The other consumer enjoys 
driving on winding roads and also wants to make a fashion statement. This consumer purchases 
a foreign sports car, a relatively higher priced vehicle. Here, there is no need to prevent arbi-
trage, or diversion, because a purchaser of a pickup truck would not be able to resell that vehi-
cle, even at a lower price, to the sports car enthusiast because the sports car enthusiast needs a 
different kind of vehicle. Because sports car consumers and pickup consumers prefer different 
kinds of vehicles, different prices can be charged without the concern of arbitrage. 
 63. One case has described this as “the so-called diversion market of the American 
pharmaceutical industry,” United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985), 
albeit in a context that includes the diversion of lower-priced products destined for export into 
the higher-priced “open door” channel in the domestic market. See id. After noting that “[a] 
much lower price is quoted for sales to exporters and nonprofit organizations,” the court ex-
plained, “[n]otably, resale under these circumstances is also at a significant advantage. Non-
profit and export organizations can, because of the low price at which they were able to obtain 
the products, undercut the domestic prices pharmaceutical manufacturers offer on their own 
goods. This is the diversion market. It is a significant source of supply for many discount 
pharmacies and hospitals throughout the nation.” Id. 
 64. See generally BORK, supra note 9, at 394–98; see also Weinstein, 762 F.2d at 1527 
(“Understandably, diversion is unpopular with pharmaceutical manufacturers.”). 
 65. See Arnold C. Celnicker, An Economic and Antitrust Analysis of the Distribution of 
Medical Products, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 499, 519–20 (1990) (“It is common for major medi-
cal products manufacturers to monitor and control resales so as to prevent arbitrage from un-
raveling the price discriminations.”). 
 66. Efforts to prevent arbitrage may take other forms: “[A]lthough well-known U.S. 
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direct or explicit way to prevent arbitrage would be a clause that spe-
cifically identifies price-disfavored purchasers in the “open door” 
channel as those to whom the price-favored purchaser may not resell. 
The “own use” clause mentioned in the introduction is a clause 
that prevents arbitrage, although an “own use” clause is an indirect 
and awkward way to do so. Consider, for example, the following 
contractual language which was quoted in one of the criminal cases 
cited above: “I [the price-favored, “closed door” purchaser] further 
certify that pharmaceuticals will be sold or dispensed only to mem-
bers of this facility and only for the facility’s ‘own use’ within the 
meaning of 15 USC 13C [sic] (52 Stat. 446).”67 This language indi-
rectly prohibits arbitrage because, under an “own use” clause, the 
purchaser expressly represents that it is purchasing drugs only for its 
“own use” which, in turn, impliedly represents that the purchaser is 
not purchasing drugs for the alternate use of engaging in arbitrage 
by reselling into another channel of distribution. Another “own use” 
clause that indirectly prohibits arbitrage in a similar manner is set 
forth in the margin.68 
 
pharmaceutical houses frequently supply ‘branded generic’ copies of competitors’ products 
whose patents have expired, they rarely offer generic versions of their own original drugs. The 
reason emphasized by industry executives . . . was fear of extensive arbitrage against the price-
insensitive market.” Scherer, Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 13, at 101–02. The same 
author later provided an expanded explanation of this price discrimination strategy: 
In principle, this two-price approach is a standard exercise in price discrimination. 
However, it is not easily pulled off. To discriminate in price, a firm must be able to 
segregate its customers. The price-sensitive class includes particularly well-informed 
retail consumers, patients of health maintenance organizations with policies favoring 
generics, and most hospital pharmacies. Using a “generic” label and charging lower 
prices is a plausible means of segregating consumers by demand elasticity. Many 
branded drug companies, we have seen, have chosen to produce generic versions of 
rival firms’ drugs. But they have been reluctant to offer generic versions of their own 
drugs because of the price discriminator’s scourge: arbitrage. If high-price consum-
ers become aware that the original brand producer is selling a low-price copy of its 
own drug, they may defect in droves from the high-price market to the low-price 
market. 
SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 378 (emphasis in original). 
 67. Ferro I, No. 99-00180-0104-CR-W-SOW, 2000 WL 33394614, at *3 (W.D. Mo. 
May 8, 2000). 
 68. Another example of an “own use” clause that indirectly prohibits arbitrage was 
quoted at length by the same court: 
I certify that the above-named Client [price-favored purchaser in the “closed door” 
channel] is not engaged in retail sales and that all items purchased through the 
GeriMed Program will be utilized consistent with the established guidelines based 
on [sic] United States Supreme Court decision in Abbott Laboratories, et al., vs. 
Portland Retail Druggists Association, et al. As used herein, any and all merchandise 
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C. “Own Use” and Antitrust Policy 
There is something going on in the “own use” clauses besides 
preventing arbitrage indirectly: drug manufacturers employ “own 
use” clauses to seek representations of compliance with the Non-
profit Institutions Act. The words “own use” are taken from the 
statute itself and were interpreted by the Supreme Court in the lead-
ing case of Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n.69 
The “own use” clause just quoted in the text explicitly cites to the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act, and the “own use” clause just quoted in 
the margin explicitly refers to Abbott Laboratories.70 Thus, “own 
use” clauses that employ language taken from the statute and that 
refer to the statute or controlling case law seek a representation that 
the price-favored purchaser in the “closed door” channel will comply 
with “own use” as those words are understood in the context of the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act. As one district court found, drug manu-
facturers employ “own use” clauses to obtain representations that 
the price discrimination strategy comes within the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act exemption.71 
 
purchased under this program shall be for our own use. The phrase “own use” is 
limited to the following: 
 
1. Dispensing of the product to inpatients or emergency patients for treatment 
at the facilities serviced by the client; 
2. Dispensing of the product to former patients upon their discharge as take-
home prescriptions or supplies necessary for a limited time and reasonable time 
as continuation of treatment; 
3. Dispensing of the product to Client employees or employees of the facilities 
serviced by the Client for their own use or the use of their dependents (but not 
for the use of their non-dependent family members); or 
4. Dispensing of the product to a staff member physician in a facility serviced 
by the Client for his or her personal use, or for the use of his or her dependents 
(but not other persons or for use in the physician’s private practice). 
I further represent and warrant that this Pharmacy [client] shall not buy, distribute, 
sell, transfer, or use contract bid priced products or cause the distribution of bid 
priced products in any manner contrary to the requirements of “own use” or any 
terms and conditions contained in this document. 
Id. (first bracketed text added). 
 69. 425 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 70. Another example of an “own use” clause from the Ferro I case, quoted infra note 
158, additionally cites to De Modena v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d 1388 
(9th Cir. 1984), another case that interprets and applies the Nonprofit Institutions Act. See 
also Celnicker, supra note 65, at 520 (two examples of contractual prohibitions of arbitrage, 
one citing Abbot Laboratories and the other referring to “Robinson-Patman Act”). 
 71. Ferro I, 2000 WL 33394614, at *4. In Ferro I, after an evidentiary hearing before a 
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United States Magistrate Judge, the District Court made the following finding: 
Although the government argues that the applicability of the Nonprofit Institutions 
Act is irrelevant in this case, the documents which form the basis for the fraud 
charges against defendants indicate otherwise. Several of the documents completed 
by the defendants make reference to the Nonprofit Institutions Act and the Abbott 
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, Inc. case. It appears that the 
pharmaceutical companies were attempting to bring the sales to Home Care Phar-
macy within the exemption created by the Nonprofit Institutions Act. No other ex-
emption has been identified which would allow the same manufacturer to sell a drug 
such as Accupril to Penn Plaza Pharmacy, a retail pharmacy, at one price and Home 
Care Pharmacy at a significantly lower price without running afoul of the Robinson-
Patman Act. 
Id. 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s finding, but the basis 
for the Eighth Circuit’s disagreement is unclear and unsupported. For example, when selecting 
a standard of review, the Eighth Circuit stated, without qualification, “We review dismissal of 
an indictment for failure to state an offense de novo.” Ferro II, 252 F.3d 964, 965–66 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The Eighth Circuit did not restrict that standard of review to 
the ultimate decision of the District Court. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit selected the de 
novo standard of review for all issues on appeal, including the findings of fact that the District 
Court made to reach the finding quoted at the outset of this footnote. 
In criminal cases, however, while the ultimate decision of a district court in a pre-trial 
matter may be reviewed under a de novo standard, any findings of fact are reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous or, as it is sometimes called, the clear error standard. See generally 2 STEVEN 
ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW §§ 11.10–11.14 
(3d ed. 1999) (standards of review for criminal pre-trial proceedings). As the Supreme Court 
stated in the context of its review of a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, 
We therefore hold that as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we has-
ten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of 
historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from 
those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394–95 (1948) (applying clearly erroneous standard of 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) to findings of fact made without jury in criminal case). 
In Ferro II, the Eighth Circuit erred in adopting the de novo standard of review for all 
findings, including findings of fact, and the sloppiness of its selection of the de novo standard 
is revealed by its misplaced reliance on the sole authority that it cites in support of a de novo 
standard. In United States v. Zangger, 848 F.2d 923, 924 (8th Cir. 1988), the defendant chal-
lenged the sufficiency of the indictment by attacking the wording of the indictment. In Zang-
ger, there was no evidentiary hearing with regard to the motion to dismiss the indictment, and 
there were no findings of fact. Consequently, the Zangger court’s statement of the appropriate 
standard of review did not need to indicate how a district court’s findings of fact, after an evi-
dentiary hearing, should be reviewed on appeal. To the same effect is the lone case that the 
Zangger court cites in support of selecting the de novo standard, United States v. Givens, 767 
F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1985). In the Givens case as well, the defendant attacked the wording of 
the indictment, there was no evidentiary hearing with regard to the motion to dismiss the 
indictment, and there were no findings of fact. Id. at 584–85. 
Moreover, in Ferro II, the Eighth Circuit’s adoption of a de novo standard of review for 
all findings, including findings of fact, flies in the face of established practice in its own circuit. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, even though “own use” clauses seek a rep-
resentation regarding compliance with an exemption to illegal price 
discrimination, not every case involving an “own use” clause has 
considered the antitrust implications of potential violations of the 
Robinson-Patman Act. For example, in one of the criminal cases 
cited above, Costanzo, the defendant-purchasers knowingly entered 
into contracts that contained “own use” clauses restricting resale to 
nursing homes, diverted pharmaceutical products to wholesalers in 
the “open door” channel, and falsified reports to the manufacturer-
sellers of the quantities of pharmaceutical products sold in compli-
ance with the “own use” clauses so as to hide the diversion.72 No-
where did the court discuss price discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act much less the exemption under the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act. Nowhere did the court examine the “own use” clauses to 
determine whether those clauses were employed to prevent arbitrage 
in a price discrimination strategy that might be illegal under the 
Robinson-Patman Act or, if presumptively illegal, exempt under the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act. Instead, the court examined the failure to 
 
Until Ferro II, Eighth Circuit opinions in criminal cases had consistently reviewed findings of 
fact in pre-trial proceedings seeking dismissal of indictments under the clearly erroneous or 
clear error standard. E.g., United States v. Van Someren, 118 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 
1997) (clear error standard to findings of fact in motion to dismiss indictment under Speedy 
Trial Act); United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 64 F.3d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); United 
States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 1994) (clear error standard applied to finding 
of fact in magistrate judge’s report in motion to dismiss indictment under statute of limita-
tions); United States v. Koory, 20 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 1994) (clear error standard applied 
and substantial deference given to findings of fact, upon report and recommendation of magis-
trate judge, in motion to dismiss indictment under Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Man-
thei, 979 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir. 1992) (clearly erroneous standard applied to findings of fact 
determining whether to apply FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 in motion to dismiss indictment). 
The Eighth Circuit’s error in selecting a standard of review is only compounded by its 
confusion in understanding why “own use” clauses are employed in a case like Ferro, where 
the “own use” clauses explicitly refer to the Nonprofit Institutions Act as well as case law in-
terpreting the exemption. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit appears to have ignored the de novo 
standard of review that it erroneously selected. Rather than examine anew the “own use” 
clauses quoted by the district court, the Eighth Circuit ignored the record and looked to two 
cases and a study, none of which examined analogous clauses, the Robinson-Patman Act, or 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act. See infra note 106 (critiquing Eighth Circuit use of inapposite 
authority). 
 72. See United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving a “claim 
that defendants defrauded drug manufacturers by obtaining pharmaceuticals at highly dis-
counted prices by falsely representing that the pharmaceuticals would be used solely by nursing 
home patients, although defendants intended all the while to divert the drugs to wholesalers in 
violation of the own-use restrictions”); id. at 661 (“fake drug utilization reports for nonexis-
tent institutional patients”). 
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comply with the “own use” clauses in isolation, did not consider  
whether antitrust policy was at issue, and upheld convictions of mail 
fraud. 
A different result was reached by the District Court in an analo-
gous case.73 In Ferro, the defendant-purchasers also entered into 
contracts that contained “own use” clauses restricting resale to nurs-
ing homes, and the indictment alleged that the defendants diverted 
pharmaceutical products to wholesalers.74 The Ferro I court, how-
ever, considered whether the drug manufacturers employed “own 
use” clauses to prevent arbitrage in a price discrimination strategy 
that might be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act and, if so, 
whether the drug manufacturers also employed the “own use” 
clauses to obtain representations that sales to the defendants would 
bring the price discrimination strategy within the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act exemption.75 After this analysis, the court dismissed the in-
dictment and did not hold the defendants “criminally liable for fail-
ing to follow through with what appears to be a scheme by the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to engage in illegal price discrimina-
tion in violation of the antitrust laws.”76 The Ferro I court thus ex-
amined the failure to comply with the “own use” clauses in a larger 
context of the antitrust exemption that was referenced by the con-
tracts, considered antitrust policy that was at issue, and dismissed an 
indictment alleging mail fraud. 
As the divergent results in these two cases indicate, the analysis 
of price discrimination issues, including the availability of the Non-
profit Institutions Act exemption, can have a significant impact when 
“own use” clauses are at issue. It is to that analysis that the discus-
sion now turns. The principal focus of this article is the proper de-
sign of price discriminating distribution systems to comply with the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. As noted already, “own use” 
clauses that prevent arbitrage can be integral to those distribution 
systems. The enforcement of “own use” clauses, especially in crimi-
 
 73. As noted above, the District Court was reversed on appeal. See supra notes 30, 71. 
 74. Ferro I, 2000 WL 33394614, at *4 (“The charges against the defendants in this 
case stem from an underlying premise that defendants defrauded pharmaceutical manufacturers 
by signing contracts containing ‘own use’ clauses in which they represented that the dis-
counted pharmaceutical products would be dispensed only for nursing home patients and then 
selling those products to commercial wholesalers.”). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at *6. 
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nal actions, raises a myriad of issues that go beyond the policies and 
concerns of the antitrust laws in general and the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act in particular. Many of those issues will be highlighted and 
briefly discussed, but any comprehensive treatment of other than an-
titrust issues is beyond the scope of this article. 
III. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE NONPROFIT  
INSTITUTIONS ACT 
Before turning to the requirements of the exemption created by 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act, a preliminary note is in order regard-
ing the antitrust laws and statutory construction. The antitrust laws 
occupy a central role as our “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”77 To 
achieve the statutory purposes behind the antitrust laws, courts rou-
tinely favor enforcement by construing liability provisions liberally 
while, at the same time, construing exemptions narrowly.78 This ap-
proach to statutory construction is no less applicable to the Non-
profit Institutions Act.79 As the Supreme Court stated in Abbott 
Laboratories, “We therefore conclude that the exemption provision 
of the Nonprofit Institutions Act is a limited one . . . .”80 Indeed, the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption applies only to illegal price dis-
crimination under the Robinson-Patman Act81 but does not bar 
 
 77. This phrase probably appears first in the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States 
v. Topco Associates Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general, and the 
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”). The phrase has been oft 
repeated by the Supreme Court, even in later times when the goals of antitrust have shifted. 
E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 651 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Topco in case deciding if Sherman Act claims are arbitrable 
under Federal Arbitration Act); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 n.38 (1983) (quoting Topco in case under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act); Cmty. Communications v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.19 (1982) (quot-
ing Topco in case raising issue of state-action antitrust exemption). 
 78. See Burge v. Bryant Pub. Sch. Dist., 520 F. Supp. 328, 331 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (con-
struing Nonprofit Institutions Act and discussing Supreme Court cases), aff’d, 658 F.2d 611 
(8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see also White & White, Inc., v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 540 
F. Supp. 951, 977–79 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (no implied antitrust exemption under Medicare 
reasonable cost regulations for hospital purchasing groups or their vendors), rev’d on other 
grounds, 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 79. For an analysis which urges that, because the Nonprofit Institutions Act is obsolete 
due to dramatic changes in the nonprofit sector, the exemption should be interpreted under 
the changed circumstances theory, see Pollak, supra note 7, at 985–97. 
 80. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
 81. Because the exemption extends to any prohibition in the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 13c (1994) (“[n]othing in the Act . . . shall apply”), the exemption is not limited to 
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claims that the same business practice may transgress other antitrust 
provisions.82 
A. Robinson-Patman Act Analysis 
Where a supplier charges different prices for the same commod-
ity, concerns immediately arise that the practice may violate the Rob-
inson-Patman Act prohibition of price discrimination under Section 
2(a).83 The general structure of analysis under the Robinson-Patman 
Act is (1) first to establish a prima facie case of illegal price discrimi-
nation, (2) second to determine if any affirmative defenses exist, and 
(3) third to determine if an antitrust exemption applies. 
The issue of whether an antitrust exemption applies only arises 
after a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination to which 
there are no affirmative defenses. If there is no prima facie case of il-
legal price discrimination under the first step of the analysis, there is 
no liability and hence no need to examine whether there is an af-
firmative defense or an antitrust exemption under the second and 
third steps. If there is a prima facie case and also an affirmative de-
fense under the first two steps of the analysis, there is no liability and 
hence no need to examine whether there is an antitrust exemption 
under the third step. But, if there is a prima facie case and no af-
firmative defense under the first two steps of the analysis, then there 
is potential liability and therefore a need to examine whether there is 
an antitrust exemption under the third step. In this last situation, li-
ability turns upon the availability of an antitrust exemption. 
The practice in the pharmaceutical industry described above cer-
 
price differences and buyer liability under sections 2(a) and 2(f) but extends to a seller’s provi-
sion of brokerage fees, promotional allowances, or valuable services that otherwise would vio-
late sections 2(c)–(e). See KINTNER, supra note 19, § 25.9, at 465 n.117. 
 82. See Am. Academic Suppliers, Inc. v. Beckley-Cardy, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 152, 155–56 
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption does not bar claims under other anti-
trust provisions), aff’d, 922 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 83. Price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act is different than economic 
price discrimination. Both compare sales by a single seller of the same product to two purchas-
ers. Price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act is triggered when the two purchasers 
pay different prices for the same product. Economic price discrimination is triggered when the 
seller recovers different economic profits from the two sales. If, for example, a seller’s transac-
tion costs vary depending upon the purchaser to whom a sale is made, the seller will recover 
different economic profits even though the purchasers pay the same price for the same product. 
Thus, economic price discrimination can exist without triggering a violation of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Moreover, under certain conditions, economic price discrimination does not raise 
competitive concerns in an unregulated market. See LEVY, supra note 33, at 75–76, 83–85. 
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tainly appears to satisfy the elements for a prima facie case of secon-
dary-line price discrimination.84 The elements of a prima facie case 
are (1) a price difference85 (2) between sales to two buyers86 (3) of 
commodities87 (4) of like grade and quality88 (5) that creates a rea-
sonable possibility or probability of competitive injury.89 
 
 84. There are preliminary matters of a jurisdictional nature. Because the Robinson-
Patman Act was enacted pursuant to Constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce, 
at least one of the compared sales under Section 2(a) must cross interstate lines. ANTITRUST 
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 430–34. Different language is used in Sections 2(c), 
2(d), 2(e), and 2(f) which has been interpreted to embrace the broader concept of affecting 
interstate commerce. Id. at 436. As noted already, Section 2(a) requires that the commodities 
must be “sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States,” and therefore does 
not apply to export or import sales. See supra note 34. Sales in the United States of already 
imported commodities are covered, however. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 
37,  at 434–35. 
 85. The first element of illegal price discrimination is “merely a price difference.” 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 436 (quotation omitted). 
Actual net prices—after all discounts, rebates, surcharges, and [so on]—are com-
pared to determine [if] there was a price difference. Differences in credit terms may 
[also] constitute a price difference. [D]elivered pricing [systems] where the price in-
cludes the costs of delivery [do not constitute a price difference if] available to all 
customers on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
Id. at 436–37. To find a price difference, only prices of reasonably contemporaneous sales may 
be compared. Id. at 438. 
 86. “Generally, at least two completed sales are required. Thus, a sale and an offer to sell 
[or] a sale and a refusal to sell . . . do not come within [this element.] . . . [A]n enforceable 
contract may substitute for [a completed sale].” Id. at 438–39 (footnotes omitted). Other 
transactions, such as leases, consignment arrangements, licenses, and loans, do not satisfy this 
element. See id. at 439–40. “While both sales must be made by the same seller,” id. at 440 
(footnote omitted), a sale through an intermediary may be included if the seller exercises suffi-
cient control over the intermediary such that the intermediary’s pricing behavior can be attrib-
uted to the seller. See id. So, too, “sales by a subsidiary may be attributed to the corporate par-
ent [if] . . . the parent exercises control over the subsidiary’s customer and pricing decisions.” 
Id. at 441. The sale by a wholly owned subsidiary has been attributed to the corporate parent 
without showing control. See id. at 438–41. 
 87. Section 2(a) applies only to “commodities,” a term which has been interpreted to 
mean tangible products. See id. Services and intangible items are not included. See id. at 442. 
In a transaction that mixes commodities and services, courts look to the dominant nature of 
the transaction. See id. at 441–43. 
 88. See id. at 436. Commodities sold to the favored and disfavored buyers must be of 
like grade and quality. Thus, gloves made of cheaper material by less skilled workers and sub-
ject to less rigid inspection do not meet this element. Id. Brand names, labels, packaging, and 
warranties are not relevant to determine if the commodities are of like grade and quality. See 
id. at 443–44. Bona fide differences that affect consumer use or marketability are relevant. Id. 
at 444–45. 
 89. Although often called the “competitive injury” requirement, an actual injury to 
competition is not required as courts have held that the Act only requires a “reasonable possi-
bility” or “probability” of injury. Id. at 446. In practice, this requirement has resulted in differ-
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Drug manufacturers who follow the practice of selling at differ-
ent prices to an “open door” channel and a “closed door” channel 
facially meet each of the five elements of a prima facie case of illegal 
secondary-line price discrimination.90 Because drug manufacturers 
charge different prices to buyers depending upon the channel of dis-
tribution, there is a price difference between sales to at least two 
buyers. Because pharmaceutical products are goods and not services, 
the requirement of “commodities” is met. Because the same phar-
maceutical products are sold to both channels, the “like grade and 
 
ent standards, depending upon whether the injury is at the primary or secondary line. See id. 
The analysis of competitive injury in primary-line cases was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). In 
Brooke Group, the Supreme Court recognized that the theory of competitive injury in cases of 
primary-line discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act mirrored the theory of competi-
tive injury in predatory pricing cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 221; see 
also ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 448. Brooke Group is an important 
case because, for the first time, the Supreme Court indicated that the same factual analysis re-
quired in section 2 cases involving predatory pricing should apply to cases involving primary-
line discrimination. See id. at 447–48. After Brooke Group, a plaintiff in a primary-line case 
must plead and prove a relevant market and analyze the likely competitive impact within that 
market, including the plausibility that the defendant will recoup any losses from below cost 
pricing. See id. at 448. Consequently, after Brooke Group, competitive injury at the primary 
line is found either directly by market analysis or indirectly by predatory intent. See id. at 447–
49. Predatory intent, in turn, can be inferred from below cost sales known as predatory pricing 
(but there is no requirement of a reasonable likelihood of recouping losses as there is in 
Sherman 2 cases). See id. at 446–49. 
Competitive injury at the secondary line requires that the favored buyers and the disfa-
vored buyer must be in competition. Id. at 449. For example, both buyers must operate in the 
same geographic area. See id. at 450. Direct evidence of lost sales or profits shows competitive 
injury. Id. Indirect evidence typically involves not insubstantial price differences over an ex-
tended period of time between buyers with low margins. Id. Evidence that no sales or profits 
were lost can rebut indirect evidence. See id. at 451. The same considerations are brought to 
bear upon competitive injury at the tertiary line. Id. at 452. 
The distinction between primary and secondary (or tertiary) line discrimination is sig-
nificant because, after Brooke Group, a different and more stringent market analysis is required 
to show competitive injury in cases of primary-line discrimination. A failure to appreciate the 
difference demonstrates a misunderstanding of the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
For example, even though Ferro II clearly involved secondary-line discrimination, the Eighth 
Circuit cited Brooke Group for the proposition that the element of competitive injury, “re-
quires careful analysis of difficult, often-litigated issues such as whether the discount may sub-
stantially lessen competition at any level of competition.” 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 200. 
Courts have not, however, applied the holding in Brooke Group, to cases like Ferro that in-
volve secondary (or tertiary) line discrimination. No doubt, the Eighth Circuit’s misunder-
standing of the Robinson-Patman Act contributed to its misunderstanding of both the record 
and the price discrimination analysis proffered by the defendants in Ferro. 
 90. See also Celnicker, supra note 65, at 512–15 (basic scenario of differential pricing of 
medical products likely satisfies prima facie case). 
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quality” requirement is met.91 Finally, because a buyer in the “closed 
door” channel has a decisive cost advantage vis-à-vis a buyer in the 
“open door” channel, there is a reasonable possibility of competitive 
injury to the buyer in the “open door” channel whenever both buy-
ers are in the same area and would sell to the same customers but for 
the difference in price.92 
 
 91. Sometimes, drug companies sell the same product at different prices depending 
upon whether the product is branded or sold as a generic. KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 29–30 
(noting different “prices and pricing methods” for “branded and generic markets”). As noted 
above, however, the use of brand names is not relevant to the determination of the require-
ment of “like grade and quality.” See supra note 88. Indeed, there is evidence that, after the 
patend expired on a branded drug, at least two drug manufacturers sold the generic equivalent 
through a subsidiary and at a dramatically reduced price. SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, 
supra note 13, at 378. In so doing, these drug manufacturers appear to be pursuing the first-
mover advantage on the branded drug while trying to capture sales of the generic version to 
relatively price sensitive consumers who have a relatively elastic demand for drugs. 
 92. Along with the dramatic changes in the provision of health care services over the 
past several years, so too has there been a dramatic change in the analysis of secondary (or ter-
tiary) line discrimination in the pharmaceutical industry. At one time the possibility of 
competitive injury between purchasers in different channels of distribution was presumptively 
dismissed. The belief was that drug purchasers were in different “classes,” that is, a purchaser in 
one “class” or channel of distribution did not sell to and compete for the customers of pur-
chasers in other channel of distribution and, consequently, could not be affected by price dif-
ferences across channels of distribution. See ROWE, supra note 1, at 173–178 (discussing analy-
sis of price variations among “customer classes”); Michael Unger, Protestors Picket Pfizer Over 
High Cost of Drugs, NEWSDAY, June 8, 1990, at 52 (“Multitiered pricing hasn’t been tested 
in court under antitrust laws, and last year [1989] an opinion issued by the [FTC] upheld 
long-standing pricing policies.”). 
Because of changes in the health care industry, purchasers of pharmaceutical products in 
one channel of distribution no longer are in an isolated class because those purchasers compete 
with purchasers in other channels of distribution. See infra note 115; see also infra note 159 
(criticizing use of “classes” by pharmaceutical industry). For example, at least in the context of 
joint federal-state Medicaid programs, there is empirical evidence that efforts to contain pre-
scription drug costs may “also cause substitution into higher-cost, health care services.” LEVY, 
supra note 33, at 21–23 (footnote omitted). This is an indication that the effective area of 
competition is in the provision of a package of comprehensive health care services, and differ-
ent drug prices to different health care providers inevitably will result in a competitive advan-
tage to the price-favored health care provider. Thus, even if a price-favored purchaser complies 
with an “own use” provision, that purchaser will have a competitive advantage in attracting 
patients vis-a-vis a price-disfavored purchaser. See also Pollak, supra note 7, at 973–75 (noting 
development of nonprofit sector after enactment of Nonprofit Institutions Act such that non-
profit institutions increasingly compete with for-profit institutions). These changes indicate 
why prior analyses of differential pricing are, at best, unpersuasive. See, e.g., Celnicker, supra 
note 65, at 517 (if price-favored purchaser does not resell, Robinson-Patman generally does 
not apply and Nonprofit Institutions Act irrelevant). 
Where allegations of secondary (or tertiary) line discrimination in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry have been recently tested, there has been no presumption of no competitive injury, 
which would automatically negate a finding of illegal price discrimination. Indeed, in a recent 
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The practice in the pharmaceutical industry described above does 
not appear to satisfy a defined affirmative defense. Three affirmative 
defenses are found in the Robinson-Patman Act itself.93 The “cost 
justification” defense permits price differences that reflect the “dif-
ferences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from 
 
major case involving allegations of secondary-line price discrimination, “a federal judge ap-
proved a settlement between some of the [defendant] drug companies and [a plaintiff class of] 
retail pharmacies that included a $350 million cash settlement and an agreement by these 
companies to refrain from setting discriminatory prices against retail pharmacies . . . .” LEVY, 
supra note 33, at 82 (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1996-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,449 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1996)). Arguably, this settlement would not 
have been forthcoming if the pharmaceutical companies enjoyed an almost conclusive pre-
sumption of no competitive injury. See also Zaretsky, supra note 28, at 272 (“Evidence was 
presented during discovery that the favored purchasers received discounts that resulted in an 
average 10% cost advantage over retail purchasers. It is difficult for a large number of firms to 
sustain such a competitive disadvantage over the long run, especially with profit margins a 
small fraction of the cost-disadvantage percentage.”). 
 93. Sometimes, courts refer to “functional availability” as though it is a non-statutory 
defense. Functional availability refers to a fact situation where a price-disfavored purchaser 
could have obtained the lower price but, for whatever reason, did not take advantage of the 
lower price. Properly understood, functional availability is not so much an affirmative defense 
as it is evidence that negates the required showings, in the prima facie case, of a price difference 
or a competitive injury. See, e.g., Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 664 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (finding that a jury instruction was proper that stated, “If you find that defendants’ 
volume discounts were functionally available to the plaintiffs, then as a matter of law either 
there is no price discrimination or the discrimination is not the proximate cause of injury”); 
Shreve Equip., Inc. v. Clay Equip. Corp., 650 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir. 1981) (“Where a pur-
chaser does not take advantage of a lower price or a discount which is functionally available on 
an equal basis, it has been held that either no price discrimination has occurred, or the dis-
crimination is not the proximate cause of the injury.”); Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass In-
dus., 482 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Any inferred competitive injury is negated by the 
fact that [plaintiff] had available comparable products from other suppliers at prices equivalent 
to the prices [defendant] gave to [plaintiff’s] competitors.”). 
Sometimes, manufacturers who sell to both distributors (or wholesalers) and retailers 
claim a “functional discount” to justify a lower price to the distributor (wholesaler). The price 
difference is “functional” in the sense that the distributor and the retailer perform different 
functions in the channel of distribution. Used this way, the “functional discount” is justified 
under the cost justification or meeting competition defense. In Texaco Inc., v. Hasbrouck, 496 
U.S. 543, 561 (1990), the Supreme Court stated that a “functional discount” would not of-
fend the Robinson-Patman Act if the seller could “prove that a particular functional discount is 
reasonable and accordingly did not cause any substantial lessening of competition between a 
wholesaler’s customers and the supplier’s direct customers.” With respect to the requirement 
of competitive injury, a “functional discount” might be justified where the distributor (whole-
saler) sells only to retailers but not where the distributor (wholesaler) sells directly to consum-
ers. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 464–69. 
The reasonableness of the price favor is related to the distribution functions actually per-
formed by the buyer. There is no requirement, under the Robinson-Patman Act, that a manu-
facturer seller must grant functional discounts. See generally id. at 468. 
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the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities 
are . . . sold or delivered.”94 Here, the seller has the burden of show-
ing that the actual cost savings of selling to the price-favored buyer 
are greater than or equal to the price difference.95 The “changing 
conditions” defense permits price differences that reflect a seller’s 
“response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the 
marketability of the goods concerned.”96 Statutory examples of 
“changing conditions” include “actual or imminent deterioration of 
perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under 
court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business.”97 
 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994). 
 95. The burden is on sellers to establish the defense, which, in practice, is difficult. See 
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 456. The seller may compare the cost of 
dealing with the favored buyer with the average costs of dealing with members of a broad 
group of similar buyers that includes the favored buyer. Id. at 457. A broad group is similar if 
they share essential factors that determine the cost of dealing. See id. To prevail, the seller must 
show actual cost savings equal to or greater than the price difference. See id. at 459. The 
seller’s costs that may be considered include a broad range of factors in distribution costs (such 
as selling and delivery) and manufacturing costs. See id. at 460. 
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, there is no such thing as an affirmative defense for 
volume discounts unless those discounts can be justified by cost savings. Indeed, one of the 
shortcomings of the price discrimination prohibition in the Clayton Act that was noted during 
the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act was that courts declined to read a cost-
justification limit into exemptions for price differences based upon quantity discounts. See ABA 
ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH, supra note 1, at 12. The final version of the Robinson-
Patman Act remedied that shortcoming by providing a cost-justification limit. See id. at 18. 
Thus, blanket judicial statements to the effect that volume discounts are accepted in the phar-
maceutical industry are misleading where those statements fail to distinguish between those 
volume discounts that are cost justified and those that are not. By contrast, state pharmaceuti-
cal industry price discrimination statutes are not consistent on whether volume discounts must 
be cost justified. Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.31(2) (West 1997) (“Nothing in this sub-
section prohibits the giving of a discount for volume purchases.”) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 32 § 13802(1)(A) (West 1999) (“This paragraph does not prohibit discounts for volume 
purchases if the discounts are justified by the economies or efficiencies resulting from the vol-
ume purchases . . . .”) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.061 (West 1998) (“Unfair discrimination 
occurs when quantity discounts are not reasonably based on actual cost savings to all like pur-
chasers.”). 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
 97. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that the seller can “show the existence of facts 
which would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the granting of a lower price 
would in fact meet the equally low price of a competitor.” United States v. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978) (quoting FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 
759–60 (1945). The seller may not seek verification of the lower price from the competitor, 
but should instead seek out information from a reliable buyer or other source. See ANTITRUST 
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 452–56. This defense is available regardless of 
whether the seller sets its price on an area-wide or customer-by-customer basis. See id. at 454. 
In either situation, the lower price must be based upon a genuine, reasonable response to 
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The “meeting competition” defense permits price differences where 
the seller acts “in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com-
petitor.”98 The lower price, which may respond to competition on a 
customer-by-customer or area-wide basis, must be based upon a 
genuine, reasonable response to price competition.99 
Drug manufacturers who follow the practice of selling, at differ-
ent prices, to an “open door” channel and a “closed door” channel 
facially fail to establish an affirmative defense.100 Because, as noted 
already, the magnitude of the price differences are so substantial, 
those differences are not likely explained by cost savings.101 Because 
pharmaceutical products are sold to buyers in both channels of dis-
tribution at the same time and in the same geographical area, the 
price differences are not likely explained as a response to changing 
circumstances. Because the price differences respond to different 
kinds of purchasers typically found in each channel,102 the drug 
 
competitive conditions. See id. The seller must intend to meet but not beat the competitor’s 
lower price. See id. at 454–55. The defense is not available if the competitor’s lower price is 
itself illegal. See id. The meeting competition defense may, under certain circumstances, be 
available in secondary-line discrimination where a seller enables its buyer to meet competition. 
See id. at 452–56. 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b). 
 99. In most cases, the defense is based upon changes in the marketability of the com-
modities that resemble the enumerated examples. Few cases have attempted, with mixed re-
sults, to show changes in the market. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 
462–63. 
 100. Interestingly, in recent litigation, the reason proffered by drug manufacturers for 
selling at higher prices to retail pharmacies bears no relation to an established Robinson-
Patman defense:  
Defendant drug manufacturers explain that their decisions not to discount prices on 
sales to retail pharmacies simply reflect each drug manufacturer’s independent eco-
nomic decision to discount prices on sales to managed-care organizations, but not 
on sales to retail pharmacies. These discounts generally are conditional on meeting 
certain sales or market share targets, and have been characterized as discounts for 
shifting [market] share. Defendant drug manufacturers argue that discounts for 
shifting share are individually profit-maximizing since the additional revenue each 
seller realizes from having sales shifted to its products more than offsets its lost reve-
nue from reduced prices. 
Weinstein & Culbertson, supra note 10, at 262; see also Elzinga & Mills, supra note 60, at 
289–92 (describing how managed care organizations intervene in the market, induce competi-
tion within a therapeutic class of drugs, and obtain discounts, all in ways not available to retail 
pharmacies). 
 101. See also Celnicker, supra note 65, at 518 (basic scenario of differential pricing of 
medical products likely does not satisfy cost justification defense). 
 102. This is the case regardless of the reason for price discrimination. See supra text ac-
companying notes 44–48 (describing reasons). If lower prices are charged because of the bar-
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manufacturer is not likely responding, in good faith, to meet price 
competition from other drug manufacturers.103 
Thus, for the practice in the pharmaceutical industry described 
above, the issue of liability for secondary-line price discrimination 
under the Robinson-Patman Act facially turns upon the availability 
of the antitrust exemption in the Nonprofit Institutions Act.104 In-
deed, drug manufacturers or other suppliers who grant price favors 
to some purchasers and employ “own use” restrictions to prevent ar-
bitrage seemingly concede that their distribution systems satisfy a 
prima facie case of unlawful price discrimination but fail to come 
within an affirmative defense. Of course, the words, “own use,” are 
taken directly from the Nonprofit Institutions Act, and some “closed 
door” distribution contracts cite to the statute itself or to cases that 
interpret the statute.105 
Further, an “own use” restriction is an awkward and indirect way 
to prevent arbitrage. Logically, there is no need to employ words 
that so strongly indicate compliance with an antitrust exemption in-
stead of a direct prohibition on arbitrage if there is no prima facie 
case or there is an available affirmative defense. Consequently, the 
legality of the distribution systems, and the propriety of enforcing 
contract clauses that prevent arbitrage through “own use” restric-
 
gaining power of large institutional purchasers, the price difference responds to a purchaser’s 
bargaining power. If lower prices are charged because of a marketing strategy to induce brand 
loyalty, the price difference responds to a purchaser’s receptivity to a kind of marketing. If 
lower prices respond to demand characteristics of purchasers, the price difference responds to a 
purchaser’s relative price sensitivity and elasticity. 
 103. Here it is important to distinguish the cost savings achieved through the recent and 
increased use of information technology by some organizations that distribute prescription 
drugs, see LEVY, supra note 33, at 43–71, and the different prices charged by drug manufac-
turers to those institutions, see id. at 63 (noting different rebates depending upon type of 
institution and/or change in market share). The available studies suggest that the reason for 
price differences in the pharmaceutical industry is the ability of some institutional purchasers to 
demand and receive lower prices from drug manufacturers. Id. at 77–81. “According to one 
account, ‘[d]rug companies forced to give deep discounts to managed health care plans are 
making up the difference by raising prices to the elderly, uninsured, and others least able to 
pay.’” Id. at 78 (quoting Steve Sakson, Drug Discounts for HMOs May Shift Costs to Others, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1995, at A3). 
 104. The fact that the pricing practices of drug manufacturers raise Robinson-Patman Act 
and other legal issues was recently noted: “Discounts to favored customers must be evaluated 
in light of mandatory rebates to the Medicaid System and to other federal government entities. 
The ongoing discriminatory pricing litigation in federal courts will also alter the pricing land-
scape.” KOLASSA, supra note 16, at 26. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 69–71. 
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tions, certainly appear to depend upon the availability of the Non-
profit Institutions Act exemption, to which the discussion now 
turns.106 
 
 106. The Eighth Circuit thought differently in Ferro II, “We know from prior cases that 
pharmaceutical sellers often grant discounts to institutional customers such as hospitals, health 
maintenance organizations, and nursing homes, without regard to whether they are non-profit 
or for-profit purchasers.” 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2001). After citing three authorities, 
the Eighth Circuit went on to say: 
This suggests that sellers perceive other bases for justifying the discounts under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, and therefore that the Non-Profit Institutions Act exemption 
is not the only determining factor in making such sales. This further suggests that, 
even when dealing with a for-profit institutional customer, a seller may wish to 
know, for Robinson-Patman Act compliance purposes, whether the customer is pur-
chasing for its “own use.” In these circumstances, the materiality of an “own use” 
misrepresentation may not be determined as a matter of law, and the district court 
erred in dismissing the indictment. 
Id. 
The problem with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is twofold. First, the Eighth Circuit 
nowhere identifies how “own use” clauses can be used to comply with the Robinson-Patman 
Act outside of one of the elements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. Second, the 
Eighth Circuit provides no credible support for its remarkable proposition that, on the record 
presented in Ferro, “own use” clauses which explicitly refer to the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 
as well as case law interpreting the exemption, see supra text accompanying notes 69–71, just 
as likely sought representations for different (but not identified) Robinson-Patman Act compli-
ance purposes. Because the above-quoted language in the Eighth Circuit’s Ferro II opinion 
casts doubt upon the fact situation addressed in this article, it is appropriate to examine the 
authority upon which the Eighth Circuit relied. 
In Ferro II, the Eighth Circuit cites United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 659 (8th 
Cir. 1993), a case that does identify business reasons why a drug manufacturer might employ 
price differences, and the Costanzo court did provide an example of an “own use” clause, al-
though the clause in that case did not refer to the Nonprofit Institutions Act or to case law 
interpreting the exemption, id. at 660. While the Costanzo court states that pharmaceutical 
sellers employed “own use” clauses to prevent diversion, that is, “to ensure that the sale of 
deeply discounted drugs to institutional pharmacies does not undermine [the sellers’] ability to 
sell to other purchasers at normal wholesale prices,” id. at 659–60, there is simply no credible 
basis to cite that discussion for the proposition that there are many reasons why pharmaceutical 
sellers routinely employ “own use” clauses for Robinson-Patman compliance purposes. In fact, 
in Costanzo, there is absolutely no discussion of antitrust issues, much less the Robinson-
Patman Act or the Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
The second case that the Eighth Circuit cites is In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs 
Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999). This opinion is one of many that was produced 
during the course of a very protracted litigation, but the opinion selected and cited by the 
Eighth Circuit only addressed antitrust conspiracy issues under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). At the place cited by the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit describes 
the practice by which manufacturers of brand name prescription drugs sell at different prices 
and how those who purchase at low prices are tempted to engage in diversion. There, the Sev-
enth Circuit does identify one business rationale for selling to wholesalers at a lower price: “A 
wholesaler is compensated for the warehousing and other functions that he performs in the 
distribution of his drugs through the difference between the price that he pays his supplier and 
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B. The Nonprofit Institutions Act Exemption 
Where there is a prima facie violation of the Robinson-Patman 
Act but no affirmative defense, suppliers who grant price favors to 
eleemosynary institutions need to design their distribution channels 
so that lower-priced sales to those institutions come within an ex-
emption to the prohibition of price discrimination. To come within 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption, suppliers need to assure 
that lower-priced sales are exempt by granting price discounts only 
to those who meet the requirements for exempt purchasers under 
 
the price at which he resells to retailers.” In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust 
Litig., 186 F.3d at 783. Throughout its opinion, the Seventh Circuit also opines that any seller 
can increase profits if that seller has market power, can prevent diversion, and can engage in 
economic price discrimination. See id. at 787. Importantly, however, the pharmaceutical sellers 
in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs did not employ “own use” clauses to compensate 
wholesalers for services or to prevent wholesalers from engaging in diversion. Rather, the 
pharmaceutical sellers used a chargeback system. In fact, in In re Brand Name Prescription 
Drugs, there is no discussion whatsoever of “own use” clauses, much less the reasons why a 
pharmaceutical seller would employ those clauses. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit opinion 
never tests the practice of price discrimination in that case against the Robinson-Patman Act. 
The Seventh Circuit does not discuss “own use” clauses, much less the way that those clauses 
might be used for Robinson-Patman compliance purposes. 
The third source that the Eighth Circuit cites is LEVY, supra note 33, a study that fo-
cuses not upon Robinson-Patman price discrimination but upon economic price discrimina-
tion, which “is not necessarily a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.” Id. at 75 n.166. In 
the place cited by the Eighth Circuit, the study describes several business rationales for price 
discrimination. See supra note 47. The study does not, however, indicate that the pharmaceu-
tical sellers employed “own use” clauses to pursue any of these business rationales. Like the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, the cited portion of the 
study contains no discussion whatsoever about “own use” clauses, much less the reasons why a 
pharmaceutical seller might employ those clauses. Moreover, the focus of the study is eco-
nomic price discrimination, and the study explicitly cautions that “this discussion does not ad-
dress the possibility that economic price discrimination may raise concerns under the Robin-
son-Patman Act.” Id. at 83 n.189. If anything, the study provides an inference that price 
discrimination in the pharmaceutical industry violates the Robinson-Patman Act by reporting a 
$350 million dollar settlement paid by drug manufacturers to retail pharmacies. See id. at 82. 
See also Scherer, Prescription Drug Litigation, supra note 7, at 249–50 (describing settle-
ment). 
In summary, the Eighth Circuit in Ferro II asserts that, “even when dealing with a for-
profit institutional customer, a seller may wish to know, for Robinson-Patman Act compliance 
purposes, whether the customer is purchasing for its ‘own use,’” 252 F.2d at 967, but none of 
the three authorities cited in support of this remarkable proposition discusses the Robinson-
Patman Act. All of the authorities discuss business reasons for practices that discriminate in 
price, but none addresses the issue of whether those business practices offend the Robinson-
Patman Act, much less whether there is any need for compliance. Only one authority, the Co-
stanzo case, identifies an “own use” clause, but that case does not discuss compliance with the 
Robinson-Patman Act. 
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the statute. In addition, suppliers need to restrict any resale or diver-
sion of supplies by price-favored purchasers to price-disfavored pur-
chasers who are willing to pay a higher price. This latter restriction is 
important for two reasons. First, as explained above, preventing arbi-
trage is crucial for any price discrimination strategy to succeed in the 
marketplace. Second, as explained below, suppliers risk losing the ex-
emption if price-favored purchasers engage in arbitrage, a for-profit 
activity.107 
When designing price-favored channels of distribution, such as 
the “closed door” channel in the pharmaceutical industry, suppliers 
can obtain important guidance from the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Abbott Laboratories, the only Supreme Court case that has squarely 
addressed an issue under the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The princi-
pal focus of the opinion in that case was the requirement of “own 
use.” In Abbott Laboratories, a hospital purchased drugs at discrimi-
natorily low prices but dispensed those drugs in a variety of ways. 
The Supreme Court placed the various uses of drug products into 
ten categories108 and then determined which categories constituted 
“own use” under the exemption.109 
The guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Abbott Labora-
tories is only the start of a correct understanding of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act exemption because the requirement of “own use” is 
only one of three statutory requirements that must be met for the 
exemption to apply.110 As the Ninth Circuit explained in De Modena 
 
 107. For example, arbitrage is present in fact situations where the buyer in the “closed 
door” channel sells to customers who otherwise would purchase in the “open door” channel. 
The extent to which a price-favored purchaser engages in this for-profit activity affects the 
availability of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption because the price-favored purchaser 
must meet the requirement of “not operated for profit.” In addition, by engaging in arbitrage 
and selling in a context that does not further the charitable or other worthy goals of the elee-
mosynary institution, the price-favored purchaser may not meet the requirement of “own use.” 
Compare Abbott Labs., v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (holding 
that de minimis sales by hospital to walk-ins who are not patients of the hospital do not destroy 
exception) with Computronics, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 809, 812 (W.D. 
Wis. 1985) (finding the university’s unrestricted resale of computers to faculty, staff, and stu-
dents not exempt). 
 108. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 8–10. 
 109. Id. at 14–18. 
 110. A question might arise, based upon the language of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 
whether the three requirements should be read in the conjunctive, thus treating each as a nec-
essary and separate element. While the statute might have been drafted more clearly, the better 
approach is to construe the three requirements as necessary and separate elements. This com-
ports with the policy of construing antitrust exemptions narrowly. For example, not every hos-
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v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.,111 when it paraphrased the 
statutory language of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, suppliers can 
enjoy the benefits of this exemption if they grant price favors only to 
exempt purchasers who “are 1) non-profit institutions; 2) eligible in-
stitutions under the Act; and 3) made the purchases in question for 
their ‘own use.’”112 Each of these requirements is a separate and dis-
tinct element that must be satisfied for a price discrimination strategy 
to come within the exemption.113 The discussion in this part of the 
article will examine each of the statutory requirements starting with 
the “own use” element and then turning to the eligible institution 
and the “not operated for profit” elements, respectively.114 
 
pital may receive price favors. Only hospitals that are “not operated for profit” may receive 
price favors. Further, not every price-favored sale to a nonprofit hospital is exempt. Only those 
sales that are for the nonprofit hospital’s “own use” are exempt. By construing each require-
ment as a necessary and separate element, the exemption will have a narrower reach. 
 111. 743 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 112. Id. at 1391; see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 
C 897, MDL 997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12920, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1995) (three re-
quirements stated as necessary and separate elements); Opinion Letter, 89 F.T.C. 689, 689 
(1977) (“[T]he exemption was intended to insulate from Robinson-Patman application all 
purchases of supplies (for their own use) by the designated classes of institutions not operated 
for profit.”). 
 113. While the prima facie case of price discrimination is limited to sales of “commodi-
ties,” 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994), the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption extends to “sup-
plies,” 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1994). The use of different terms suggests that “supplies” are more 
limited than “commodities,” and thus, “supplies” should be an additional element of the ex-
emption. As one treatise has noted, however, “While one might think that the ‘supplies’ of this 
provision is narrower than the ‘commodities’ of the . . . basic § 2(a) prohibition, perhaps refer-
ring only to consumables, the courts have not so interpreted it. Indeed, the term ‘supplies’ 
seems to have about the same scope as the word ‘commodities’ in the main statute.” 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 195. For example, in Logan Lanes, a 
case involving bowling alley equipment, the court stated that the term, “[supplies] embraces 
anything required to meet the institution’s needs, whether it is consumed or otherwise dis-
posed of, or whether it constitutes, or becomes part of, a material object utilized to enable the 
institution to carry on its activities.” Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F.2d 212, 216 
(9th Cir. 1967). If, as it seems, “supplies” are coextensive with “commodities,” and “com-
modities” is an element that must be proved as part of the prima facie case, then there is no 
need to include “supplies” as an element of the exemption. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion in Abbott Laboratories had defined “own use” as limiting the exemption to supplies 
that are consumed on the premises of an eligible institution, but this opinion was vacated by 
the Supreme Court. Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 510 F.2d 486, 489 (9th 
Cir. 1974), vacated, 425 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 114. In the next part of the article, the discussion will turn to two additional concerns 
not anticipated in the statutory language. One is the supplier’s obligation of routinely obtain-
ing certification of compliance with the statutory requirements by assuring that price-favored 
purchasers are, in fact, exempt purchasers. Another arises in a fact situation where a supplier 
sells through an intermediary who, in turn, sells to the ultimate purchasers. 
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1. “Own use” 
The “own use” requirement is the one that has received the 
greatest attention from the Supreme Court. As noted already, in Ab-
bott Laboratories, the Court placed the various uses of drug prod-
ucts into ten categories, and then determined which categories con-
stituted “own use” under the exemption. In making that 
determination, the Court noted that, when compared to the tradi-
tional functions performed by hospitals at the time the exemption 
was passed by Congress, modern hospitals had expanded the func-
tions that they perform.115 In doing so, the Court declined to expand 
the scope of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption to protect a 
hospital’s use of price discounted supplies to perform functions not 
anticipated when the exemption was enacted: 
The modern American hospital developed from an institution 
originally intended for the sick poor. Language in the bill which 
became the 1938 Act, that would have exempted only sales to 
nonprofit institutions “supported in whole or in part by public sub-
scriptions,” was deleted, and the Act’s exemption provision was not 
so restricted and confined. We thus do not relate the exemption to 
what might be described as the nonprofit hospital’s original or “tra-
ditional” status. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Act that 
indicates that its exemption provision is to be applied and expanded 
automatically to whatever new venture the nonprofit hospital finds 
attractive in these changing days. The Congress surely did not 
intend to give the hospital a blank check. Had it so intended, it 
would not have qualified purchases by nonprofit institutions in the 
way it did in § 13c.116 
The Court then articulated a standard that defines “own use” in 
terms of the traditional functions that were performed by hospitals: 
 We therefore conclude that the exemption provision of the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act is a limited one; that just because it is a 
nonprofit hospital that is purchasing pharmaceutical products does 
not mean that all its purchases are exempt from Robinson-Patman; 
that the test is the obvious one inherent in the language of the 
statute, namely, “purchases of their supplies for their own use”; and 
 
 115. See also HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 196 (“the domain of 
the nonprofit hospital had expanded considerably in the previous decades, and hospitals had 
become major rivals with for-profit pharmacies in the retailing of pharmaceuticals”). 
 116. Abbott Labs, 425 U.S. at 13 (citations omitted). 
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that “their own use” is what reasonably may be regarded as use by 
the hospital in the sense that such use is a part of and promotes the 
hospital’s intended institutional operation in the care of persons  
who are its patients. This implies the limitation and it turns the 
measure naturally from the purchase to the use, as § 13c re-
quires.117 
The Court then proceeded to place the ten categories of drug 
use into three groups, the first of which were those uses that clearly 
comply with the “own use” requirement. For example, 
“[d]ispensation to the bed-occupying inpatient and to the patient at 
the hospital’s emergency facility, in either case for use on the hospital 
premises, is a part of the institution’s basic function, and is dispensa-
tion for the hospital’s ‘own use.’”118 
A second group of drug uses were those that clearly fail to com-
ply with the “own use” requirement. Here, the Court used the ex-
ample of a physician who is connected with the hospital and pur-
chases drugs from the hospital, not for herself or for her dependents, 
but for others: “To the extent that the physician utilizes his prox-
imity to the hospital pharmacy, and it permits him so to do, for other 
persons or other uses—even, as this record occasionally intimates, for 
dispensation in that portion of his private practice unconnected with 
the hospital—the requirement of the hospital’s ‘own use’ is not ful-
filled.”119 
The third group of drug uses were those that, although not for 
the hospital’s “own use,” were de minimis and, for that reason, 
would not negate a finding of compliance with the “own use” re-
quirement.120 Here, the Court used the example of an occasional 
walk-in prescription buyer who “is not within the statute’s exemp-
tion.”121 Recognizing, however, “that there may be an occasion 
 
 117. Id. at 14; see also KINTNER, supra note 19, § 25.9 at 466 (“this element [“own 
use” requirement] excludes from the exemption goods which are not used by the institution 
for its normal non-profit function”). 
 118. Abbot Labs., 425 U.S. at 14. 
 119. Id. at 17. 
 120. It was by creating this third category, which permits nonexempt but de minimis 
uses, that the Supreme Court changed the analysis under the “own use” element from what 
had previously been an effort by courts to examine the overall character of an eligible institu-
tion’s use of price-discounted supplies. Cf. Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 
510 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1974) (“consumer role” test); Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 378 F.2d 212, 213 (9th Cir. 1967) (“primary purpose” test). 
 121. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 18. 
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when the hospital pharmacy is the only one available in the commu-
nity to meet a particular emergency situation,” the Court concluded: 
We are content, however, to conclude that the occasional emer-
gency is de minimis, in any event, and that its presence solitarily 
would not trigger litigation of the present kind. So long as the hos-
pital pharmacy holds the emergency situation within bounds, and 
entertains it only as a humanitarian gesture, we shall not condemn 
the hospital and its suppliers to a Robinson-Patman violation be-
cause of the presence of the occasional walk-in dispensation of that 
type.122 
One issue that has been litigated under the rubric of the “own 
use” requirement is the extent to which a purchaser can purchase 
supplies for nonexempt uses and yet remain in the somewhat subjec-
tive category of de minimis sales that do not negate a finding of 
“own use.” Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,123 is an example 
of a case in which the court did not negate a finding of compliance 
with the “own use” requirement because nonexempt uses were de 
minimis.124 There, bowling equipment, purchased at discriminatorily 
low prices, was installed in the Student Union Building on the Utah 
 
 122. Id. One court subsequently looked at de minimis use in a different light by using the 
fact of de minimis use as relevant to the issue of whether there was an anticompetitive effect, a 
showing that is required for one of the elements of a prima facie case of illegal price discrimina-
tion under the Robinson-Patman Act. See Rudner v. Abbott Labs., 664 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (noting defendant’s argument that de minimis use negates plaintiff’s re-
quired showing of competitive injury but court finding, in context of summary judgment, issue 
of fact on whether “there was only a de minimis effect on competition”). 
 123. 378 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 124. The Ninth Circuit decided Logan Lanes before the Supreme Court handed down its 
opinion in Abbott Laboratories. Understandably, the Ninth Circuit did not use the “de mini-
mis” verbiage subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court. One treatise has pointed to other 
language in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion to suggest that the Ninth Circuit employed a different 
test, a “primary purpose” test:  
The primary purpose of the purchases established beyond dispute, was to fulfill the 
needs of the University in providing bowling facilities for its students, faculty and 
staff. This being the case, any additional use of the bowling facilities by the general 
public for a fee, even if such use is substantial, would not establish that the purchases 
were not made for the use of the University. 
Logan Lanes, Inc., 378 F.2d at 217 (emphasis added by KINTNER, supra note 19, §  25.9, at 
467); see also Burge v. Bryant Pub. Sch. Dist., 520 F. Supp. 328, 332 (E.D. Ark. 1980) 
(adopting “primary purpose” test), aff’d on other ground, 658 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam). In Abbott Laboratories, however, the Supreme Court cited Logan Lanes with ap-
proval. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 18 n.10. Thus, the Supreme Court’s “de minimis” test fol-
lows on the Ninth Circuit’s analysis but uses language that shifts the focus from the overall 
character of all uses to the quantity of nonexempt uses. 
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State University campus. A nearby private bowling alley filed the law-
suit, alleging competitive injury because the public was permitted to 
bowl at the Student Union, which enjoyed lower costs due to the 
lower price of the Student Union’s bowling equipment. Early in the 
opinion, the court cited the following facts upon which it later relied 
in finding that the nonexempt use was de minimis: 
The bowling facilities were primarily for the use of students, faculty 
and staff of the University, but were also used by members of the 
public. One use the students make of such bowling equipment is to 
fulfill physical education requirements at the University. All income 
from the Student Union bowling alleys is used to finance student 
activity programs, or goes into a fund for expansion and improve-
ment of the University.125 
The court also noted that, over an almost two-year period, 128,349 
lines were bowled at the Student Union, of which “125,415 were 
bowled by students, faculty, staff and guests, while 2,934 were 
bowled by others.”126 
By contrast, Computronics, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc.,127 is 
an example of a case where nonexempt uses exceeded the bounds of 
de minimis and, therefore, precluded a finding of “own use.” There, 
a computer manufacturer sold computers, at a significant discount, 
to the University of Wisconsin for resale to students and staff. The 
lawsuit for price discrimination was brought by a competing retail 
outlet. The computer manufacturer moved for summary judgment, 
arguing in part that the sales came within the exemption. In denying 
 
 125. Logan Lanes, Inc., 378 F.2d at 214. 
 126. Id. at 215. These facts provide a context to distinguish the evidentiary standard for 
the competitive injury element of the prima facie case of secondary-line price discrimination 
and the outer bounds of the de minimis category. The evidentiary standard for the competitive 
injury element is a reasonable probability or possibility of injury to competition which, for sec-
ondary-line discrimination, can be shown if the favored and disfavored purchasers are in a 
competitive relationship coupled with either a loss of sales by the disfavored purchaser or by 
substantial price differences. In Logan Lanes, this standard was met because the nearby bowl-
ing alley lost sales as demonstrated by the 2934 lines bowled at the Student Union by mem-
bers of the general public. The characterization of nonexempt uses as de minimis did not turn 
upon a comparison of the favored and disfavored purchasers, however. Rather, the characteri-
zation appears to rely, principally, on a percentage comparison of nonexempt uses to exempt 
uses. In Logan Lanes, the general public accounted for just under 2.3 percent of the lines 
bowled at the Student Union. See id. Similarly, in De Modena v. Kaiser Foundation Health 
Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984), fewer than one percent of drug sales were 
made to nonmembers who walked in to fill a prescription, which the court deemed de minimis. 
 127. 600 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Wis. 1985). 
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summary judgment, the court recognized that some of the uses 
might be exempt but noted, 
 
Even if it is assumed that providing faculty and students with com-
puters serves an educational purpose, the Apple-University contract 
allows non-instructional staff, such as janitors, to purchase the 
product at a discount. Although purchasers through the University 
are forbidden to resell merchandise, there is no realistic way to for-
bid such purchasers from using the merchandise in other than an 
educational sense. After all, a student could purchase a computer 
shortly before leaving the University with the intention of using it 
in business after graduation.128 
As these cases demonstrate, the opinion in Abbott Laboratories 
opened the possibility that, although some uses might comply with 
the “own use” requirement, others that do not comply might exceed 
the bounds of de minimis sales and, therefore, would negate a find-
ing of “own use.” To this possibility, the drug manufacturers in Ab-
bott Laboratories argued on behalf of the hospitals that the Court’s 
standard would require a clumsy and expensive system, first, to seg-
regate exempt from nonexempt uses and, second, to account for 
those segregated uses.129 The Court thought the concern was “over-
stated”: 
Looking at the problem from the point of view of the purchasing 
hospital, two alternatives, and perhaps more, are presented. The 
first, and easier, is for the hospital pharmacy not to dispense in any 
way herein above held to be outside the exemption of § 13c. The 
second is for the pharmacy to do exactly what the [drug manufac-
turer] petitioners deplore, namely to establish a recordkeeping pro-
cedure that segregates the nonexempt use from the exempt use. 
This would be supplemented by the hospital’s submission to its 
supplier of an appropriate accounting followed by the price adjust-
ment that is indicated.130 
 
 128. Id. at 812. 
 129. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 19–20. 
 130. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted) (indicating in a footnote that the two alternatives de-
scribed in the text were not meant to be exclusive of ways to comply with the “own use” re-
quirement). 
A leading treatise has drawn a distinction between the facts in Logan Lanes and those in 
Abbott Laboratories to suggest that a requirement of segregating exempt from nonexempt 
uses should not apply to every kind of price-discounted supply: 
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Although the definition of “own use” no doubt leaves difficult 
fact issues in some cases, those who design distribution systems un-
der the Nonprofit Institutions Act can find guidance in three consid-
erations. First, “own use” refers to a function performed, when the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act was enacted, by the kind of purchaser ex-
empted by the Act. Second, the “own use” requirement permits a de 
minimis amount of nonexempt use, that is, use which does not oth-
erwise qualify as “own use” under the statute. Third, if there is more 
 
But the issue in Logan Lanes is very different because the court there was consider-
ing the status of capital equipment—bowling lanes—which were purchased once 
and then used for students and nonstudents alike. The hospital [in Abbott Labora-
tories] at least had the option of purchasing pharmaceuticals at one price for its ex-
empt use and at another price for its nonexempt use. By contrast, Utah State Uni-
versity could comply with a conclusion that the relatively small use made by 
nonstudents was nonimmune only by closing the lanes to nonstudents altogether or 
else closing them entirely. 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 199–200. The treatise then recom-
mends that, “[w]here the purchase in question is of capital or other equipment that must be 
shared” between exempt and nonexempt uses, a “primary purpose” rule should be adopted 
“where the transaction costs of complying with Abbott are too high in relation to the value of 
the product in question.” Id. at 200. 
With all due respect, this suggestion misses the import of Abbott with regard to when a 
segregation is required and overlooks relatively easy alternatives to comply with Abbott even 
where the price-discounted supply represents a capital or fixed cost. In Abbott, the creation of 
the third category of de minimis use means that exempt and nonexempt uses need to be segre-
gated only if nonexempt uses exceed the bounds of de minimis. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
reached the issue of segregating exempt and nonexempt uses only after it found that the “own 
use” requirement had not been met because there were more than a de minimis amount of 
nonexempt uses. Thus, if the nonexempt use does not exceed the bounds of de minimis use, 
that will not negate a finding of “own use,” and there is no need to segregate uses to assure 
compliance with the “own use” requirement, regardless of whether the price-discounted sup-
ply is a fixed or variable cost. 
Moreover, even where nonexempt use of capital equipment exceeds the bounds of de 
minimis use, the facts in Logan Lanes suggest a relatively easy way to comply with the re-
quirement of segregating exempt use from nonexempt use. In Logan Lanes, a survey indicated 
that the general public accounted for approximately 2.3 percent of the lines bowled at the Stu-
dent Union. 378 F.2d at 215. As to the supplier, Brunswick Corp., the University should pay 
the price-discounted price of the bowling alley equipment plus 2.3 percent of the difference 
between the price-discounted price and the competitive price. As to the general public, the 
University should charge an additional fee equal to the amount paid to the supplier in excess of 
the price-discounted price that is prorated over the number of lines bowled by the general 
public during the useful life of the bowling alley equipment. Here, the survey can be used to 
estimate the total number of lines that the general public will bowl over the useful life of the 
equipment. Then, the general public’s price for a line would equal the student price plus an 
amount determined by the extra amount paid for the equipment divided by the total number 
of lines that the general public will bowl. To enforce the system, the lower price per line 
bowled would be available only to those with a university identification card. 
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than a de minimis amount of nonexempt use, the supplier and buyer 
who enjoy the benefits of the exemption should not be heard to 
complain of the burdens of establishing a recordkeeping procedure  
that separates use that qualifies as “own use” from use that does 
not.131 
The requirement that eligible institutions purchase supplies only 
for their “own use” furthers the purpose of the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act to preserve “price favors that sellers would wish to grant to 
eleemosynary institutions.”132 Congress fashioned this exemption so 
that the Robinson-Patman Act would not force eleemosynary institu-
tions to pay higher prices for their supplies, all to the detriment of 
the charitable or other worthy goals that eleemosynary institutions 
pursue. Obviously, this purpose is not served, and the exemption 
would reach more broadly than intended, if price favors are granted 
to eleemosynary institutions for goals other than the charitable and 
other worthy goals that Congress sought to protect from the Robin-
son-Patman Act.133 Thus, it makes perfect sense to define “own use,” 
that is, an exempt use, in terms of the traditional functions or goals 
pursued by eleemosynary institutions when Congress enacted the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
2. Eligible institution 
A second statutory requirement that must be met for the price-
favored purchaser to be an exempt purchaser under the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act is that the purchaser must be an eligible institution. 
When determining if a purchaser is an eligible institution, the De 
Modena court followed a two-step inquiry.134 First, the court asked 
 
 131. The practical result in this third and last scenario would seem to be that, because the 
price-favored purchaser ultimately will pay a higher price for supplies that are directed to a 
nonexempt use, the price-favored purchaser will have to charge its customers a higher price for 
goods or services sold or provided in the context of that nonexempt use. Thus, a price-favored 
purchaser who engages in a more than a de minimis amount of nonexempt use will need to 
maintain its own two-tiered pricing structure: a lower price associated with exempt uses of 
supplies that are appropriately price-discounted and a higher price associated with nonexempt 
uses of supplies that should not be price-discounted. 
 132. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 12. 
 133. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 195 (“The phrase [‘own 
use’] was undoubtedly put in the statute to prevent nonprofits from obtaining an unfair advan-
tage by purchasing at a lower price and then reselling in competition with for-profit firms. . . . 
For example . . . a pharmacy owned by a nonprofit hospital might undersell rival for-profit 
pharmacies.”). 
 134. See De Modena v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d. 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 
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whether the purchaser is among the kinds of institutions specifically 
enumerated in the exemption, that is, “schools, colleges, universities, 
public libraries, churches, [and] hospitals.”135 Second, if the pur-
chaser is not one of the enumerated kinds of purchasers, the court 
then asked whether the purchaser falls within the catchall category of 
“charitable institutions.”136 
Case law has not yet indicated how courts will determine 
whether a purchaser is one of the kinds of institutions specifically 
enumerated in the exemption. It seems unlikely, however, that a 
purchaser can become an eligible institution simply by calling itself 
one of the institutions on the enumerated list. Here, as elsewhere in 
antitrust, courts are likely to look at substance rather than form.137 
While courts have not confirmed that they will take this approach, 
guidance can be gleaned from Abbott Laboratories. There, in the 
context of the “own use” requirement, the Court distinguished the 
status of an enumerated institution and looked, instead, to the tradi-
tional functions performed by an enumerated institution. Following 
this analysis, a purchaser is an eligible institution if a significant por-
tion of the purchaser’s business is to engage in the traditional func-
tions performed by an enumerated institution at the time the exemp-
tion was enacted in 1938. 
Where a purchaser is not among the kinds of institutions specifi-
cally enumerated, courts look to a variety of factors to determine 
whether a purchaser falls within the catchall category of “charitable 
institution.”138 For example, in De Modena, the court recognized 
 
1984) (“The [Nonprofit Institutions] Act does not explicitly list [health plans]. Thus, we must 
determine whether such organizations are charitable institutions . . . .”). 
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1994). 
 136. Id. 
 137. For example, when determining that a wholly owned subsidiary could not conspire 
with its corporate parent for purposes of liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Su-
preme Court noted that, “if antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit 
was clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into unincorpo-
rated divisions. . . . Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals.” Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773–74 (1984); see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58–59 (1977) (“[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason stan-
dard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . formalistic line draw-
ing.”); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967) (“[L]ook at substance rather 
than form.”). 
 138. 15 U.S.C. 13c. In its pharmaceutical industry price discrimination statute, Maine 
provides an exception for charitable institutions that are defined solely in terms of “the re-
quirements of the United States Internal Revenue Code, Section 501(c)(3) . . . .” ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13804(4) (West 1999). At the risk of oversimplification, compliance 
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that, “The definition of the term ‘charitable’ has never been static 
and has been broadened in recent years.”139 Noting that, originally, 
charitable organizations were those who served the indigent and re-
ceived funds primarily from donations, the court found that an or-
ganization of health plans was charitable given modern and less re-
strictive interpretations. The De Modena court based its finding that 
a health plan was charitable by examining how the health plan was 
treated under the law of charitable trusts and by the Internal Reve-
nue Service.140 Another court also looked at how the institution 
characterized itself when incorporating.141 
As the case law develops, hopefully the contours of this require-
ment will become clearer, especially with respect to the definitions of 
the kinds of institutions specifically enumerated in the exemption. 
Regardless of developments in that area, however, the catchall cate-
gory of “charitable institutions” provides a relatively clear alternative 
for those who design distribution systems under the Nonprofit Insti-
tutions Act. If price-favored purchasers are not clearly performing 
the traditional functions of one of the enumerated institutions, the 
supplier should assure that price-favored purchasers are charitable in-
stitutions.142 
The requirement that exempt purchasers must be eligible institu-
 
with § 501(c)(3) principally involves two requirements. The first requirement is no private 
inurement, which means no payment of profits to owners, as opposed to the retention of any 
profits and dedication of those profits to the charitable purposes of the organization. The sec-
ond requirement is that a charitable organization must serve charitable purposes. See generally 
MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 630–37 (3d ed. 
1988) (discussing § 501(c)(3) requirements). In this context, the term, “charitable,” has itself 
been subject to a variety of interpretations, suggesting that there is not much coherence in this 
second requirement. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
85–115 (7th ed. 1998) (discussing scope of the federal tax law definition of charitable). 
 139. De Modena, 743 F.2d. at 1391 (quoting Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. 
Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
 140. See id. at 1391–92 (law of charitable trusts and IRS treat health plans as charitable 
institutions). 
 141. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL 997, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12920, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1995) (noting that IRS determina-
tion and certificate of incorporation is sufficient to show status as not-for-profit charity). 
 142. The analysis in this article suggests a different approach to defining an eligible insti-
tution, depending upon whether the purchaser qualifies as an eligible institution by being ei-
ther one of the enumerated institutions or a charitable institution. Enumerated institutions 
likely will be limited by a historical view that looks to the traditional functions performed by 
those named institutions when the Nonprofit Institutions Act was enacted. Charitable institu-
tions, by contrast, likely will be defined by an evolving view that is affected by the definition of 
charitable institutions in other areas of law. 
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tions demonstrates how Congress drafted the Nonprofit Institutions 
Act to further the purpose to preserve “price favors that sellers would 
wish to grant to eleemosynary institutions.”143 Congress might have 
used the term, “eleemosynary,” and then left to the courts the task 
of defining the kinds of institutions that fell within that rubric. In-
stead, Congress defined eligible institutions slightly more precisely 
by way of a list of institutions and a catchall category.144 Of course, 
any precision gained by the actual language of the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act is largely illusory because judicial interpretation is still 
needed to look behind labels and to define the kinds of institutions 
listed as well as the catch-all category of charitable institutions. 
Nonetheless, Congress eschewed an approach that would have in-
cluded any institution with a worthy goal but sought instead to limit 
the exemption to the charitable and worthy goals of certain kinds of 
institutions. 
3. “Not operated for profit” 
A final statutory requirement that must be met for the price-
favored purchaser to be an exempt purchaser under the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act is that the purchaser may not operate for profit.145 
Issues that arise under this requirement are conceptually distinct 
from those under the other two requirements, even though the fac-
tual inquiries may resemble those under one of the other require-
ments. For example, when determining whether a purchaser is a 
charitable institution, the analysis may likely blur the distinct re-
quirements that the purchaser must be an (1) eligible institution that 
(2) is “not operated for profit.” The reason appears to be that the 
very definition of a “charitable institution” includes the requirement 
that the institution does not operate for profit.146 Also, an otherwise 
 
 143. Abbott Labs., v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 12 (1976). 
 144. See id. at 13 (noting that an earlier version “would have exempted only sales to 
nonprofit institutions ‘supported in whole or in part by public subscriptions,’ was deleted, 83 
CONG. REC. 6065 (1938), and the Act’s exemption provision was not so restricted and con-
fined”). 
 145. One case in the pharmaceutical industry seems to be a relatively straight forward 
application of this requirement, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18048, even though the marketplace outcome has been criticized as anti-
competitive. Pollak, supra note 7, at 984–85. For a symposium that addresses the economic 
implications of this protracted litigation, see Symposium, The US Brand Name Prescription 
Drug Antitrust Litigation, 4 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 237 (1997). 
 146. The potential for confusion when similar factual inquiries arise under conceptually 
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eligible “charitable institution” that engages in for-profit activity 
would lose the exemption for two reasons: (1) it is no longer a chari-
table institution, and (2) it is now operating for profit. 
An issue that has arisen in this context concerns the extent to 
which an institution that overall operates not-for-profit can engage 
in limited for-profit operations without offending this requirement. 
The analysis here may resemble the one to determine whether pur-
chases for nonexempt uses exceed the bounds of de minimis because 
resales for profit do not fall within “own use.” A case which focuses 
upon the “not operated for profit” requirement and shows a strict 
approach is Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co.147 
There, a publisher of law books granted price favors to campus book 
stores who, in turn, resold the books to law students and presuma-
bly, nonstudents.148 The lawsuit was brought by a competing retail 
outlet that sold books and other supplies to law students. In reject-
ing the contention that the sales to the campus book stores came 
within the exemption, the court seemed to rely, in part, on the “not 
operated for profit” requirement: 
Although the appellee [publisher] has sold books to all three of the 
universities for their own use, i.e., for their libraries, the transac-
tions here in question were not actually with the universities, but 
with the self-sustaining campus book stores, and the books sold 
were not for the use of the universities, but for resale at a profit.  
 
separate requirements is demonstrated by a concurring opinion in Abbott Laboratories and in a 
leading treatise. In his concurring opinion in Abbott Laboratories, Justice Marshall opined 
that, if hospitals did not make a profit on sales of price-discounted drugs to the general public, 
those hospitals would come within the exemption because they would be acting in a “charita-
ble” capacity. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 21–23. In this analysis, Justice Marshall did not dis-
tinguish the separate requirements of being an eligible institution and “not operated for 
profit,” and he did so in a case where the issue concerned the “own use” requirement. Id. In 
his treatise, Professor Hovenkamp implicitly collapses the eligible institution and “not operated 
for profit” requirements when he states that, “[w]hat constitutes a qualifying nonprofit institu-
tion has produced little dispute.” HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 195 
(citing and discussing Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. 
Cir. 1955)). 
 147. 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
 148. Because the court’s opinion does not mention that sales were restricted to students, 
the fair inference is that the bookstores were open to the general public. See HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 195 (“[T]hey [Bookstores] purchased educational law 
books at a discriminatorily low price and resold them to students and nonstudents alike.”). 
Such an inference raises concerns under the “own use” requirement because, to the extent that 
law books are resold to the general public, those sales do not further the traditional function 
associated with a university. 
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The exemption provision is therefore inapplicable to these transac-
tions.149 
The campus book stores in Students Book Company were 
deemed operating for profit even though those bookstores were 
characterized as “self-sustaining.” Although the court did not elabo-
rate upon their methods of business, the “self-sustaining” characteri-
zation suggests that, financially, the book stores operated independ-
ently without receiving subsidies from the larger universities or, for 
that matter, passing along profits to those universities.150 In fact, it 
does not appear that the campus book stores were considered to be a 
part of the larger university with which each was associated. Indeed, 
when the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories cited the case with 
approval, the Court noted that, “we are in accord with the District 
of Columbia Circuit’s characterization of the bookstore purchases as 
not being transactions with the universities at all, but with the cam-
pus bookstores for resale at the latter’s profit.”151 
On different facts, a different result was reached in Logan Lanes, 
a case that was discussed in the context of the “own use” require-
ment. As noted in that discussion, an eligible institution that does 
not operate for profit may engage in a de minimis number of sales 
that do not comply with the “own use” requirement. In Logan 
Lanes, the court found “own use” despite the fact that the bowling 
alleys at the Student Union were open to the public who did not use 
the bowling alleys for university purposes. On the issue of profits, 
that court looked, not to the fact that profits may have been made 
from a de minimis number of public sales, but to the use of those 
profits: 
The primary purpose of the purchases [of bowling equipment] es-
tablished beyond dispute, was to fulfill the needs of the University 
in providing bowling facilities for its students, faculty and staff. This 
being the case, any additional use of the bowling facilities by the 
general public for a fee, even if such use is substantial, would not  
 
 
  149.  Students Book Co. v. Wash. Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49, 50–51 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 
1955). 
 150. See HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 195 (“[The bookstores] 
were self-sustaining in the sense that they required no operating funds from the university.”). 
 151. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 19 n.10. 
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establish that the purchases were not made for the use of the 
University.152 
Thus, the “not operated for profit” requirement was met because to 
the extent that the facilities are used by persons other than students, 
faculty and staff, the net proceeds of such additional use was directed 
to defray the costs of the university’s overall operation. 
Another issue that arises in this context concerns the extent to 
which an institution that is “not operated for profit” can be con-
trolled by an institution that is operated for profit. In De Modena, 
retail pharmacies challenged price favors granted to a non-profit or-
ganization of health plans who “provide[d] interested members with 
a ‘drug plan.’”153 The retail pharmacies argued that, while the health 
plans were “organized as non-profit institutions,” the health plans 
were actually operated for profit because those plans were “con-
trolled by Permanente Medical Groups, which are for-profit corpora-
tions consisting of doctors who provide medical care for members 
[of the health plans].”154 When rejecting this argument, the court 
examined the substance of the financial arrangements between the 
health plans and the doctors’ for-profit corporations: 
The [doctors’] Medical Groups do not set their own fees. The 
HP’s [health plans] pay the Medical Groups an agreed upon 
amount per member per month, and this amount does not vary 
with the volume of service the group provides to the membership. 
This fact greatly limits the amount of control the Medical Groups 
can exercise over the HP’s. That the HP’s and Kaiser Hospitals 
must fulfill their need for certain medical services by contracting 
with doctors who seek a profit does not make the HP’s and Kaiser 
Hospitals themselves for-profit organizations.155 
 
 152. Logan Lanes, Inc., v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F.2d 212, 217 (9th Cir. 1967). The 
Logan Lanes court distinguished Students Book Co. because, there, profits were used to sus-
tain the bookstores but not for university purposes. Id. 
 153. De Modena v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 743 F.2d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 
1984). Thus, De Modena follows an aspect of the requirement of no private inurement for 
charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the United States Internal Revenue Code. Pro-
vided that the profits from a business that is related to the charitable purpose are retained and 
dedicated to the charitable purpose, an organization will not lose its tax-exempt status under § 
501(c)(3). See supra note 138. 
 154. De Modena, 743 F.2d at 1391. 
 155. Id. (footnote omitted) (noting also that the IRS had found that the health plans 
were not sufficiently controlled by the doctors’ for-profit corporations to indicate that the 
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Although difficult fact issues no doubt will arise, the cases just 
discussed provide some guidance for those who design distribution 
systems under the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The Students Book 
Company and Logan Lanes courts examined the “not operated for 
profit” requirement where the price-favored purchaser operated as a 
discrete unit within a larger nonprofit institution. The Students Book 
Company court found that the requirement was not met because any 
profits were retained so that the discrete unit would be self-
sustaining. By contrast, the Logan Lanes court found that the re-
quirement was met because any profits from a de minimis number of 
nonexempt sales were used to defray the costs of the overall not-for-
profit operations of the larger institution. Thus, if a purchaser is a 
unit within an eligible institution, the unit should either be operated 
strictly not-for-profit or direct any profits from de minimis nonex-
empt sales to defray the costs of the overall not-for-profit operations 
of the eligible institution.156 
The De Modena court examined the “not operated for profit” 
requirement where an otherwise exempt purchaser maintained finan-
cial arrangements with an organization operated for profit. The De 
Modena court found that the requirement was met because the for-
profit organization did not financially control the operations of the 
exempt purchaser. Specifically, the court examined the fees paid by 
the exempt purchaser to the for-profit organization, and the facts in-
dicated that the amount of those fees were not related to the amount 
of discounted supplies purchased or used by the exempt purchaser. 
Thus, if an exempt purchaser has financial arrangements with an or-
ganization that is operated for profit, those arrangements should not 
transfer revenues to the for-profit organization based upon the  
 
health plans operated for profit). 
 156. This is the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in an opinion that was vacated by 
the Supreme Court: 
It was undisputed that the hospitals derived substantial profits from the sale of drugs 
and from time to time enjoyed over-all operating surpluses. However, the existence 
of such profits or surpluses is not in itself enough to foreclose availability of the ex-
emption. In an integrated medical center it is to be expected that one department 
may provide financial support to another. 
Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 510 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated 
by, 425 U.S. 1 (1976). Perhaps because the facts in Abbott Laboratories demonstrated that, 
overall, the hospitals “operated not for profit,” the Supreme Court disposed of the case by fo-
cusing upon another requirement, the “own use” requirement. See also Abbott Labs., 425 
U.S. at 6–7 (noting that hospitals’ pharmacies operated at a profit but that the profits sup-
ported other activities). 
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amount of price-discounted supplies purchased or used by the ex-
empt purchaser. 
These results make sense in light of the purpose of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act to preserve “price favors that sellers would wish to 
grant to eleemosynary institutions.”157 This purpose would be frus-
trated if the financial benefits of price favors intended for exempt 
purchasers were diverted to for-profit operations. A larger and oth-
erwise exempt institution should not be allowed to secure price fa-
vors so that a discrete unit may gain a competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
price-disfavored competitors. So too, a for-profit organization that 
has financial arrangements with an exempt purchaser should not be 
allowed to increase its revenues based upon the price favors granted 
to the exempt purchaser. In either situation, the exemption would 
reach more broadly than intended because the financial benefits of 
price favors that Congress wanted to preserve for exempt purchasers 
would be diverted to nonexempt purposes. 
4. Exempt purchasers, arbitrage, and “own use” clauses 
Clearly, the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption is available 
only to the supplier and purchaser in those transactions where the 
price-favored purchaser complies with each and every one of the 
three requirements just discussed. This much seems certain, not only 
from the express language of the statute, but also from the policy of 
construing antitrust exemptions narrowly. The exemption will neces-
sarily have a narrower reach if each and every element must be satis-
fied before price discrimination is exempted. There simply appears 
no way for a supplier to benefit from the exemption by granting 
price favors to a purchaser who complies with only one or perhaps 
two of the three statutory requirements. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this observation may have been lost on 
those who design distribution systems to come within the exemp-
tion. Consider, for example, the following “own use” clause: 
[Purchaser] certifies that although it is not a non-profit institution 
within the meaning of the Non Profit Institutions Act, pharmaceu-
ticals purchased at contract pricing are for [purchaser]’s “own use,” 
as defined in DeModena, et al. v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 
 
 157. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 12. 
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Inc., et al., 743 F.2d 13888 [sic] (9th Cir. 1984) applying the  
holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories, et al. 
v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, Inc., 425 U.S. 1 
(1976).158 
This clause simply does not make sense. In effect, the clause asks 
a purchaser who is not exempt, because it operates for profit, to cer-
tify that it is exempt, because it will comply with the “own use” re-
quirement. While this “own use” clause may purport to prevent arbi-
trage indirectly, in no way does this clause bring an otherwise illegal 
price discrimination strategy within the Nonprofit Institutions Act 
exemption. To the contrary, this clause indicates that the exemption 
is not available because the price-favored purchaser does not meet 
the necessary requirement of “not operated for profit.”159 
In civil cases, a failure to analyze each of the three requirements 
of the Nonprofit Institutions Act might not reflect a misunderstand-
ing of the exemption. In those cases, the party alleging illegal price 
discrimination can show that the exemption does not apply with 
proof that the distribution system fails to meet any one of the three 
statutory requirements. Thus, the parties or the court can focus upon 
the one requirement at issue, perhaps giving no more than a list of 
the other requirements. To address or resolve the dispositive issue, 
the parties or the court opinion do not need to venture beyond the 
particular requirement at issue to discuss facts which might show 
whether other requirements are met or not. This may give the erro-
neous impression that sales are exempt if the purchaser meets only 
one of what are three separate and necessary requirements. For ex-
ample, in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Abbott Laboratories, the 
principal focus was upon the “own use” requirement, and the Court 
 
 158. Ferro I, No. 99-00180-0104-CR-W-SOW, 2000 WL 33394614, at *3 (W.D. Mo. 
May 8, 2000) (first two sets of bracketed text added). 
 159. There is a more cynical view that is motivated, at least in part, by populist concerns 
for the survival of neighborhood retail pharmacies: 
[M]any states have price discrimination statutes and their function is to disallow the 
large corporation from starving the small neighborhood business and its patrons. Al-
though the purposes of the statutes are to prohibit the creation of meaningless 
classes which are used as vehicles to afford major purchasers exorbitant discounts, 
manufacturers still manage to employ discount tactics. The creation of as many as 
eight different classes has permitted Maryland manufacturers to evade the impact of 
the Robinson-Patman Act. A different sales price is attached to each of the eight 
classes, thus the general public foots the bill and in effect subsidizes the low prices 
afforded to HMOs and hospitals for no justifiable reason. 
Pisone, supra note 34, at 78–79 (footnotes omitted). 
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did not emphasize facts which would have indicated whether the 
supplier limited sales to eligible institutions who did not operate for 
profit. This may have led some—like the supplier who drafted the 
“own use” clause just quoted—to design a price-favored distribution 
channel with only the “own use” requirement in mind. 
In criminal cases involving “own use” clauses, however, a failure 
to establish that the distribution system was designed to comply with 
all three of the requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act seems 
based upon a lack of an understanding that antitrust issues are pre-
sent or, perhaps, of the exemption itself. In a criminal case, if an anti-
trust exemption is brought into play, it is in the prosecution’s inter-
est to show that antitrust policy issues need not be considered.160 
Indeed, in Ferro, where antitrust issues came into play and were ex-
plicitly considered, the District Court dismissed the indictment, in 
significant part, because the distribution system was not designed to 
meet all of the requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act ex-
emption.161 Thus, it is in the prosecution’s interests to show that all 
of the requirements of the exemption are present. Such a showing 
would indicate that there is no antitrust violation thereby removing 
any need to consider antitrust policy issues.162 
With respect to the “own use” requirement, it is worth empha-
sizing that a supplier’s legal interests of avoiding antitrust liability by 
granting price favors only to exempt purchasers dovetails with the 
supplier’s economic interests of preventing price-favored purchasers 
from engaging in arbitrage. For both interests, an “own use” clause 
plays an instrumental role. A supplier’s price-favored purchasers must 
comply with the “own use” requirement to qualify for the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act exemption. By demanding an “own use” clause, a 
supplier can contractually assure that one of the three statutory re-
 
 160. The District Court in Ferro I made this point implicitly by noting, “With respect to 
the contracts at issue in this case, the pharmaceutical manufacturers have the burden of estab-
lishing that a transaction falls within the exemption of the Nonprofit Institutions Act because it 
is the manufacturers who enjoy the benefit of the exemption.” Ferro I, 2000 WL 33394614, 
at *4. If the burden does not fall on the defendants in a criminal case to prove that they did 
not comply with the Nonprofit Institutions Act, then the burden falls on the government who 
benefits by removing antitrust issues from consideration. 
 161. Id. at *3–*5. 
 162. Indeed, the Eight Circuit, which reversed the District Court in Ferro, indicated that 
Robinson-Patman Act compliance issues were relevant, Ferro II, 252 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 
2001), and that, on remand, the burden was on the government to “present pharmaceutical 
seller witnesses to testify as to the materiality of any ‘own use’ misrepresentations.” Id. at 968. 
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quirements will be met. Also, as noted already, a supplier who pur-
sues a price discrimination strategy must prevent arbitrage for the 
strategy to be successful in the marketplace. By demanding an “own 
use” clause, a supplier can contractually prohibit arbitrage, thereby 
providing that the economic interests are met. 
A supplier who pursues a price discrimination strategy and seeks 
the legal benefits of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption must 
also prevent arbitrage because a price-favored purchaser who engages 
in arbitrage will not likely meet one or both of the other two neces-
sary requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act. Arbitrage is a 
quintessentially for-profit activity.163 Thus, a price-favored purchaser 
who engages in arbitrage is not, to that extent, a charitable institu-
tion, the catchall category for the requirement of a qualified institu-
tion.164 So too, a price-favored purchaser who engages in arbitrage is 
not, to that extent, meeting the requirement of “not operated for 
profit.” Thus, for the supplier to assure that price favors are granted 
only to exempt purchasers, the supplier must assure that price-
favored purchasers do not engage in arbitrage. Here as well, by de-
manding an “own use” clause, the supplier can contractually prevent 
a practice that would destroy the exempt status of the price-favored 
purchaser. 
C. Statutory Requirements and Enforcing an “Own Use” Clause 
Once a distribution system has been designed to comply with the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act, both the supplier and its price-favored 
 
 163. The discussion in the text uses “arbitrage” in the common language sense of buying 
from a seller and reselling at a profit to those who otherwise would purchase from the seller at 
a higher price. Of course, one can imagine a scenario where an exempt purchaser obtains sup-
plies at a discount and then sells to others without charging a price that generates revenues 
above the original cost of the supplies and the transaction costs of resale. Such a sale would not 
generate an accounting profit. This scenario is not likely to involve a resale to another exempt 
purchaser because that other exempt purchaser presumably could obtain the supplies directly 
from the supplier at the original discount without paying the reseller for the transaction costs 
of resale. Thus, this scenario likely will involve resale to a nonexempt purchaser who is willing 
to pay any price less than that charged for supplies not sold at a discount. Here, there is no 
reason for the exempt purchaser to forgo profit opportunities. 
 164. Under the tax law, a charitable institution may earn profits and retain its charitable 
status, provided that those profits are used for charitable purposes but not distributed to pri-
vate shareholders or other owners. See supra note 138. Under the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 
a different result may follow from a different focus under the “own use” requirement. Under 
the exemption, the question is whether the price-discounted supplies are used for exempt uses, 
allowing only for a de minimis amount of nonexempt uses. 
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purchasers benefit from ongoing compliance with the exemption’s 
requirements. The supplier, as a for-profit entity, benefits because 
price discrimination enables the supplier to garner increased profits. 
The price-favored purchasers, as eleemosynary institutions, benefit 
because price discrimination allows them to pay lower prices for sup-
plies. Those lower prices, in turn, translate into lower costs that en-
able the price-favored eleemosynary institutions to expand the prod-
ucts or services that they offer as they pursue their charitable or other 
worthy goals. Of course, these benefits are available only if the price-
favored purchasers comply with each of the three requirements of 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
1. Incentives to cheat 
A problem arises, however, because price-favored purchasers have 
strong incentives to cheat or chisel on the “own use” requirement 
that impliedly prevents arbitrage.165 A price-favored purchaser who 
engages in arbitrage and diverts supplies to those who are willing to 
pay a higher price potentially can garner significant profits,166 at least 
in the short run. This is especially true for industries like the pharma-
ceutical industry, where price-favored purchasers in the “closed 
door” channel have paid as little as twenty-five percent of the price 
paid by price-disfavored purchasers in the “open door” channel.167 
To garner profits through arbitrage, the price-favored purchaser aims 
to charge a price that is slightly less than the price charged by the 
supplier to price-disfavored purchasers. The profit garnered by the 
price-favored purchaser is the difference between the price charged 
to the price-disfavored purchasers and the price paid to the supplier, 
less any transaction costs incurred by the price-favored purchaser 
 
 165. Those incentives are almost indistinguishable from the incentives that lead a mem-
ber of a price-fixing cartel to cheat or chisel on the agreement to maintain high prices by low-
ering price and expanding output to take advantage of profit opportunities. See generally 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 147–52 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing cartels, incentives to cheat, and monitoring); 
CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW: INTERPRETATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 1–3 (1998) (numerical example of “chiselers” on price-fixing cartels). 
 166. United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 666 (8th Cir.1993) (“The record clearly 
supports a finding that Civella controlled the diversion operation, an operation that produced 
large profits with little work and almost no investment.”). 
 167. Id. at 659 (“[D]rug manufacturers sell pharmaceuticals to institutional [“closed 
door”] pharmacies at prices that may be as low as twenty-five percent of the prices at which the 
companies sell drugs to other [“open door”] customers.”). 
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when reselling to price-disfavored purchasers. 
From an economic perspective concerned with success in the 
marketplace, the profit opportunities of arbitrage or diversion will 
likely be short lived, however. If the supplier knows the identity of 
the price-favored purchaser who resells, the supplier can end arbi-
trage simply by refusing to deal with that reseller.168 If the supplier 
does not know the identity of the diverting reseller, when arbitrage 
starts, the supplier likely will respond by competing with the reseller, 
the price-favored purchaser who diverts and resells into the price-
disfavored distribution channel. This competition will exert a down-
ward pressure on price until every purchaser, price-favored and price-
disfavored, pays the same, lower price. When this happens, the profit 
opportunities of arbitrage will evaporate. To be more precise, profit 
opportunities of arbitrage will evaporate as soon as the supplier 
charges a price to price-disfavored purchasers that equals the price 
the supplier charges the price-favored purchaser who engages in arbi-
trage plus that price-favored purchaser’s transaction costs of arbi-
trage. 
From a legal perspective concerned with antitrust compliance, 
the profit opportunities of arbitrage or diversion will also likely be 
short lived. The profit opportunities of arbitrage will evaporate be-
cause the supplier will lose the exemption of the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act. As noted already, by engaging in arbitrage, an otherwise 
exempt purchaser risks non-compliance with the requirements of the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act which would, in turn, jeopardize the anti-
trust exemption for both the supplier and the price-favored pur-
chaser. If the price-favored purchaser no longer complies with all of 
the statutory requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, the ex-
emption does not apply, and the supplier may not sell to the price-
favored purchaser at the lower price without offending the Robin-
son-Patman Act’s prohibition of price discrimination. To avoid anti-
trust liability, the astute supplier will cease granting price favors to 
any price-favored purchaser who engages in arbitrage. When the 
price-favored purchaser who previously engaged in arbitrage is 
charged the same price that the supplier charges those to whom that 
purchaser had diverted supplies, arbitrage will cease. 
 
 168. Id. at 666 (diverting reseller terminated after discovery of diversion operation); see 
also Petersen, supra note 31, at C1 (“drug companies send auditors to wholesalers and phar-
macies, and cut off those that raise suspicions [under the Prescription Marketing Act of 
1987]”). 
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Nonetheless, where incentives are sufficiently strong, arbitrage is 
likely. For example, a price-favored purchaser may believe that arbi-
trage will likely escape detection, thereby extending the time period 
over which the price favored purchaser expects to garner profits. 
Even where detection is likely and the profit opportunities of arbi-
trage are likely to be short lived, if the amount of profits are suffi-
ciently high, the temptation to engage in arbitrage may still be 
strong. Indeed, in the criminal cases already cited, defendants di-
verted pharmaceutical products and pursued the profit opportunities 
of arbitrage despite the possibility of detection. The reason, it seems, 
is that the defendants thought that they could avoid detection, the 
profit opportunities were substantial, or both.169 
2. Enforcement alternatives 
Consequently, suppliers who seek to avoid illegal secondary-line 
price discrimination by complying with the Nonprofit Institutions 
Act have strong incentives to monitor price-favored purchasers to as-
sure compliance with “own use” clauses and to enforce those clauses 
where necessary. Of course, suppliers might enforce “own use” 
clauses directly by filing an action for breach of contract. Damages 
likely would equal profits that the supplier lost to a price-favored 
purchaser who engages in arbitrage,170 and a remedy of specific per-
formance might direct the price-favored purchaser to comply with 
the “own use” restriction by refraining from diverting supplies and 
engaging in arbitrage.171 Nonetheless, an action for breach of con-
tract might not be an effective deterrent to price-favored purchasers 
who are tempted by the profit opportunities of arbitrage. Under the 
 
 169. Of course, one way to reap the profit opportunities of arbitrage and to avoid detec-
tion is to misrepresent that pharmaceutical products will not be diverted. As one court noted, 
“While it represents no illegality in itself, the diversion industry clearly presents unique oppor-
tunities for the development of fraudulent practices.” United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 
1522, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 170. See generally 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.10, at 
209–20 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing contract damages for non-breaching supplier, including lost 
profits). For a general statement of rules concerning the calculation of damages for breach of 
contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1979); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra, 
§ 12.1, at 146–53. 
 171. For general statements of rules affecting the availability of specific performance, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357, 359–69 (1981); 3 FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 170, §§ 12.4 to 12.7, at 159–87; U.C.C. § 2-716 (1977). 
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preferred measure of contract damages,172 price-favored purchasers 
probably risk only the profits that the supplier would have earned 
had the price-favored purchasers adhered to the “own use” clauses, 
an amount that likely would approximate the price-favored pur-
chaser’s own gain from arbitrage.173 Thus, in a contract action, the 
price-favored purchaser who engages in arbitrage likely risks only the 
profits from arbitrage, but no more. In addition to contract reme-
dies, a price-favored purchaser who engages in arbitrage and loses its 
exempt status also loses its continuing ability to purchase supplies at 
lower costs, all to the detriment of any charitable or other worthy 
goals that the purchaser pursues. 
Suppliers might indirectly enforce “own use” clauses by filing a 
tort action for fraud.174 The theory here is that the price-favored pur-
chaser induced a supplier to sell at a lower price by signing a contract 
containing an “own use” clause, even though the price-favored pur-
chaser had no intention of adhering to the “own use” clause.175 The 
 
 172. The preferred measure of damages is the expectation interest: 
How do courts encourage promisees to rely on promises? Ordinarily they do so by 
protecting the expectation that the injured party had when making the contract by 
attempting to put that party in as good a position as it would have been in had the 
contract been performed, that is, had there been no breach. The interest measured 
in this way is called the expectation interest and is said to give the injured party the 
“benefit of the bargain.” 
3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 170, § 12.1, at 147; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1981) (“Contract damages are ordinarily based on the injured 
party’s expectation interest and are intended to give him the benefit of his bargain by awarding 
him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the contract been performed.”). For expectation measures of damages that 
apply to the sales of goods, see U.C.C. §§ 2-712, 2-713 (1977). 
 173. See generally 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 170, § 12.20b, at 357–67 (discussing 
appropriateness of damages based upon disgorgement of the breaching party’s gain). For a 
discussion of the circumstances under which an injured party’s loss equals the injuring party’s 
gain, see Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1909, 1917–24 (1997). 
 174. For a brief discussion of the elements of a civil action for fraud, see 2 FOWLER V. 
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.1, at 381 (2d ed. 1986). 
 175. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 544 (1977) (“The recipient of a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation of intention is justified in relying upon it if the existence of the intention 
is material and the recipient has reason to believe that it will be carried out.”); 2 HARPER ET 
AL., supra note 174, § 7.10, at 445–46 (“Promises and statements of the speaker’s intention or 
purpose are now generally recognized as involving a statement or implication of the speaker’s 
own state of mind. . . . The question then arises whether it is a material fact and . . . the law 
has been readier to recognize the potential materiality of the speaker’s intention than of his 
opinions.”). As the source just cited explains: 
Promissory statements deserve separate treatment. “A promissory statement is not, 
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price-favored purchaser’s subsequent diversion and arbitrage are evi-
dence of the original, fraudulent intent.176 In a tort action, the po-
tential for punitive damages creates a greater deterrent to arbi-
trage.177 The price-favored purchaser risks losing more than damages 
that would compensate the supplier for lost profits which, as already 
noted, likely would approximate the price-favored purchaser’s own 
gain from arbitrage.178 Thus, in a tort action, the price-favored pur-
chaser may risk more than the profits from arbitrage. In addition to 
tort remedies, a price-favored purchaser who engages in arbitrage 
risks its continuing ability to purchase supplies at lower costs. 
Another way for a supplier to enforce an “own use” clause indi-
rectly is to enlist the government’s assistance in bringing a criminal 
action for fraud. It is altogether possible that this may have happened 
in the criminal cases cited above. The court’s opinion in Costanzo 
indicates that this is what happened.179 Criminal sanctions effectively 
enforce a contractual provision like an “own use” clause if the threat 
of criminal sanctions provides incentives to adhere to such a clause. 
 
ordinarily, the subject either of an indictment or of an action.” On the other hand, 
the promise itself is generally regarded as a representation of a present intention to 
perform. Hence, such a promise, made by one not intending to perform, is a mis-
representation—a misrepresentation of the speaker’s present state of mind—and is 
actionable as a misrepresentation of fact. 
Id. § 7.10, at 447 (footnotes omitted). 
 176. As with all misrepresentations, to be actionable, there must be reliance, and the reli-
ance must be justifiable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977). “In order for reli-
ance upon a statement of intention to be justifiable, the recipient of the statement must be jus-
tified in his expectation that the intention will be carried out.” Id. at § 544 cmt. c. See also 2 
HARPER ET AL., supra note 174, § 7.8, at 423–24 (“A person who relies on a misrepresenta-
tion can recover for losses caused to him thereby only if the law regards his reliance as justifi-
able.”). Thus, to the extent that drug manufacturers are aware that price-favored purchasers 
will not adhere to an “own use” restriction, a tort action for fraud is not likely to prevail. Cf. 
United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1533 (11th Cir. 1985) (although defendants al-
leged that “some manufacturers ‘wink’ at representations of nonprofit or export status in order 
to use the diversion market as a ‘dumping-ground’ for drugs nearing expiration,” jury finding 
of fraud upheld). 
 177. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1977) (discussing puni-
tive damages in tort actions). By contrast, in contract, the general rule is that punitive damages 
are not available unless the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are available. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). 
 178. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977) (outlining damages 
for fraudulent misrepresentation); 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 174, § 7.15, at 477–92 (dis-
cussing actual and consequential damages for fraud). 
 179. United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 666 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[E]mployees at Ciba-
Geigy [pharmaceutical supplier] did discover Care’s diversion within a period of months, re-
ported it to the FBI, and subsequently discontinued selling to Care.”). 
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Indeed, criminal sanctions potentially have a more widespread im-
pact than a civil action brought by a supplier. A successful prosecu-
tion in one case not only has a specific deterrent effect on that de-
fendant, but also a general deterrent effect on others who may be 
tempted by the profit opportunities of arbitrage. Thus, criminal sanc-
tions, including the possibility of incarceration, provide a potentially 
effective mechanism to enforce “own use” clauses. 
3. Civil contexts of enforcement 
Any enforcement of “own use” clauses that are part of a price 
discrimination strategy should not proceed without a careful exami-
nation of antitrust issues, including the requirements of the Non-
profit Institutions Act exemption. If there is a prima facie case of il-
legal price discrimination and no affirmative defense, the legality of 
the distribution system turns upon compliance with the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act. If such a distribution system does not comply with 
all of the requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, the distri-
bution system constitutes illegal price discrimination. The seller 
would be liable under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act,180 
and a purchaser who knowingly accepts or induces the price favor 
would be liable under section 2(f).181 
If analysis shows that the price discrimination strategy is illegal, 
the “own use” clause is integral to the illegality because the “own 
use” clause prevents arbitrage and thereby enables the illegal price 
discrimination scheme to be successful in the marketplace. Courts do 
not, however, enforce contract clauses that are part of an illegal 
scheme and therefore contrary to public policy. Thus, without care-
ful consideration of whether a distribution system was designed to 
come within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption, a court risks 
lending its hand to enforce an “own use” clause that is integral to il-
legal price discrimination. 
As an illustrative example of the problems that may arise when an 
“own use” clause is enforced without examining the broader context 
of the price discrimination strategy, consider the following facts 
which are based on those in Ferro. A price-favored purchaser of 
pharmaceutical products in the “closed door” channel of distribution 
signed a contract that included a clause indicating that the purchaser 
 
 180. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994). 
 181. Id. § 13(f). 
1COR.DOC 3/5/02  8:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1448 
will use the products for its “own use” by reselling only to patients in 
nursing homes.182 At the same time, however, the purchaser truth-
fully represented to the drug manufacturers that it is a for-profit op-
eration.183 The drug manufacturers nonetheless charged a lower price 
to the purchaser for the same products that it sold, at higher prices, 
in the “open door” channel. The price-favored purchaser and price-
disfavored purchasers were in the same geographic area and, but for 
the difference in price, the price-disfavored purchasers would have 
sold to the patients in nursing homes who were serviced by the 
price-favored purchaser. The price differences did not, however, re-
flect different costs, changed circumstances, or a good faith effort to 
meet competition. Subsequently, the price-favored purchaser pur-
sued the profit opportunities of arbitrage and resold some of the 
pharmaceutical products to distributors in the “open door” channel. 
On these facts, the reasons why the drug manufacturer required 
the purchaser to represent that the products are for its “own use” 
seem obvious. The manufacturer’s objectives were twofold. First, by 
requiring the purchaser to represent that the drugs will be for its 
“own use,” the manufacturer seeks to create a “closed door” channel 
that comes within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. This 
seems obvious because the “own use” language is taken from the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act.184 Second, by requiring the purchaser to 
represent that the drugs will be for its “own use,” the manufacturer 
seeks to prevent the purchaser from engaging in arbitrage by resell-
ing into the “open door” channel. This seems obvious because an 
“own use” clause is one way to prevent the arbitrage that would not 
allow the price discrimination strategy to achieve success in the mar-
ketplace. The manufacturer thus uses the “own use” restriction to 
come within an exemption to illegal price discrimination and, at the 
 
 182. Examples of the actual clauses signed by the defendant-purchasers in Ferro were 
included in the District Court’s opinion and are reproduced, supra notes 68, 156, and text 
accompanying note 67. 
 183. Ferro I, No. 99-00180-0104-CR-W-SOW, 2000 WL 33394614, at *4–*6 (W.D. 
Mo. May 8, 2000) (with respect to four contracts, defendant-purchasers represented them-
selves as operating through a “Profit Corp.,” “a ‘for profit’ entity,” “For Profit,” and “a for-
profit organization”). Further, in that case, on one contract, one of the individual defendants 
“wrote ‘N/A’ next to a paragraph stating that the company was an eligible institution under 
the Non Profit Institutions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13c.” Id. at *2. 
 184. Indeed, in Ferro I, the District Court found that “own use” clauses referring to the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption were employed for this purpose. Id. at *4; see supra note 
71. 
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same time, to prevent arbitrage that would not allow the price dis-
crimination strategy to be economically successful. 
On these facts, the contract with an “own use” restriction none-
theless is part of an illegal secondary-line price discrimination strat-
egy. The distribution system satisfies a prima facie case and does not 
fall within an affirmative defense such as cost justification, changed 
circumstances, or meeting competition. The legality of the price dis-
crimination strategy therefore turns upon the availability of the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. That exemption is not avail-
able, however. The reason is that the purchaser is a for-profit organi-
zation, which indicates that the purchaser fails to comply with one of 
the necessary requirements of the exemption, the requirement of 
“not operated for profit.” 
On these facts, efforts to enforce the “own use” clause seem 
wholly misplaced. Indeed, the drug manufacturer no doubt could 
not bring a contract action to enforce the “own use” clause directly. 
Although the principal focus of this article is not upon judicial en-
forcement of illegal contracts, it is worth noting that there is doc-
trinal support for this conclusion. Courts do not allow themselves to 
become a party to illegality by enforcing contracts that are illegal and 
therefore contrary to public policy.185 Even where courts exercise 
their discretion to enforce some aspects of a contract, courts refrain 
from enforcing the particular clause or clauses that are integral to the 
illegality.186 The “own use” clause, of course, is integral to the 
illegality: the “own use” clause, because it prevents arbitrage, is  
 185. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 81–82 (1982) (“the illegality defense 
should be entertained in those circumstances where its rejection would be to enforce conduct 
that the antitrust laws forbid”); Kelly v. Konsuga, 358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959) (contract defense 
of illegality should be limited to situations that would “make the courts a party to the carrying 
out of one of the very restraints forbidden by the Sherman Act”). See Resolution Trust Corp. 
v. Home Sav. of Am., 946 F.2d 93, 96–97 (8th Cir. 1991) (contracts entered into in violation 
of federal statutory laws are unenforceable). See generally KINTNER, supra note 19, § 3.3 
(common law courts have long refused to enforce contracts in restraint of trade); 3 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 170, §§ 5.1 and 5.3, at 2–8 and 18–31 (public policy as a ground to 
deny contract enforcement generally and contracts in restraint of trade particularly). 
 186. See generally 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 170, at §§ 5.7 to 5.8, at 78–87 (discuss-
ing “divisibility” whereby courts may “hold[] agreements unenforceable only in part”). For 
example, in Kelly, 358 U.S. 516, a purchaser of onions sought to avoid payment, arguing that 
the contract violated the antitrust laws because the seller agreed to refrain from delivering addi-
tional onions to the futures market so that the price of onions would be fixed and the quantity 
limited. The Court declined to extend the defense of illegality that far: 
Past the point where the judgment of the Court would itself be enforcing the pre-
cise conduct made unlawful by the Act, the courts are to be guided by the overrid-
ing general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it, “of preventing people from getting 
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gality: the “own use” clause, because it prevents arbitrage, is neces-
sary for the illegal price discrimination strategy to be successful in the 
marketplace.187 If the drug manufacturer brought a breach of con-
tract action against the purchaser for failing to adhere to the “own 
use” clause, the purchaser could successfully defend by pointing out 
that the “own use” clause is unenforceable as contrary to public pol-
icy because the “own use” clause is integral to the illegal price dis-
crimination strategy.188 
 
other people’s property for nothing when they purport to be buying it.” 
Id. at 520–21 (quoting Cont’l Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 
271 (1909) (dissenting opinion)). The Court then pointed out that the defense of illegality 
would not extend to those parts of the contract that were not tainted by the illegality: 
Accordingly, while the nondelivery agreement between the parties could not be en-
forced by a court, if its unlawful character under the Sherman Act be assumed, it can 
hardly be said to enforce a violation of the Act to give legal effect to a completed 
sale of onions at a fair price. 
Id. at 521; see also Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 81 n.7 (1982) (“A defendant 
proffering the defense seeks only to be relieved of an illegal obligation and does not ask any 
affirmative remedy based on the antitrust . . . laws.”); Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. Am. Can Co., 330 
U.S. 743, 755 (1947) (rejecting defense to payment by a price disfavored purchaser who 
claimed that price discounts given to favored purchasers constituted illegal price discrimina-
tion). See generally KINTNER, supra note 19, § 30.14 (discussing holding in Bruce’s Juices); 3 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 170, § 5.9, at 88 (exception to rule against restitution of unenforce-
able agreement where “forfeiture . . . is disproportionate to the contravention of public policy 
involved”). For cases that have adopted this approach in the context of alleged Robinson-
Patman violations, see Delta Marina, Inc. v. Plaquemine Oil Sales, Inc., 644 F.2d 455, 458–59 
(5th Cir. 1981); El Salto, S.A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 477, 482–83 (9th Cir. 1971). 
 187. This analysis explains why the court correctly declined to consider allegedly illegal 
price discrimination in United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1985). There, 
defendants were able to purchase price-discounted pharmaceutical products by misrepresenting 
that the products would be resold overseas in the export market where the Robinson-Patman 
Act does not apply. The defendants then diverted the products into the domestic market where 
the Robinson-Patman Act does apply. The defendants argued that they should not be liable for 
mail fraud because the suppliers were engaging in illegal price discrimination in the domestic 
market. Although the Weinstein court did not explain its reasoning in so many words, the re-
sult was correct because the contract term at issue was not integral to the alleged illegality. 
There was, at best, only a tenuous connection between, on the one hand, a misrepresentation 
and a breach of contract in the export market where price discrimination is legal and, on the 
other, different contracts in the domestic market where price discrimination can be illegal. 
 188. These principles indicate why the “own use” clauses in cases like Ferro are unen-
forceable, even if other parts of the contract are. The purchaser could not defend a lawsuit, 
brought by the drug manufacturer, seeking payment for the pharmaceutical products by point-
ing to the “own use” clause because there is nothing illegal about a simple contract for the sale 
and purchase of drugs. The purchaser could, however, defend a lawsuit seeking to enforce the 
“own use” clause because that clause is integral to the illegal price discrimination strategy. 
Only by following the “own use” clause does the purchaser cross the line and help to enable 
the illegal scheme. If the court did not allow a defense to the “own use” clause and, instead, 
enforced the “own use” clause, the court would lend its hand to an illegal scheme by enforcing 
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Nor on the given facts should the drug manufacturer be allowed 
to enforce the “own use” clause indirectly by way of a civil action for 
fraud. Consider first that the drug manufacturer sought the pur-
chaser’s representation that the products would be for “own use” 
because the manufacturer sought a representation that the purchaser 
would not engage in arbitrage by reselling the products into the 
“open door” channel. Because the purchaser’s participation in the 
distribution system does not bring price-favored sales to that pur-
chaser within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption, however, 
the distribution system is illegal secondary-line price discrimination 
under the Robinson-Patman Act. In this context, the purchaser’s 
representation is that the purchaser will adhere to an “own use” 
clause that is integral to the economic success of an illegal price dis-
crimination strategy. The inference from the given facts is that the 
drug manufacturer entered into the contract as a way to enlist the 
participation of the price-favored purchaser in an illegal secondary-
line price discrimination strategy. For the same reasons that courts 
do not enforce illegal contracts directly in contract actions, courts 
should not enforce illegal contracts indirectly in tort actions. 
Consider next that the drug manufacturer sought the purchaser’s 
representation that the products would be for “own use” because the 
manufacturer sought a representation that the purchaser’s participa-
tion in the distribution system would bring price-favored sales to 
that purchaser within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. The 
purchaser did not, however, represent every fact necessary for the 
drug manufacturer to believe that price-favored sales to that pur-
chaser would be exempt from the prohibition of secondary-line price 
discrimination. To the contrary, on facts like those that were present 
in Ferro, the purchaser represented that it was a for-profit organiza-
tion; the purchaser represented that its participation would not meet 
one of three necessary requirements for lower-priced sales to be ex-
empt. On facts such as these, the drug manufacturer could not rea-
sonably believe that its price discrimination strategy would come 
within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption.189 
The principal focus of this article is not upon the law of fraud, 
 
a clause that is integral to an illegal price discrimination strategy. 
 189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 547 cmt. a (1977) (“Ordinarily one who 
makes an investigation will be taken to rely upon it alone as to all facts disclosed to him and all 
facts that must have been obvious to him in the course of it.”). 
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but here as well there is doctrinal support for the conclusions just 
reached. Every misrepresentation is not a fraud; a misrepresentation 
is fraudulent only if it is material.190 In this context, a useful defini-
tion of materiality is matter that “a reasonable [person] would attach 
importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice 
of action in the transaction in question.”191 As soon as a price-
favored purchaser truthfully represents that it operates for profit, the 
drug manufacturer knows or should know that lower priced sales to 
that purchaser cannot meet all of the requirements of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act exemption. Any further representation or misrepre-
sentation cannot affect a reasonable manufacturer’s choice to sell to 
the purchaser at lower prices if the manufacturer sought representa-
tions to assure that the purchaser’s participation in the distribution 
system would bring the system within the Nonprofit Institutions 
Act.192 Simply put, the purchaser’s truthful representation that any 
one of the three requirements is not met renders immaterial any rep-
resentation or misrepresentation as to the remaining requirements.193 
 
 190. Oftentimes, this statement is made in the context of the requirement that the neces-
sary reliance must be justifiable: “Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable 
unless the matter misrepresented is material.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1) 
(1977). See also 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 174, § 7.9, at 435 (“The notion of justifiable 
reliance is limited by the rule of materiality: Even a fraudulent misrepresentation is not action-
able if the representation is ‘immaterial.’”). 
 191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977). See also 2 HARPER ET 
AL., supra note 174, § 7.9, at 436 (quoting RESTATEMENT formulation of materiality). 
 192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545 cmt. d (1977) (“Thus, as between 
bargaining adversaries there can ordinarily be no justifiable reliance upon an opinion, as stated 
in § 542. The recipient is not justified in accepting the opinion of a known adversary on the 
law and is expected to draw his own conclusions or to seek his own independent legal ad-
vice.”); id. at § 546 (“reliance [on misrepresentation must be] a substantial factor in determin-
ing the course of conduct that results in his loss”). See also 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 174, 
§ 7.8, at 433–35 (“But the more clearly the statement reflects only the speaker’s legal judg-
ment, the less likely courts are to hold that reliance on it is justified unless the speaker has spe-
cial legal skill or knowledge, including, e.g., that he could reasonably be expected to have spe-
cial knowledge of settled legal rules as they apply to routine transactions in his business, or 
unless he stands in a fiduciary capacity to the person to whom the statement is made.”) (foot-
notes omitted). 
 193. Of course, materiality is an issue of fact. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 
cmt. e. (1977) (“As in all cases in which the conduct of the reasonable man is the standard, the 
question of whether a reasonable man would have regarded the fact misrepresented to be im-
portant in determining his course of action is a matter for the judgment of the jury subject to 
the control of the court.”). Thus, the determination of whether a truthful representation of 
noncompliance of one requirement renders immaterial a false representation of compliance of a 
separate requirement will turn on the facts of each case. 
In an analogous fact situation, a developer of condominiums faced two requirements: 
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There are additional problems for a civil cause of action for 
fraud, and these do not turn upon whether a price-favored purchaser 
makes a truthful representation of noncompliance with one or more 
of the three necessary requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions 
Act. Under the general law of fraud, the one defrauded must “part 
with a thing of value or . . . surrender a legal right.”194 First, if the 
facts show that a price-discriminating seller engaged in a strategy that 
was thwarted by a purchaser’s arbitrage, any fraud associated with a 
promise not to engage in arbitrage did not cause the seller to part 
with anything of value. The reason is that the seller never came into 
possession of those profits. A price-favored purchaser’s failure to ad-
here to a promise not to engage in arbitrage prevents a price dis-
criminating seller from recovering increased profits from price-
disfavored purchasers. Arbitrage does not take profits already in the 
seller’s possession; arbitrage prevents profits from coming into the 
seller’s possession. 
Second, if the facts show that a seller is engaging in illegal price 
discrimination, the seller is not legally entitled to any prospective 
economic advantage from the price discrimination strategy. When 
expanding the prohibition on price discrimination to include secon-
dary-line discrimination, the Robinson-Patman Act was intended to 
assure that purchasers who resell to the same consumers compete on 
 
(1) subdivision review and (2) sanitation approval. Young v. Flathead County, 757 P.2d 772 
(Mont. 1988). The county first stated that the project was not a “subdivision” and, therefore, 
did not require subdivision review. After the county later changed its position on the require-
ment of subdivision review, the developer encountered additional obstacles, and the developer 
eventually abandoned the project. The developer brought an action for, inter alia, negligent 
representations, seeking to recover, as damages, expenses incurred on the project. The trial 
court excluded evidence that the sanitation approval would not have been forthcoming and 
found in favor of the developer. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed, finding that the 
trial court erred in excluding evidence that the sanitation approval would not have been forth-
coming. The Supreme Court also found that, “the [negligent mis]representations did not 
‘proximately cause’ the damages in this case.” Id. at 777. 
[S]ince other factors—the economy, failure to secure additional financing, and espe-
cially the inability to secure approval of the sewer system—has an impact on the re-
sulting damage, developers cannot claim the County’s representations alone 
“proximately caused” the damage. Where more than one possible cause of damage 
appears, the plaintiff must eliminate causes other than those for which the defendant 
is responsible. 
Id. 
 194. 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, ET. AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 
16.08 (5th ed. 2000). 
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a level playing field by paying the same price for supplies.195 A seller 
who engages in illegal discrimination is not entitled to profit by 
charging price differences because, under the Robinson-Patman Act, 
purchasers who compete in the same geographic area are entitled to 
pay the same price. Any fraud associated with a promise not to en-
gage in arbitrage does not cause an illegally price discriminating 
seller to part with prospective profits to which the seller is entitled.196 
4. The criminal context 
When an “own use” clause is at the heart of a criminal action, 
additional considerations come into play, largely because some 
criminal offenses have an incredibly broad reach. For example, under 
the federal general conspiracy statute,197 a conspiracy to violate one 
of the laws of the United States is actionable as soon as the agree-
ment is made and one conspirator engages in one overt act in fur-
therance of the conspiracy.198 Criminal conspiracy liability attaches 
even if the conspirators do not complete the target or substantive of-
fense that violates the underlying federal law or, for that matter, take 
a substantiated step that is needed for an attempt offense.199 Thus, as 
 
 195. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520 (1963) (“In short, Con-
gress intended to assure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that businessmen at the same 
functional level would start on equal competitive footing so far as price is concerned.”). 
 196. Only by ignoring antitrust analysis and assuming that a seller is entitled to profits on 
higher-priced sales to price-disfavored purchasers would a court come to an opposite conclu-
sion. For example, in United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1989), before reach-
ing a truncated and flawed analysis of antitrust issues, see infra notes 209–13 and accompany-
ing text, the court stated, “the effect of the scheme was to deprive the manufacturers of money 
which they should have received on sales of pharmaceuticals to wholesalers.” Stewart, 872 F.2d 
at 960. 
 197. The general conspiracy statute provides, in significant part, that “If two or more 
persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of 
such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined . . . or impris-
oned . . . or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 
 198. The elements of a general conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 are “(1) the parties 
make an agreement; (2) to achieve an illegal goal; (3) with the knowledge of the conspiracy 
and with actual participation in the conspiracy; and (4) at least one conspirator committed an 
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Julia Cheung et al., Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 595 (1994). Although the word “defraud” appears in a portion of 
the statute omitted in the preceding quotation, see supra note 197, a general federal conspiracy 
can reach activity that does not involve fraud or deceptive means, Cheung et al., supra, at 593. 
Further, “in prosecutions for conspiracy to import, possess, or distribute narcotics, the gov-
ernment need not prove any overt acts.” Id. at 601. 
 199. Chueng et al., supra note 198, at 600–01. 
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soon as a supplier and a price-favored purchaser knowingly enter into 
a contract that violates the Robinson-Patman Act and one sale is 
made to either a price-disfavored or price-favored purchaser, criminal 
liability may attach, regardless of whether other sales are made pur-
suant to that contract.200 By contrast, in a civil action, at least two 
sales at different prices to at least two buyers are necessary elements 
of a prima facie case. Thus, where an “own use” clause is at issue, 
criminal liability may lie regardless of whether a price-favored pur-
chaser acquired price-discounted supplies and adhered to the “own 
use” clause. Moreover, if this theory were pursued, criminal liability 
would be available against both the seller and the purchaser as co-
conspirators. 
Similarly, mail fraud201 is a prophylactic offense that reaches 
broadly with few limitations.202 For example, although mail fraud is 
based upon common law fraud, mail fraud does not import every 
limitation of common law fraud.203 Mail fraud might attach even 
 
 200. After the overt act of making one sale, a price-favored purchaser could not avail itself 
of the defense of withdrawal by claiming that it did not adhere to the “own use” clause. “To 
escape liability for the conspiracy, an actor must unequivocally withdraw before the commis-
sion of any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. at 620. 
 201. The federal mail fraud statute, in significant part, proscribes the use of the mails “[1] 
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or [2] for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises, or [3] to sell . . . exchange . . . 
distribute . . . or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit . . . coin . . . security, or other arti-
cle.” 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). 
 202. As one treatise has summarized, 
While the proscriptions of the mail fraud statute reach three species of schemes, 
what has become the heart of the provision is the use of the mails for the purpose of 
executing a scheme or artifice to defraud. The statute neither defines the term “de-
fraud” nor attempts to categorize the various forms of fraud it might reach, how-
ever. Judicial decisions in which the fraud element has been considered tend gener-
ally to give the term a broad, nontechnical reading. Inasmuch as “the forms of fraud 
are as multifarious as human ingenuity can devise,” one court observed, “it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to formulate an exact, definite and all-inclusive definition” of 
it. 
2 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 8.32, at 88–89 (1993 & Supp. 
2000) (footnotes omitted). 
 203. See United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1996) (mail fraud 
reaches more broadly than common law fraud); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. Di Con Fin. Co., 886 
F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). This is not to say that mail fraud does not import some 
of the limitations, or requirements, of common law fraud. For example, mail fraud has essen-
tially the same requirement that the misrepresentation or omission must be material. See Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (materiality is an element of mail fraud). Neder fur-
ther states that materiality is present where a statement has “a natural tendency to influence, or 
[is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making body to which it was ad-
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though the one defrauded has not yet come into possession of the 
property targeted by the scheme to defraud204 and the one defrauded 
is not entitled to that property.205 Theoretically, there is nothing to 
prevent mail fraud from reaching illegal activity where one wrong-
doer attempts to cheat another wrongdoer out of proceeds of the 
target offense. To borrow from a phrase, if a thief can steal from a 
thief, a wrongdoer can commit mail fraud against a wrongdoer. For 
example, mail fraud theoretically reaches a fact situation where a 
supplier and a price-favored purchaser knowingly enter into a con-
spiracy to violate the Robinson-Patman Act, and the price-favored 
purchaser agrees not to engage in arbitrage, but all along the price-
favored purchaser secretly and deceptively intended to engage in ar-
bitrage, thereby depriving the supplier of anticipated profits from the 
price-disfavored channel of distribution. Thus, applying mail fraud in 
the context of an “own use” clause opens the possibility of criminal 
sanctions for a failure to adhere to a price discrimination strategy that 
violates the antitrust laws. 
A hypothetical can illustrate how the incredibly broad reach of 
the general conspiracy and mail fraud statutes can bring a criminal 
prosecution into conflict with the policies of another area of law.206 
Consider a buyer who purchases a house by way of a contract which 
contains a racially restrictive covenant that prohibits the buyer from 
reselling to minorities. Of course, racially restrictive covenants are 
unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of nondiscrimina-
 
dressed.” Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)). Cf. supra 
text accompanying note 191 (definition of materiality in civil fraud context). 
 204. United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(“Although proof that the injury was accomplished is not required to convict under 1341, we 
believe the statute does require evidence from which it may be inferred that some actual injury 
to the victim, however slight, is a reasonably probable result of the deceitful representations if 
they are successful.”); see also United States v. Mack, 159 F.3d 208, 215–16 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(mail fraud conviction under 1341 and 1346 of public official who deprived public of honest 
services need not show “concrete business harm”); United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 
1337 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (wire fraud requires “a failure to disclose something which in the 
knowledge or contemplation of the employee poses an independent business risk to the em-
ployer”) (emphasis added). See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets Criminal 
Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1998) (mail fraud is an inchoate crime and “the prose-
cutor need not prove an injury”). 
 205. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 24–25 (“The common-law requirements of ‘justifiable reli-
ance’ and ‘damages,’ for example, plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes.”). 
 206. The author is indebted to G. Ray Warner for pointing to this hypothetical to dem-
onstrate how the expansive application of the mail fraud statute can lead to nonsensical results. 
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tion.207 The buyer signs the contract fully aware of the racially restric-
tive covenant but fully intending to resell to anyone, including a ra-
cial minority, should the opportunity arise. Provided that the mails 
have been used, there seems to be nothing to prevent criminal liabil-
ity from attaching to the buyer, especially when the buyer enters into 
a contract of resale to a racial minority. Mail fraud liability attaches 
because, by signing the contract with the racially restrictive covenant 
and purchasing the house, the buyer obtained the original seller’s 
property by falsely representing that the buyer would not resell to 
minorities. Further, criminal conspiracy liability attaches because, by 
signing the contract of resale with the minority and using the mails 
in connection with the proposed sale, the buyer has made an agree-
ment and taken an overt act in furtherance of a scheme to violate the 
federal mail fraud statute by defrauding the original seller of the 
house. Because of the incredibly broad reach of these criminal stat-
utes, criminal prosecution can conflict with nondiscrimination policy 
because criminal sanctions can be used to punish those who intend 
to disregard racially restrictive covenants that are contrary to public 
policy and therefore unenforceable. 
The analogy to the conflict in the preceding illustration is com-
plete as soon as an “own use” clause is substituted for the racially re-
strictive covenant and antitrust policy is substituted for nondiscrimi-
nation policy. The conflict between criminal prosecution and public 
policy is similarly present if the government brings a lawsuit seeking 
criminal sanctions for a purchaser’s failure to follow an “own use” 
clause that is integral to an illegal price discrimination strategy. There 
is no reason to ignore antitrust policy issues simply because the loose 
requirements of incredibly broad criminal statutes may technically 
apply. Criminal sanctions, perhaps more so than civil remedies, effec-
tively require a court to enforce an illegal scheme by punishing those 
who breach a clause that is integral to the illegality. Indeed, the in 
terrorem effect of potential criminal sanctions, including incarcera-
tion, might lead a party to an illegal contract to adhere to a clause 
that is integral to the illegal scheme, even though that clause is unen-
forceable in a civil lawsuit. Criminal prosecution of a purchaser who 
 
 207. The classic case is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1948), which held that, 
because judicial enforcement of contracts constitutes state action, courts may not enforce ra-
cially restrictive covenants without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4 (1997) (discussing 
application of nondiscrimination policy to private conduct). 
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declines to adhere to the “own use” clause that is part of an illegal 
price discrimination strategy leads to the nonsensical result that 
criminal sanctions can and will enforce an “own use” restriction even 
though civil remedies are not available. 
Indeed, in criminal cases that have not considered the seemingly 
inevitable conflict with antitrust policy, the results seem nonsensical. 
For example, in two criminal cases cited above, Costanzo and Stew-
art, neither court considered whether the drug manufacturers de-
signed their seemingly illegal price discrimination strategies to com-
ply with each of the separate and distinct requirements of the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. In Costanzo, the defendant-
purchasers knowingly entered into contracts that contained “own 
use” restrictions, diverted pharmaceutical products to wholesalers in 
the “open door” channel, and falsified reports to the manufacturer-
suppliers of the quantities of pharmaceutical products sold to nursing 
homes so as to hide their diversion.208 Nowhere, however, did the 
court even discuss the exemption contained in the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act. Nowhere did the court establish that the drug manufac-
turers, who demanded the “own use” restrictions, had carefully de-
signed their distribution systems to come within the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act exemption. Instead, when the opinion is read against 
the backdrop of price discrimination analysis, the court left the im-
pression that the drug manufacturers were engaging in an illegal 
secondary-line price discrimination strategy that had been frustrated 
when the defendants diverted products and engaged in arbitrage. 
The court left the impression that criminal sanctions punished a 
price-favored purchaser for failing to adhere to an illegal price dis-
crimination strategy. 
In Stewart, the defendants also knowingly entered into contracts 
that contained “own use” restrictions. The defendants in Stewart ad-
ditionally represented that they operated through a not-for-profit 
buying agency for hospitals and that the drugs were for the “own 
use” of the hospitals.209 At trial, the defendants did request instruc-
tions on “certain provisions of the antitrust laws, including the Rob-
 
 208. United States v. Constanzo, 4 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 209. United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957, 958 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The defendants 
then sent letters to several manufacturers, stating that HSSI was a nonprofit shared services 
group representing thirty-one hospitals. The defendants later represented that pharmaceuticals 
purchased from the manufacturers were for the ‘own use’ for HSSI’s member hospitals.”). 
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inson-Patman Act.”210 The court in Stewart did cite to the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act,211 and the court did conclude that the defendants 
did not enjoy the exemption for sales made when diverting supplies 
to for-profit wholesalers.212 The court’s focus was misplaced because 
the court should have asked whether drug manufacturers, who de-
manded the “own use” restrictions, had assured that their price-
favored sales to the defendants complied with each of the separate 
and distinct requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemp-
tion. Nowhere, however, did the court make that determination. 
Specifically, the court did not examine whether the drug manufac-
turers limited lower-priced sales to exempt purchasers by assuring 
that the hospitals to whom defendants were to resell pharmaceutical 
products came within the exemption.213 Instead, as in Costanzo, the 
court left the impression that the drug manufacturers were engaging 
in an illegal secondary-line price discrimination strategy that had 
been frustrated when the defendant diverted products and engaged 
in arbitrage. And, as in Costanzo, the Stewart court left the impres-
sion that criminal sanctions punished a price-favored purchaser for 
failing to adhere to an illegal price discrimination strategy. 
In Costanzo and Stewart, the criminal sanctions that followed 
convictions under the federal mail and wire fraud statutes seem il-
logical for at least two reasons. In both cases, the drug manufacturers 
included the “own use” restriction presumably because they sought a 
representation that the purchaser’s participation in their distribution 
systems would bring the price discrimination strategies within the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. Yet, the courts’ opinions 
never establish that the purchasers represented every fact necessary 
for the manufacturers to believe that, by selling to the defendants, 
their distribution systems would be exempt from the prohibition of 
price discrimination. The courts never established that the drug 
manufacturers were defrauded into believing that their distribution 
 
 210. Id. at 961. 
 211. Id. (quoting portion of Nonprofit Institutions Act). 
 212. Id. (“HHSI [the defendant] was not entitled to obtain reduced prices on the pur-
chases at issue in this case and the trial court did not err in refusing the requested instructions 
[on antitrust issues].”). 
 213. There was evidence that the defendant-purchasers represented that they operated 
through a nonprofit entity and that they would resell to hospitals. See supra note 209. The 
court did not, however, look behind the label of “hospital” or, for that matter, even discuss 
whether the hospitals met the requirement of “not operated for profit.” Stewart, 872 F.2d at 
961. 
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systems were legal price discrimination because price-favored pur-
chasers met all three of the requirements necessary to come within 
the exemption. 
The results in Costanzo and Stewart seem illogical for a second 
reason. Neither court considered the possibility that criminal sanc-
tions were being used to enforce an unenforceable “own use” restric-
tion. As noted already, both opinions left the impression that the 
drug manufacturers were engaging in illegal price discrimination, es-
pecially given the lack of any finding that the manufacturers granted 
price favors only to purchasers who complied with all three of the 
requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. The fraud 
of which the defendants were convicted, however, was their single 
representation that the products would be for their “own use” cou-
pled with their subsequent but originally intended plan to resell the 
products to others. On these facts, the manufacturers could not 
likely have enforced the “own use” restrictions in a breach of con-
tract action because it appears that the “own use” clauses are unen-
forceable as integral to violations of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
Nonetheless, the government was allowed to impose criminal sanc-
tions for the same breach of contract. The nonsensical lesson that is 
left by these cases is that criminal sanctions may be used to enforce a 
contract restriction that, in a civil case, is unenforceable as contrary 
to public policy. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore all of the consid-
erations that arise when incredibly broad criminal statutes may reach 
those who decline to violate public policy. Given the brief analysis 
that has been urged, perhaps a preliminary suggestion is appropriate: 
Criminal sanctions should not be applied if the effect of those sanc-
tions would provide incentives to adhere to contract clauses that are 
contrary to a clearly articulated statutory policy. This is not so much 
a situation where a thief steals from a thief or a wrongdoer commits 
mail fraud against a wrongdoer and the means of stealing or defraud-
ing are illegal in and of themselves. Rather, it is more of a situation 
where an individual, even if culpable at some level, would be pun-
ished for specific conduct that actually furthers a public policy goal. 
A buyer who signs a racially restrictive covenant should not be crimi-
nally punished for later refusing to discriminate. Without more, the 
resale is a perfectly legitimate sale that is consistent with nondis-
crimination policy. So too, a purchaser who obtains a price discount 
from a distribution system that illegally discriminates in price should 
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not be criminally punished for later refusing to refrain from arbi-
trage. Without more, the resale to price-disfavored purchasers is a 
perfectly legitimate sale that is consistent with the antitrust policy fa-
voring free and open competition. 
Without some limit upon enforcing contracts that are contrary to 
public policy, the two previously discussed cases—Costanzo and 
Stewart—demonstrate how direct or indirect judicial enforcement of 
“own use” clauses may conflict with congressional policy. The Rob-
inson-Patman Act prohibits defined instances of price discrimination, 
and the Nonprofit Institutions Act provides a limited exemption 
where suppliers grant price favors to eleemosynary institutions that 
meet all three requirements of the exemption. These enactments re-
flect a congressional policy that some price discrimination is prohib-
ited and some price discrimination is permitted. If a supplier employs 
an “own use” clause to prevent a price-favored purchaser from en-
gaging in arbitrage, the “own use” clause must be followed or en-
forced for the supplier’s price discrimination strategy to be successful 
in the marketplace. Before enforcing an “own use” clause directly or 
indirectly, courts should carefully examine the kind of price discrimi-
nation to which the “own use” clause is integral. Otherwise, a court 
may find itself assisting a supplier in price discrimination without 
knowing whether the supplier’s price discrimination strategy is one 
that Congress has prohibited or permitted. 
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE EXEMPTION 
While the statutory language of the Nonprofit Institutions Act 
defines three requirements that must be met to come within the ex-
emption, two additional concerns have arisen in the case law. This 
part of the article examines, first, the nonstatutory requirement of 
routinely obtaining certification which was discussed in the Supreme 
Court’s Abbott Laboratories214 opinion and, second, the fact situa-
tion, present in some cases, where the supplier sells through an in-
termediary who then resells supplies to the ultimate purchasers. 
 
 214. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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A. Requirements Not Found in the Statute 
1. Certification 
In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court included language 
which indicated that, to come within the exemption, a supplier 
should assure that its purchaser is, in fact, an eligible institution that 
is “not operated for profit” and that purchases supplies for its “own 
use.” This language followed the court’s direction, noted already, 
that a purchaser with both exempt and nonexempt uses could submit 
appropriate accounting to its supplier as a way to meet the “own 
use” requirement with respect to the exempt uses.215 The Court then 
opined that the supplier has obligations as well: 
The supplier, on the other hand, properly may expect to be pro-
tected from antitrust liability for reasonable and noncollusive reli-
ance upon its hospital customer’s certification as to its dispensation 
of the products it purchases from the supplier. But it is not unrea-
sonable to expect the supplier to assume the burden of obtaining 
the certification when it seeks to enjoy, with the institutional pur-
chaser, the benefits provided by § 13c. It clearly does this with re-
spect to responsibility for identification of its purchaser under that 
statute’s standard, and little additional burden is imposed if it is re-
quired to take the small second step of routinely obtaining a repre-
sentation from its hospital customer as to the use of the products 
purchased.216 
Although not explicitly noted in the Court’s opinion, an impor-
tant consideration for allocating the burden of obtaining certification 
to the supplier is the different way that the supplier benefits from the 
exemption. Of course, as the Court noted, both the supplier and the 
purchaser benefit from the exemption. The purchaser, as a not-for-
profit entity that pursues charitable or other worthy goals, benefits 
by paying a lower price for supplies, thereby enabling the purchaser 
to expand the products or services that it offers by lowering the costs 
of providing those products or services. By definition, an exempt 
purchaser does not recover additional profits from price favors be-
cause the purchaser must not operate for profit. The supplier, how-
ever, is a for-profit entity. By permitting the supplier to price dis-
 
 215. Id. at 20 (quoted at supra note 130). 
 216. Id. at 20–21. 
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criminate, the exemption enables the supplier to garner additional 
profits by expanding output by way of the price discrimination strat-
egy.217 Thus, although both the supplier and the price-favored pur-
chaser benefit, the supplier is the one who recovers the additional 
profits that are available to pay for the transaction costs of certifica-
tion.218 
Some courts have read Abbott Laboratories as establishing a 
nonstatutory requirement that a supplier must routinely obtain a cer-
tification that the purchaser is a qualified institution that does not 
operate for profit and that purchases supplies for its “own use.” For 
example, in Rudner v. Abbott Laboratories,219 the court discussed 
the language just quoted and concluded that 
[b]ecause the supplier enjoys the benefits of the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act exemption, however, a two-part burden is imposed upon 
it: first, it must identify its purchaser as a nonprofit institution; and, 
second, it must routinely obtain a representation from the non-
profit institutional customer as to the use of the purchased prod-
ucts.220 
The court then refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
supplier, in part because, “The record before this court leaves too 
many open questions relating to . . . whether Abbott fulfilled its pe-
riodic certification obligation . . . .”221 
It bears emphasis that language just quoted is misleading insofar 
 
 217. Even if the price discriminating seller (1) does not raise price or expand output on 
sales to price-disfavored purchasers and (2) does not recover accounting profits on sales it 
would otherwise not have made to price-favored purchasers, it is likely that the seller will be 
better off. Assuming that the seller has a not insignificant amount of fixed costs and does not 
operate at a loss in sales to price-favored purchasers, the increased quantity allows fixed costs to 
be spread over a greater volume, thereby reducing average total costs for all sales. 
 218. Of course, an exempt purchaser who uses price-discounted supplies for more than a 
de minimis amount of nonexempt uses must incur the transaction costs of, first, segregating 
exempt from nonexempt uses and, second, accounting for those nonexempt uses. See supra 
notes 129 & 130 and accompanying text. The exempt purchaser can avoid these transaction 
costs simply by refraining from using price-discounted supplies for more than a de minimis 
amount of nonexempt uses. 
 219. 664 F. Supp 1100 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
 220. Id. at 1103–04. 
 221. Id. at 1106. See also Lago & Sons Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood, Inc., No. 92-200-SD, 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12909, at *20–*21 (D.N.H. Sept. 6, 1994) (finding proper certifica-
tion where bid forms “generally state that the milk is to be used for the school lunch program” 
and “no evidence . . . to suggest that the dairy products sold by Hood to nonprofit schools 
were used for any purpose other than consumption by school children”). 
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as the nonstatutory requirement of routinely obtaining certification 
is stated in terms of only two of the three statutory requirements of 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. As noted above, the ex-
emption is available only to the supplier and purchaser in those 
transactions where the purchaser is an eligible institution that is “not 
operated for profit” and that purchases supplies for its “own use.” In 
Rudner, the buyer was a “not-for-profit corporation which operates 
an acute care hospital.”222 Thus, the buyer was an eligible institution 
because it was a hospital and, it seems, because it also fell within the 
catchall category of a “charitable institution.” Certainly, where a 
buyer is a charitable institution, the separate and distinct require-
ments of being an eligible institution and “not operated for profit” 
might seem to collapse into one factual inquiry in one particular case. 
Nonetheless, a general statement of the supplier’s certification obli-
gations should state those obligations in terms of routinely obtaining 
certification of all three statutory requirements. 
In an unpublished opinion, one court reached a different conclu-
sion about the import of the Supreme Court’s language in Abbott 
Laboratories: 
We do not agree, as argued by the Defendants, that Abbott im-
poses upon suppliers a requirement to obtain certification from 
purchasers as to the purchaser’s compliance with the Nonprofit In-
stitutions Act. The Court’s language is not mandatory, but rather 
permissive. It merely outlines an alternative method by which a 
manufacturer can demonstrate that it is not liable for its sales to 
certain customers. While periodically obtaining a certification or 
representation from its customer as to the use of the products pur-
chased is not unreasonable, and certainly not unwise, it is not yet a 
requirement.223 
This unpublished opinion can be criticized for reading Abbott 
Laboratories too loosely. The portion of the Abbott Laboratories 
opinion upon which this district court relied is the portion quoted 
previously and directed to methods of segregating exempt use from 
nonexempt use.224 Fairly read, this portion of the Supreme Court’s 
 
 222. Rudner, 664 F. Supp. at 1102. 
 223. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94C897, MDL997, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18048, at *15–*16 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1995) (footnote and quotation 
omitted). 
 224. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 20 (1976) (quoted at 
supra note 130). 
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opinion indicates that the suggested methods of assuring compliance 
are not mandatory because other methods might be available in dif-
ferent fact situations. By indicating that other methods might suffice, 
the Supreme Court did not, however, imply that a supplier has no 
responsibility to use at least one method to obtain certification rou-
tinely. Thus, although no one method of obtaining certification is 
mandatory, the requirement of routinely obtaining certification is. 
Even though an unpublished opinion suggests, perhaps errone-
ously, that routinely obtaining certification is not required, the better 
reasoned approach is to impose a requirement that suppliers rou-
tinely obtain certification that their purchasers are exempt under the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act. One reason arises from language in the 
Abbott Laboratories opinion itself. There, the Supreme Court re-
jected an argument, made by the drug manufacturers on behalf of 
the hospitals, that compliance with the “own use” requirement 
might be burdensome.225 By parity of reasoning, suppliers should not 
complain if a requirement of routinely obtaining certification im-
poses a burden in exchange for the benefits of an antitrust exemp-
tion. Moreover, as noted already, the supplier benefits from the ex-
emption by garnering additional profits that are available to pay the 
transaction costs of routinely obtaining certification. 
A second reason to impose a requirement of routinely obtaining 
certification upon suppliers arises from the purpose of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act to preserve “price favors that sellers would wish to 
grant to eleemosynary institutions.”226 Obviously, this purpose 
would be frustrated if sellers inadvertently gave price favors to for-
profit organizations and did not assure that price favors were limited 
to eleemosynary institutions who are, in fact, exempt purchasers. A 
requirement of routinely obtaining certification implements congres-
sional intent by requiring suppliers to assure that their otherwise ille-
gal price discrimination furthers the express purpose of the Non-
profit Institutions Act. In addition, the benefit, to the purchaser, of 
receiving a price favor would be thwarted if the responsibility of rou-
tinely providing certification is placed on the purchaser. If the bur-
den is placed upon the purchaser, the purchaser would incur the 
transaction costs of providing certification which only reduces the 
 
 225. Id. (quoted at supra note 130). 
 226. Id. at 12. 
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beneficial impact of a price favor.227 
A third reason to impose a routine certification requirement 
upon suppliers arises from the fact that the exemption in the Non-
profit Institutions Act, like other antitrust exemptions, should be 
construed narrowly.228 The exemption will have a narrower reach if 
this additional requirement is imposed. A requirement of routinely 
obtaining certification will narrow the exemption to those suppliers 
who, in exchange for the benefits of an antitrust exemption, under-
take the additional burden of assuring that their purchasers are ex-
empt institutions. In addition, a requirement of routinely obtaining 
certification will narrow the exemption to fact situations in which 
suppliers assure that their otherwise illegal price discrimination fur-
thers the purpose of the Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
2. Channel of distribution with intermediary 
An issue that has not been adequately addressed by the courts is 
how the exemption might apply in a fact situation in which the price-
favored channel of distribution involves an intermediary between the 
supplier and the ultimate purchasers.229 In Stewart, for example, the 
drug manufacturers sold to defendant-purchasers who represented 
that they would, in turn, sell to other entities, including hospitals.230 
In this context, there is not so much a single price-favored purchaser 
as there is a price-favored channel of distribution with at least one 
purchaser who resells to another. This fact pattern raises the follow-
ing issue: Assuming that the ultimate purchasers are eligible institu-
tions that are “not operated for profit” and that use the supplies for 
 
 227. The statement in the text is based upon the assumption that transaction costs will be 
lower if incurred by the supplier rather than the purchasers. Indeed, there may be economics of 
scale if the supplier sets up a system of routinely obtaining certification rather than requiring 
each purchaser to set up separate systems. In any event, the seller’s costs of certification no 
doubt will be passed along to purchasers in the form of a higher price, and thus the beneficial 
impact of a price favor depends upon the assumption that transaction costs will be lower if in-
curred by the seller. Where this assumption does not hold, the parties should be free to allocate 
certification responsibilities with the aim of reducing overall transaction costs. 
 228. Id. at 14 (quoted at supra note 80 and accompanying text). 
 229. For an overview of the various ways that intermediaries are used in channels of dis-
tribution in the pharmaceutical industry, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 31, at 5–7. See also KOLASSA, supra note 16 at 2–3 (noting, from a perspective fa-
voring profit maximizing for drug companies, that, “too much attention has been paid to in-
termediaries . . . that have wrongly been classified as market segments”). 
 230. See supra note 209. 
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their “own use,” is the exemption no longer available because the 
supplier sold through an intermediary who does not meet the re-
quirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption? 
Although the facts may not have squarely raised this issue, the 
only case in which an intermediary’s status was addressed in the con-
text of the Nonprofit Institutions Act was Logan Lanes.231 There, the 
bowling equipment was initially purchased by the Utah State Build-
ing Board before the equipment was, in turn, transferred to Utah 
State University, an exempt purchaser.232 Plaintiff argued that the 
court should “limit the exemption to the purchasing party, and not 
extend it to the party selling the goods to a non-profit institu-
tion.”233 In effect, plaintiff argued that while the exemption might 
apply to the transaction between the Utah State Building Board, the 
intermediary, and the Utah State University, the exempt purchaser, 
the exemption should not apply to the transaction between Bruns-
wick Corporation, the supplier, and the Utah State Building Board, 
the intermediary. Thus, plaintiff argued that the supplier could not 
benefit from the exemption because the supplier was not in privity 
with the exempt purchaser.234 
Unfortunately, the Logan Lanes court does not provide much 
guidance because the court did not develop facts that might have 
elaborated upon the character of the Utah State Building Board.235 
The case presents a unique fact situation if, as seems likely, the Utah 
State Building Board is a not-for-profit state agency charged with the 
exclusive responsibility of arranging construction of state-owned 
buildings such as the Student Union. If so, the university was pre-
vented by law from purchasing supplies directly from a supplier but, 
instead, was required to purchase through a state agency. Thus, 
Logan Lanes may not provide much support for the proposition that 
 
 231. Logan Lanes, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 378 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 232. Id. at 214 (“The bowling equipment purchased by the Board was installed in the 
Student Union Building on the Utah State University campus at Logan, Utah.”). 
 233. Id. at 215. 
 234. Apparently, the supplier did not argue that the channel of distribution was exempt 
because each purchaser was exempt, albeit under a different exemption. The Utah State Build-
ing Board, the intermediary with whom the supplier was in privity, may have been exempt un-
der the so-called government entity exemption. See infra notes 244–51 and accompanying 
text. The Utah State University, the purchaser with whom the Board was in privity, was ex-
empt under the Nonprofit Institutions Act. Logan Lanes, 378 F.2d at 215. 
 235. See also Logan Lanes, 378 F.2d at 217 (declined to “reach the question of . . . so-
called governmental exemption”). 
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a supplier complies with the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption 
when that supplier deals through a nonexempt intermediary who, in 
turn, sells to an exempt purchaser. 
Nonetheless, the Logan Lanes court’s language on this point is 
not constrained by the factual character of the Utah State Building 
Board. The court’s language is consistent with the common sense 
proposition, now accepted by the courts,236 that, if a purchaser is ex-
empt, the other party to the transaction, the supplier, also enjoys the 
benefits of the exemption: 
For every purchase, however, there must be both a purchaser and a 
seller. It follows that if a particular purchase is exempt from the 
Act, both the seller and purchaser involved in that transaction are 
exempt. Moreover, the benefits in the form of lower prices which 
are expected to accrue to non-profit institutions by reason of this 
statute would be illusory if only the purchasing institution, but not 
the sellers thereto, were exempted. No seller would be able to give 
a non-profit institution the benefit of a lower price which was dis-
criminatory under the Act, if such seller was not exempt from the 
sanctions of the Act in making the sale.237 
The language just quoted also is consistent with a limited fact 
situation in which Utah State University and the Board were treated 
as a single economic entity because the University could obtain sup-
plies only from the Board and the Board was acting as the Univer-
sity’s affiliated purchasing agent.238 As such, the transfer within a sin-
 
 236. Burge v. Bryant Pub. Sch. Dist., 520 F. Supp. 328, 332 (E.D. Ark. 1980), aff’d on 
other grounds, 658 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). As pointed out in one treatise: 
The Supreme Court implicitly accepted this conclusion in [Abbott Laborato-
ries]. . . . The Court’s conclusion was that most such sales fell within the provision, 
and that therefore the seller was immunized from § 2(a) liability. . . . [T]he Court 
stated that “a supplier . . . properly may expect to be protected from antitrust liabil-
ity for reasonable and noncollusive reliance upon its . . . customer’s certification as 
to its dispensation of the products it purchases from the supplier.” 
KINTNER, supra note 19, § 25.9, at 465 n.118 (quoting Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 20–21). 
See also HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST, supra note 17, § 2354c, at 194 (“Without any significant 
dissent, however, the courts have construed the statute to protect the seller as well as the 
buyer.”). 
 237. Logan Lanes, 378 F.2d at 215–16. See also Bridges v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, 
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Me. 1998) (quoting Logan Lanes and holding that seller is ex-
empt if purchaser meets requirements of Nonprofit Institutions Act). 
 238. The analysis of whether two or more persons are within a single economic entity 
typically arises where defendants assert that, because they are part of a single economic entity, 
they are incapable of conspiring under section one of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
See generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 21–29. Sometimes, a fact 
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gle economic entity would not be a sale to a buyer under the Robin-
son-Patman Act.239 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has issued two opinion 
letters that address an analogous fact situation. In 1977, the FTC 
opined on the sale of pharmaceutical products, at cost, by a not-for-
profit hospital to a not-for-profit nursing home.240 With respect to 
the proposed sales to the nursing home, the FTC noted: 
The Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories . . . held that the 
phrase “for their own use” limited the classes of individuals to 
whom the supplies could be resold. However, the Commission 
does not believe these limitations were intended to apply to resales 
of supplies, at cost, by one charitable institution to another that are 
limited, in turn, to the latter charitable institution’s own use. A re-
sale of this nature would constitute a not-for-profit transfer of sup-
plies from one institution, eligible under the exemption, to another 
such institution, also eligible under the exemption. In the Commis-
sion’s view, the exemption was intended to insulate from Robin-
son-Patman application all purchases of supplies (for their own use) 
by the designated classes of institutions not operated for profit. The 
transactions, as above described, would not appear in conflict with 
such a purpose.241 
Similarly, in 1993, the FTC opined on the sales, at cost, of 
pharmaceuticals by not-for-profit hospitals to affiliated not-for-profit 
long-term care facilities.242 Quoting from Abbott Laboratories and 
its opinion letter just discussed, the FTC noted that “we believe that 
 
situation that involves an agreement among persons within a single economic entity is called an 
“intraenterprise conspiracy.” Id. at 21, 27. Also, the proposition that persons within a single 
economic entity cannot conspire is sometimes called the “Copperweld doctrine” after Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984), which held that a 
parent corporation cannot conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary. 
 239. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 37, at 441 n.76 (citing cases holding 
that sale to a wholly owned subsidiary is not one of two sales required under Robinson-Patman 
Act). See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, 1998 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS 137 (1999) (same). 
 240. 89 Op. F.T.C. 689 (1977). 
 241. Id. at 689. The hospital also requested an opinion on the sale of pharmaceutical 
products, at cost, to the general public in the event that pharmaceuticals become difficult or 
impossible to obtain because of an emergency caused by a Medicaid strike. Relying on lan-
guage from Abbott Laboratories, the FTC opined that “if needed pharmaceuticals are not 
available or difficult to obtain, your client may resell the needed pharmaceuticals to the general 
public as a humanitarian gesture.” Id. at 690. 
 242. Presentation Health Sys., FTC Advisory Opinion, [1993–97 Transfer Binder, FTC 
Complaints and Orders] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,519 at 23,198 (Dec. 21, 1993). 
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the sales you describe would be similarly exempt under the Non-
Profit Institutions Act, as long as the long-term care facilities pur-
chase the pharmaceuticals for their own use.”243 Taken together, 
these opinion letters support the proposition that an intermediary 
should meet the requirements of an exempt purchaser under the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
A fact situation in which a for-profit supplier sold through a for-
profit intermediary to an exempt purchaser has been examined, albeit 
in the context of a different exemption. This exemption, the so-
called governmental entity exemption, has its origins in a 1936 opin-
ion letter by the United States Attorney General. Shortly after the 
Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936, Attorney General Cum-
mings opined that the prohibition on price discrimination did not 
apply to government contracts.244 The Attorney General noted that 
the government oftentimes receives special prices below market 
price, but based his opinion upon the general rule that “statutes . . . 
in matters affecting commerce do not ordinarily apply to the Gov-
ernment unless it is expressly so provided” and the absence of any 
express provision in the Robinson-Patman Act.245 Like the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act which sought to preserve price favors for eleemosy-
nary institutions, the so-called governmental entity exemption 
sought to preserve price favors for the government. Of course, in 
both contexts, dealing through a for-profit intermediary jeopardizes 
the extent to which price favors will be passed through to the ulti-
mate purchaser. 
Subsequently, several courts relied upon the Attorney General’s 
opinion and applied the so-called governmental entity exemption.246 
 
 243. Id. at 23,198. Here, the FTC also opined that an additional basis for applying the 
exemption arises because affiliated institutions could be regarded as a single “unit having pur-
chased the pharmaceuticals for its ‘own use,’ comprised of the use by its hospitals and its long-
term care facilities.” Id. See supra note 238. 
 244. 38 Op. Att’y. Gen. 539 (1936). 
 245. Id. at 540. 
 246. E.g., Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. Cummins News Co., 632 F.2d 
680, 688 (7th Cir. 1980) (“There is strong evidence in the legislative history that the Robin-
son-Patman Act Amendments were not intended to include purchases by the federal govern-
ment.”); Pac. Eng’g & Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
75,054 at 96,721 (D. Utah 1974) (“government actions are excluded from the coverage of 
the [Robinson-Patman] Act”), rev. on other grounds, 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977); Gen. 
Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Const. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602–03 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (“the 
[Robinson-Patman] Act does not apply to sales to the government, state or municipalities”), 
aff’d, 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942). The so-called governmental entity exemption has not 
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In two of the cases just cited in the margin, the courts faced a fact 
situation involving a for-profit intermediary, but those courts 
reached different results. In Pacific Engineering & Production Co. of 
Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the defendant sold a component of 
solid rocket fuel to a for-profit contractor who, in turn, manufac-
tured rockets for the federal government.247 As to the Robinson-
Patman claims brought by defendant’s competitor, the defendant ar-
gued that, because the ultimate purchaser was the federal govern-
ment, the defendant should enjoy an exemption on its sales to the 
contractor. The court rejected this argument, noting that: 
[Defendant] has cited no support for the proposition that sales to 
private parties are exempt merely because the ultimate consumer is 
the government. Since the government as ultimate consumer 
would benefit by vigorous competition among those it buys from 
and their suppliers, no public policy would be served by such an ex-
ception.248 
In effect, the Pacific Engineering court held that a manufacturer who 
engages in price discrimination does not benefit from the ultimate 
purchaser’s exemption if the manufacturer deals through a for-profit 
intermediary. 
In General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., the 
court reached the opposite conclusion, although in the context of an 
alternate holding. There, the defendant furnished brick and tile to a 
for-profit contractor who built new housing for a municipal housing 
commission. The price discrimination claim was brought by defen-
 
been allowed, however, for sales of pharmaceuticals to state and local government hospitals 
who resold the pharmaceuticals in competition with private pharmacies. Jefferson County 
Pharm. Ass’n, v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150, 171 (1983). There, the Supreme Court found 
that there was no Robinson-Patman exemption for “purchases by a State for the purpose of 
competing in the private retail market with a price advantage.” Id. at 170. This result parallels 
the “own use” requirement of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption because the govern-
ment does not appear to be furthering governmental purposes by competing with retail out-
lets. 
 247. In effect, the plaintiff complained that the defendant won the subcontract to supply 
rocket fuel to the rocket manufacturer because the defendant bid a price lower than the price 
that the defendant was charging its other customers. Thus, this case involves an allegation of 
primary-line discrimination where the alleged competitive injury takes place at the level of the 
entity charging different prices. While different than the typical case involving the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act exemption which concerns allegations of secondary-line discrimination, the 
case nonetheless addresses the ability of a supplier to deal through an intermediary and to claim 
an exemption based upon the status of the intermediary’s customer. 
 248. Pac. Eng’g, 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 96,742. 
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dant’s competitor.249 Noting that the Robinson-Patman Act applies 
only to discriminatory sales of commodities, the court first held that 
the Act did not apply because “[t]he contract [between the contrac-
tor and the housing commission] was essentially a construction [ser-
vice] contract, not a contract of sale [of commodities].”250 
The General Shale Products court, as an alternate holding, con-
sidered whether the defendant could benefit from the governmental 
exemption if the contract between the contractor and the housing 
commission was for the sale of commodities and, thus, subject to the 
Robinson-Patman Act. In effect, the court was responding to the de-
fendant who sought to cloak itself with the exemption of the ulti-
mate purchaser, the housing commission. Here, the court stated 
that, “even if the transaction could be construed as a sale of brick . . . 
it would not be within the purview of the Act because the Act does 
not apply to sales to the government.”251 In effect, the General Shale 
Products court allowed the defendant to cloak itself with the exemp-
tion of the ultimate purchaser. The decision thus stands for the 
proposition that a supplier who engages in price discrimination does 
benefit from the ultimate purchaser’s exempt status even though the 
supplier deals through a for-profit intermediary. 
Even if language in some judicial opinions may suggest that a 
supplier enjoys the benefits of an antitrust exemption where the sup-
plier deals through a nonexempt intermediary, the better reasoned 
approach under the Nonprofit Institutions Act is to require that 
every entity in the supplier’s price-favored chain of distribution must, 
as much as is reasonably possible, meet all three of the statutory re-
quirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The reasons mirror 
those given above in the context of the nonstatutory requirement for 
a routine certification. 
One reason to require that intermediaries must be exempt insti-
tutions arises from language in the Abbott Laboratories opinion. In 
that case, the Supreme Court rejected an argument, made by the 
 
 249. Like the Pacific Engineering case just discussed, this case also involved an allegation 
of primary-line price discrimination. Here as well, the case nonetheless addresses the ability of a 
supplier to deal through an intermediary and to claim an exemption based upon the status of 
the intermediary’s customer. 
 250. Gen. Shale Prods., 37 F. Supp. at 602. Because the Robinson-Patman Act applies 
only to sales of commodities, the prohibition of illegal price discrimination does not apply to 
contracts that predominately concern the provision of services. See supra note 87. 
 251. Gen. Shale Prods., 37 F. Supp. at 602. 
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drug manufacturers on behalf of the hospitals, that establishing a re-
cordkeeping procedure to assure compliance with the “own use” re-
quirement might be burdensome.252 In so doing, the Court sug-
gested administrative alternatives that the drug manufacturers and 
their purchasers might implement.253 There are obvious administra-
tive alternatives that would allow suppliers to avoid dealing through 
nonexempt intermediaries. Suppliers might deal directly with the ex-
empt purchasers or, perhaps, deal through a truly not-for-profit in-
termediary that purchases solely on behalf of exempt purchasers.254 
In addition, and following the admonition in Abbott Laboratories, a 
supplier should not complain if these or other administrative alterna-
tives impose a burden in exchange for the benefits of an antitrust ex-
emption. 
A second reason to require that intermediaries must be exempt 
institutions arises from the express purpose of the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act to preserve “price favors that sellers would wish to grant to 
eleemosynary institutions.”255 Obviously, this purpose would be frus-
trated if suppliers dealt through for-profit intermediaries who are not 
concerned about passing on price favors but, instead, seek to maxi-
mize profits, even if that means raising price and restricting output. 
A requirement that intermediaries must be truly not-for-profit insti-
tutions that purchase solely on behalf of exempt purchasers imple-
ments Congressional intent. By requiring suppliers to deal though 
exempt intermediaries, suppliers deal through intermediaries who are 
most likely to pass on price favors to eleemosynary institutions in-
stead of pocketing those discounts as their own profits. 
A third reason to require that intermediaries must be exempt in-
stitutions arises from the fact that the exemption in the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act that, like other antitrust exemptions, should be con-
strued narrowly.256 The exemption will have a narrower reach if this 
 
 252. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 20 (1976) (quoted at 
supra text accompanying note 130). 
 253. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 254. The latter possibility is, in fact, one that has been used by intermediaries who pur-
chase with the objective of reselling outside of the United States. See United States v. 
Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985) (“IMA was a well-known and well-regarded 
umbrella organization acting on behalf of protestant churches in the solicitation of pharmaceu-
tical supplies and the distribution of those supplies to sponsored medical missions in develop-
ing nations.”). 
 255. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 12. 
 256. Id. at 14. 
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additional requirement is imposed. Requiring suppliers to deal only 
through exempt intermediaries will narrow the exemption to those 
suppliers who, in exchange for the benefits of an antitrust exemp-
tion, undertake the additional burden of assuring that their interme-
diaries are indeed exempt institutions. In addition, requiring suppli-
ers to deal only through exempt intermediaries will narrow the 
exemption to fact situations in which suppliers assure that their in-
termediaries further the purpose of the Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
The conclusion that intermediaries must qualify as exempt pur-
chasers under the Nonprofit Institutions Act needs to be tempered 
with the recognition of the particular role that an intermediary per-
forms in a channel of distribution. Almost by definition, an interme-
diary does not purchase for “own use”; the intermediary purchases 
for resale to others. To assure that the purposes of the Nonprofit In-
stitutions Act are served, however, there is no reason to allow the in-
termediary to resell to for-profit purchasers who, in theory, likely 
have a relatively inelastic demand for the supplies, are price insensi-
tive, and consequently can and will pay a higher price. There is no 
reason to permit price discrimination under the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act and then to allow an intermediary to engage in arbitrage 
and thereby defeat the price discrimination strategy in the market-
place. Rather, to further the statutory purpose, the intermediary 
should be required to resell only to exempt purchasers. Thus, where 
a supplier deals through an intermediary, the “own use” requirement 
should be modified to require the intermediary to resell price-
discounted supplies solely to exempt purchasers. 
Similarly, the requirement that the intermediary must be an eli-
gible institution needs slight modification. Of course, an intermedi-
ary whose sole function is to resell to others is not among the kinds 
of institutions specifically enumerated in the exemption. Under a lib-
eral interpretation of the catchall category of “charitable institu-
tions,” an intermediary might fall within the catchall category of a 
“charitable institution” if the intermediary’s sole purpose is to resell 
only to exempt purchasers. In other words, the intermediary would 
not be able to use revenues from the sale of supplies to exempt pur-
chasers to defray the costs of engaging in other activities, including 
the distribution of entirely unrelated products. Otherwise, the inter-
mediary might be tempted not to pass on price favors to exempt 
purchasers but, instead, to use the discounts to subsidize those other 
activities. Thus, where a supplier deals through an intermediary, the 
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eligible institution requirement should be modified to require the in-
termediary to engage in no other economic activity than reselling 
price-discounted supplies to exempt purchasers.257 
If an issue arises regarding instances in which the intermediary 
resells to nonexempt purchasers, an approach should be taken that 
mirrors the Supreme Court’s treatment of de minimis sales in Abbott 
Laboratories. There, an occasional sale in extraordinary circum-
stances of limited supplies was de minimis and would not negate a 
finding of compliance with the “own use” requirement. So too, in 
the context of an intermediary, an occasional sale to a nonexempt 
purchaser in extraordinary circumstances should not result in a loss 
of the intermediary’s exemption. If more than such extraordinary de 
minimis sales occur, however, the supplier and the intermediary 
should, first, segregate exempt from nonexempt transactions and, 
second, account for those segregated transactions. As the Supreme 
Court explained in Abbott Laboratories, the supplier and the inter-
mediary should not seek the benefits of the Nonprofit Institutions 
Act exemption and then complain about the burdens of establishing 
a recordkeeping procedure to assure compliance with the exemp-
tion’s requirements.258 
The requirement of “not operated for profit,” however, does not 
need to be modified for an intermediary in a price-favored channel of 
distribution. As already noted, the purpose of the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act is not furthered if an intermediary is not concerned about 
passing on price favors to eleemosynary institutions but, instead, 
seeks to garner profits by selling to the highest bidder or to use any 
profits to subsidize other economic activity. Rather, if the intermedi-
ary is a truly not-for-profit entity, the intermediary’s incentive will be 
to pass along price favors to exempt purchasers whose purchase and 
use of the price-discounted supplies will further the express purpose 
 
 257. It is altogether possible that a fact situation may arise where economies of scale dic-
tate that the most efficient distribution system for a local area requires one intermediary who 
resells to both exempt and nonexempt purchasers. If such a fact situation should arise, 
accounting controls should be employed to assure that price-discounted supplies are resold 
only to exempt purchasers and that revenues from the resale of price-discounted supplies do 
not subsidize other economic activities. This may necessitate the complexities of, for example, 
allocating fixed costs between exempt transactions and nonexempt transactions. Nonetheless, 
these kinds of accounting methods are likely no less burdensome than those used to assure 
compliance with other Robinson-Patman Act provisions such as the cost justification defense. 
 258. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 20 (quoted at supra text accompanying note 130). 
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of the Nonprofit Institutions Act.259 
To avoid confusion, perhaps it is useful to summarize the preced-
ing discussion by distinguishing an “exempt purchaser” from an “ex-
empt intermediary.” An “exempt purchaser” is the ultimate pur-
chaser who meets all three statutory requirements discussed earlier. 
An “exempt intermediary,” by contrast, is an entity who purchases 
supplies for resale and meets the requirements that were modified to 
reflect the particular role that intermediaries perform in a channel of 
distribution. Thus, an “exempt intermediary” purchases for resale  
only to exempt purchasers, does not engage in other economic ac-
tivities, and is “not operated for profit.” 
3. Certification with an intermediary 
Where a supplier deals through an intermediary, the requirement 
of routinely obtaining certification should apply, not only to the ul-
timate purchasers to whom the intermediary resells supplies, but also 
to the intermediary. Routine certification of the intermediary should 
assure that the intermediary resells solely to exempt purchasers, does 
not engage in other economic activity, and is “not operated for 
profit.” Routine certification of the ultimate purchaser should assure 
that the purchaser purchases supplies for its “own use,” is an eligible 
institution, and is “not operated for profit.” In other words, routine 
certification should assure that all of the entities in the price-favored 
channel of distribution are exempt intermediaries or exempt pur-
chasers. 
The supplier is the one who, in the first instance, should be re-
sponsible for obtaining certification of the intermediary as well as the 
ultimate purchasers. The three reasons given for imposing a certifica-
tion requirement upon the supplier where the supplier deals directly 
with the ultimate purchaser apply with as much force as where a sup-
plier deals through an intermediary. In addition, an important con-
sideration here is that the supplier typically is the one who designs 
and arranges its distribution channels. The supplier could, for exam-
ple, deal directly with the ultimate purchasers or, perhaps, assist the 
ultimate purchasers by organizing a not-for-profit buying agency 
 
 259. Again, it is altogether possible that a fact situation may arise where economies of 
scale dictate that the most efficient distribution system for a local area requires one intermedi-
ary who resells to both exempt and nonexempt purchasers. If such a fact situation should arise, 
the same accounting procedures should be applied as noted above.  See supra note 257. 
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that purchases supplies on behalf of a group of ultimate purchas-
ers.260 Given these and no doubt other options that are available to a 
supplier, the initial burden should be on the supplier to design and 
arrange the price-favored channel of distribution to comply with the 
Nonprofit Institutions Act. 
The supplier should also have ongoing responsibility for rou-
tinely obtaining certification of intermediaries and ultimate purchas-
ers. Again, the reasons mirror the ones already noted in the context 
where the supplier deals directly with the ultimate purchaser. An im-
portant consideration here is that the supplier, who may operate for 
profit, is the one who stands to garner additional profits from the 
ongoing operation of the price-favored channel as part of the price 
discrimination strategy. Another consideration stems from the pur-
pose of the Nonprofit Institutions Act to preserve “price favors that 
sellers would wish to grant to eleemosynary institutions.”261 This 
purpose would not be served if the intermediary or the ultimate pur-
chasers incur the transaction costs of certification and the supplier 
has lower transaction costs of certification. Of course, the entities in 
the price-favored distribution channel should be allowed to allocate 
certification responsibilities by way of contract. Presumably, the enti-
ties will do so with a view toward allocating responsibilities to the 
entity who can obtain or provide certification at the lowest cost. 
Nonetheless, because the supplier is the one who benefits through 
additional profits, the supplier is the one who should be legally re-
sponsible for assuring that the requirements of initially and routinely 
obtaining certification are met. 
B. Nonstatutory Requirements and Enforcing an “Own Use” Clause 
The additional concerns discussed in this part of the article do 
not change the basic structure of incentives or enforcement alterna-
tives or, for that matter, the need to examine “own use” clauses in 
the broader context of an overall price discrimination strategy that 
may violate the antitrust laws. The requirement of obtaining certifi-
cation, initially and routinely, adds a fourth requirement to the three 
 
 260. If the latter option is taken, and the buying agency deals exclusively with exempt 
purchasers, the buying agency might be an affiliated agent that forms a single economic entity 
with the exempt purchasers and, for that reason, avoids the additional considerations that arise 
for a truly independent intermediary. See supra notes 238, 243. 
 261. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 12. 
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requirements expressly stated in the Nonprofit Institutions Act. A 
difference is that the nonstatutory requirement of routinely obtain-
ing certification focuses upon the obligations of suppliers whereas 
the three statutory requirements focus upon the character of pur-
chasers. The presence of an intermediary no doubt requires slight 
modification of the three statutory requirements and additional certi-
fication obligations. Nonetheless, where a supplier chooses to deal 
through an intermediary in the price-favored channel of distribution, 
these concerns should be met to assure that the purpose of the Non-
profit Institutions Act is furthered. 
Even with these additional concerns, every entity in the price-
favored channel of distribution benefits from ongoing compliance 
with the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The supplier and the ultimate 
purchaser benefit in the ways already discussed and regardless of the 
presence of an intermediary. Suppliers garner more profits, and ex-
empt purchasers receive price favors that better enable them to pur-
sue their charitable or other worthy goals. An intermediary benefits 
as well. By receiving price favors from the supplier, the exempt in-
termediary can sell more supplies to exempt purchasers. Given that 
selling to exempt purchasers is an exempt intermediary’s raison 
d’être, an exempt intermediary has every incentive to perform its 
functions and to expand its sales to its customer base of exempt pur-
chasers. 
1. Incentives and enforcement alternatives 
The presence of an intermediary, however, may lead to greater 
incentives to “cheat” or “chisel” on any requirement that impliedly 
prevents arbitrage, such as a contract clause which requires the in-
termediary to sell only to exempt purchasers.262 Of course, these in-
 
 262. Some suppliers have designed price-favored channels of distribution with intermedi-
aries and have used “own use” clauses to prevent arbitrage by those intermediaries. For exam-
ple, all of the “own use” clauses already provided in this article were taken from the District 
Court’s opinion in Ferro I, see supra notes 68, 156, and text accompanying note 67, where the 
individual defendants operated through an intermediary that resold to nursing homes. As al-
ready noted, an “own use” clause is, at best, awkward for an intermediary because, by defini-
tion, an intermediary purchases, not for its own consumption or use, but for resale to others. A 
more logical way to prevent arbitrage in a contract with an intermediary is to require the in-
termediary not to sell to nonexempt purchasers or, alternately, to sell only to identified exempt 
purchasers. An “own use” clause in a contract with an intermediary might make sense if, as the 
District Court in Ferro found, that clause seeks representation of compliance with the require-
ments of the Nonprofit Institutions Act. See supra note 71. 
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centives exist for any purchaser in the price-favored channel of distri-
bution. The temptation to engage in arbitrage may be stronger for 
an intermediary to the extent that the intermediary does not identify 
with the charitable or other worthy goals of the exempt purchasers 
to whom the intermediary should restrict its sales of price-discounted 
supplies. Even if the profit opportunities of arbitrage will likely be 
short lived, an intermediary who perceives of itself as merely a reseller 
in a channel of distribution may succumb more quickly to the lure of 
profit opportunities. Indeed, in the criminal cases already discussed, 
the defendants who pursued the profit opportunities of arbitrage 
were not eleemosynary institutions that provided health care services 
but, rather, were distributors of pharmaceutical products.263 
The additional certification requirements or the presence of an 
intermediary do not change the incentives for suppliers to monitor 
the price-favored channel of distribution to assure compliance with 
“own use” clauses and to enforce those clauses where necessary. 
Suppliers who seek to avoid otherwise illegal price discrimination by 
complying with the Nonprofit Institutions Act cannot allow pur-
chasers in the price-favored channel of distribution to engage in arbi-
trage. By engaging in arbitrage, an exempt intermediary, no less than 
an exempt purchaser, risks noncompliance with the requirements of 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act which would, in turn, jeopardize the 
antitrust exemption for the price-favored channel of distribution. 
Consequently, suppliers who detect arbitrage by an intermediary 
need to enforce contractual prohibitions of arbitrage either directly 
in an action for breach of contract, indirectly in an action for fraud, 
or perhaps by enlisting the government’s assistance in bringing a 
criminal action for fraud. 
2. Contexts of enforcement 
While the additional concerns do not change the need for those 
who seek to enforce contractual prohibitions of arbitrage to examine 
those clauses in the broader context of an overall price discrimination 
strategy, the supplier’s certification obligations add a wrinkle to that 
 
 263. United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 659 (8th Cir. 1993) (institutional pharmacy 
that resold to patients in nursing homes); United States v. Stewart, 872 F.2d 957, 958 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (nonprofit group reselling to hospitals); Ferro I, No. 99-00180-0104-CR-W-SOW, 
2000 WL 33394614, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 8, 2000) (institutional pharmacy that resold to 
patients in nursing homes). See also United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 
1985) (purchaser intended to resell in export market). 
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context. As an illustrative example, consider the following facts 
which are based upon Costanzo. A purchaser of pharmaceutical 
products signs a contract that includes an “own use” clause, thereby 
putting the purchaser into the “closed door” channel.264 The sup-
plier makes no inquiries, and the purchaser makes no representations 
regarding the statutory requirements that the purchaser must be an 
eligible institution that is “not operated for profit.”265 Although not 
obtaining the required certification, the supplier nonetheless charges 
a lower price to the purchaser for the same products that it sells, at 
higher prices, in the “open door” channel. The price differences do 
not, however, reflect different costs, changed circumstances, or a 
need to meet competition. Subsequently, the purchaser pursues the 
profit opportunities of arbitrage and resells some of the products to 
distributors in the “open door” channel. 
In the illustrative example, the contract with an “own use” re-
striction is part of an illegal price discrimination strategy. On the as-
sumed facts, the distribution system satisfies a prima facie case and 
does not fall within an affirmative defense such as cost justification, 
changed circumstances, or meeting competition. The legality of the 
price discrimination strategy therefore turns upon the availability of 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. That exemption is not 
available, however. The reason, on the assumed facts, is that the sup-
plier did not obtain certification from the purchaser that the pur-
chaser was an eligible institution that was “not operated for profit.” 
It matters not whether the purchaser, in fact, meets those require-
ments. Following the language of Abbott Laboratories, for a supplier 
to enjoy the benefits of the exemption, the supplier must routinely 
obtain certification. In the illustrative example, the supplier did 
 
 264. In Costanzo, the court provided the following example of an “own use” clause, 
which it described as “fairly typical”: 
Products purchased from CIBA-GEIGY at other than standard prices or terms are to 
be used exclusively for long term care facility inpatients for whom we are the phar-
macy provider. Any other use of these products will be cause for immediate termina-
tion of this account as well as any pricing Agreements then in force with CIBA-
GEIGY. 
Costanzo, 4 F.3d at 660. 
 265. The opinion in Costanzo, unlike the District Court’s opinion in Ferro, see supra 
notes 182, 183, did not comment on facts that might bear upon these other requirements of 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act. The reason, to be fair to the Costanzo court, appears to be that 
the defendants did not invite the court to analyze the antitrust issues surrounding price dis-
crimination. “The principal challenge that defendants raise on appeal is to the sufficiency of the 
evidence [regarding intent to defraud].” Costanzo, 4 F.3d at 664. 
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not.266 
The extra wrinkle added by the supplier’s certification obliga-
tions arises where the supplier seeks to enforce a contractual prohibi-
tion of arbitrage indirectly in an action for fraud or by enlisting the 
government’s assistance in bringing a criminal action for fraud. Con-
sider, in the illustrative example, that the supplier sought the pur-
chaser’s representation that the products would be for “own use” 
because the manufacturer sought a representation that the pur-
chaser’s participation in the distribution system would bring the sys-
tem within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. The supplier 
did not, however, obtain every representation necessary for the sup-
plier to believe that, by selling to the purchaser, the distribution sys-
tem would be exempt from the prohibition of price discrimination. 
To the contrary, in the illustration, the supplier did not seek repre-
sentations regarding the other two statutory requirements. The sup-
plier elicited no representation that the purchaser was an eligible in-
stitution or, in the case of an intermediary, did not engage in 
economic activity other than reselling to exempt purchasers. Nor did 
the supplier elicit a representation that the purchaser was “not oper-
ated for profit.” On the assumed facts, because the supplier did not 
elicit representations of compliance with regard to all three statutory 
requirements, the supplier never obtained the required certification 
and therefore was not defrauded into believing that its price dis-
crimination strategy would come within the exemption. 
Although the principal focus of this article is not upon the law of 
fraud, it is worth noting that there is doctrinal support for the con-
clusion just reached. In general, fraud can be found for a failure to 
disclose a material fact, but only where there is a duty to disclose.267 
 
 266. This example is not meant to suggest that all or even a good number of pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers are knowingly ignorant of how intermediaries resell their products or, for 
that matter, of the diversion market in the pharmaceutical industry. As one court explained: 
While there was testimony in this case that in many instances pharmaceutical manu-
facturers used nonprofit and export organizations as a “dumping ground” for phar-
maceutical products nearing expiration, it was clear that many pharmaceutical 
houses actively seek to prevent diversion of products sold to export and nonprofit 
organizations. Some companies, in fact, go so far as to maintain investigators whose 
sole function is to trace sources of diversion supply. 
Weinstein, 762 F.2d at 1527. See also Petersen, supra note 31 (“Some [drug companies] 
have even hired investigators to track wholesalers that may be violating the [Prescription 
Drug Marketing Act of 1987]. Other drug companies send auditors to wholesalers and 
pharmacies, and cut off those that raise suspicions.”). 
 267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (1977) (“One who fails to disclose to 
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In the illustrative example, the purchaser might be liable for a 
fraudulent omission provided that, first, the purchaser knew that 
facts about whether it was a qualified institution (or, if an intermedi-
ary, did not engage in economic activity other than reselling to ex-
empt purchasers) and was “not operated for profit” were material to 
the supplier’s decision to enter into the contract268 and, second, the 
purchaser owed a duty to disclose those facts to the supplier. Of 
course, whether there is a duty to disclose often is a fact-intensive in-
quiry that is context dependent.269 Nonetheless, courts should be re-
luctant to find a duty to disclose where the one allegedly defrauded 
has an affirmative duty to investigate the material facts.270 The sup-
plier’s certification obligations, however, place just such an affirma-
tive duty on the supplier because the supplier has an obligation to 
assure that the purchaser meets the requirements of the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act. Thus, in the illustrative example, the supplier was 
not defrauded by the purchaser’s silence because the purchaser did 
not have a duty to disclose facts that would indicate whether the 
purchaser meets all three of the statutory requirements of the exemp-
tion.271 
 
another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a 
business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented 
the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty 
to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.”). If, on different 
facts, the purchaser actively conceals material facts or prevents the supplier from routinely ob-
taining certification, liability would lie for fraudulent concealment. Id. at § 550. 
 268. Id. § 551 cmt. c (“A person under the duty stated in this Subsection [(2)] is re-
quired to disclose only those matters that he has reason to know will be regarded by the other 
as important in determining his course of action in the transaction in hand.”). 
 269. See id. § 551 cmt. l (“It is extremely difficult to be specific as to the factors that give 
rise to this known, and reasonable, expectation of disclosure.”); id. § 551 cmt. m (“If there are 
disputed facts bearing upon the existence of the duty, as for example the defendant’s knowl-
edge of the fact, the other’s ignorance of it or his opportunity to ascertain it, the customs of 
the particular trade, or the defendant’s knowledge that the plaintiff reasonably expects him to 
make the disclosure, they are to be determined by the jury under appropriate instructions as to 
the existence of the duty.”) 
 270. See id. § 551 cmt. k (“The defendant may reasonably expect the plaintiff to make 
his own investigation, draw his own conclusions and protect himself; and if the plaintiff is indo-
lent, inexperienced or ignorant, or his judgment is bad, or he does not have access to adequate 
information, the defendant is under no obligation to make good his deficiencies.”). 
 271. In the illustrations to another comment to § 551, a common factor that appears 
where nondisclosure leads to liability is that the plaintiff could not reasonably discover the 
nondisclosed fact by an ordinary inspection or investigation. Id. § 551 cmt l, illus. 9–12. In the 
context of the requirement of routinely obtaining certification that intermediaries and purchas-
ers comply with the statutory requirements of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, the supplier is 
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Additional doctrinal support for the conclusion just reached can 
also be found in the general common law rule that the one de-
frauded must rely upon the alleged fraud and that reliance must be 
justified.272 In the context of the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemp-
tion, the supplier has an affirmative duty to obtain certification that 
price-favored sales are made only to exempt purchasers. In this con-
text, the supplier’s certification obligations effectively mean that a 
supplier should rely upon its own efforts to assure that price-favored 
purchasers meet all three of the statutory requirements of the exemp-
tion. Where the supplier makes no effort to obtain certification of 
one of the requirements, any reliance on the purchaser’s silence 
seems misplaced.273 Thus, in the illustrative example, the supplier was 
not defrauded by the purchaser’s silence because any reliance by the 
supplier on that silence was not reasonable. 
The preceding discussion shows how enforcement of an “own 
use” clause or, for that matter, any contractual prohibition of arbi-
trage, may appear nonsensical if the examination does not expand to 
the broader context of price discrimination, including an analysis of 
the supplier’s routine certification obligations. If the supplier fails to 
obtain certification, an otherwise illegal price discrimination strategy 
does not come within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption and, 
therefore, is illegal. An “own use” or other clause that prevents arbi-
trage is integral to the economic success of the price discrimination 
strategy, however. Consequently, where the supplier fails to comply 
with the requirement of routinely obtaining certification, the “own 
use” clause should not be enforced because that clause is contrary to 
the public policy against illegal price discrimination. If indirect en-
forcement is sought through a civil or criminal action for fraud, the 
results seem illogical. Where the supplier has an affirmative duty to 
investigate material facts but fails to do so, the supplier is misled by 
its own failure to investigate by routinely obtaining certification, not 
 
merely expected to “obtain[] a representation from its . . . customer” as to compliance. Abbott 
Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggist Ass’n, 425 U.S. 1, 21 (1976). Thus, unless and until the 
supplier undertakes this “little additional burden” and “small . . . step,” id., the purchaser 
should not be liable for nondisclosure. 
 272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977). 
 273. This is an extension of the growing acceptance by courts of a “duty to inspect” 
which negates a finding of fraud where the misrepresentation “would be shown up as false on 
the most casual inspection.” 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 174, § 7.12, at 455–64. Where 
there is an affirmative obligation to obtain certification, the inspection should be more than 
casual. 
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by the purchaser’s silence. The nonsensical result is that allegations 
of fraud effectively claim that the supplier was defrauded by its own 
failure to comply with a requirement of an antitrust exemption. 
Examples of seemingly nonsensical results can be found in two of 
the criminal cases previously discussed at length. In Costanzo and 
Stewart, the courts did not inquire as to whether the allegedly de-
frauded drug manufacturers had met their obligations to obtain a 
certification that the defendant intermediaries were exempt or, for 
that matter, that the ultimate purchasers were exempt. Rather, both 
opinions focus principally upon contractual prohibitions of diversion 
and defendants’ efforts to disguise the diversion. Certainly, both 
courts mention facts that might bear upon some of the requirements 
other than the “own use” requirement or, for an intermediary, a 
slightly altered requirement to purchase supplies only for resale to 
exempt purchasers.274 Neither court, however, explains how the de-
fendants’ silence on material facts constitutes fraud where, under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Abbott Laboratories, the drug 
manufacturers had an affirmative duty to investigate those material 
facts. Neither court explains how the drug manufacturers suppliers 
failure to obtain certification of compliance with the Nonprofit 
Institutions Act defrauded those same drug manufacturers into 
reasonably believing that their price discrimination strategies came 
within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. 
The recent appellate opinion in Ferro II, which reversed the Dis-
trict Court, can be faulted on several grounds,275 but at least the 
opinion is a step in the right direction. As background to its discus-
sion, the Ferro appellate court recognized that, at a minimum, “A 
brief review of federal price discrimination law and pricing practices 
 
 274. In Costanzo, the “own use” clause restricted resales to nursing home inpatients, and 
those nursing homes may have been “charitable institutions” that were “operated not for 
profit,” but the court never specifically addressed those facts. United States v. Costanzo, 4 
F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1993). In Stewart, the defendant-purchasers did resell to hospitals, 
but the court did not go further to determine if those hospitals were “operated not for profit.” 
See supra notes 208–212. 
 275. Some of the Eighth Circuit’s errors already have been discussed in the margin. The 
Eighth Circuit applied the wrong standard of review. See supra note 71. The Eighth Circuit 
failed to apply the standard of review that it did select to the “own use” clauses quoted by the 
District Court but, instead, made factual inferences from two cases and a study, none of which 
examined analogous clauses, the Robinson-Patman Act, or the Nonprofit Institutions Act. See 
supra note 106. The Eighth Circuit cited to misleading authority when discussing the competi-
tive injury requirement of secondary-line discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. See 
supra note 89. 
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in the pharmaceutical industry is necessary to an understanding of 
the[] issues.”276 The Ferro appellate court also focused, correctly, 
upon the materiality of the “own use” clauses and the question of 
whether those clauses were employed to seek representations of 
compliance with the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption.277 Inex-
plicably, however, the Ferro appellate court never examined the 
“own use” clauses in the record and quoted in the District Court’s 
opinion, much less the facts that these “own use” clauses explicitly 
referred to the Nonprofit Institutions Act as well as controlling case 
law.278 Instead, the Ferro appellate court suggested, without citing 
 
 276. Ferro II, 252 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 277. Id. at 967–68. 
 278. The Eighth Circuit may have ignored the record because of its belief that, “The dis-
trict court also erred procedurally in taking up this issue [materiality] prior to trial.” Id. at 967. 
This statement is curious for two reasons. The first is that, if a factual determination on the 
issue of materiality cannot be made before trial, the Eighth Circuit could have rested on that 
ground without attempting to create an issue of fact by making factual inferences from inappo-
site sources. See supra note 106. The second is that the Eight Circuit failed to examine, with 
care, United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 523 (1995), the authority upon which it relied, 
not only for the statement just quoted, but also for the conclusion that, “so long as the in-
dictment contains a facially sufficient allegation of materiality, federal criminal procedure does 
not provide for a pre-trial determination of sufficiency of the evidence.” Ferro II, 252 F.3d at 
967 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307–08 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
Gaudin provides no basis for the results suggested by the Eighth Circuit. The issue in 
Gaudin did not arise in the context of a pre-trial evidentiary hearing but, instead, at the con-
clusion of a trial on the merits when the judge refused to submit the question of materiality to 
the jury. Prior to Gaudin, some courts had held that materiality was not an issue of fact that 
could ever go to the jury. E.g., United States v. Gribben, 984 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1993) (ap-
pellate court may review pre-trial hearing dismissing portion of indictment on materiality be-
cause materiality is an issue of law); Unites States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148, 1151 (6th Cir. 
1985) (same). Both cases were cited by Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510 n.1. 
The Gaudin Court’s reasoning, and its holding, are limited to the stage of criminal pro-
ceedings where issues of fact are presented to the jury. The Court reasoned that, because mate-
riality involves issues of fact and the defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury make 
ultimate decisions of guilt on every element of the charged crime, the judge may not deprive 
the defendant of the jury’s determination of any issue of fact, including an issue of mixed law 
and fact. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510, 513–15, 522–23. A motion to dismiss an indictment in 
a pre-trial evidentiary hearing implicates neither the defendant’s right to a jury trial nor an ul-
timate finding of guilt. To the contrary, a motion to dismiss an indictment in a pre-trial evi-
dentiary hearing allows the district court to be a gatekeeper and to halt factually unfounded 
criminal prosecutions before the trial stage of the proceedings where the defendant’s right to a 
jury trial and any ultimate findings of guilt come into play. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Gaudin explicitly distinguished procedural pre-trial 
contexts that do not implicate a defendant’s right to a jury’s determination of guilt on each 
element of the charged offense. At one point, the Court parenthetically noted that, “The 
prosecution’s failure to provide minimal evidence of materiality, like its failure to provide 
minimal evidence of any other element, of course raises a question of ‘law’ that warrants dis-
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any credible support, that there were lots of reasons why a seller 
might use an “own use” clause to comply with the Robinson-Patman 
Act.279 Nonetheless, the Ferro appellate court took a step in the right 
direction when it concluded by noting that, on remand, “the gov-
ernment may present pharmaceutical seller witnesses to testify as to 
the materiality of any ‘own use’ misrepresentations the government 
is able to prove.”280 The factual issues on remand thus will focus, in 
significant part, upon whether drug manufacturers were seeking rep-
resentations of compliance with the Nonprofit Institutions Act.281 
 
missal.” Id. at 517. The Court then cited, without criticism, to cases in which courts granted 
demurrers to indictments after hearing arguments pertaining to materiality. The Court 
additionally distinguished other cases by noting that 
some of the other cited cases involve the convicted defendant’s claim that materiality 
should not have been decided by the jury, so that even if the issue was not one of 
the prosecution’s failure to make a threshold case, it did not arise in a context in 
which the defendant’s right to jury trial was at issue. 
Id. at 517–18. The Court then cited, without criticism, to cases involving post conviction pro-
ceedings. Id. at 518. 
Properly read, Gaudin provides no support for the Eighth Circuit’s far reaching proposi-
tion that issues of materiality may never be addressed by a district court in a pre-trial eviden-
tiary hearing. Properly read, Gaudin held that, because materiality involves issues of fact, the 
defendant is entitled to a jury determination of materiality at the trial stage of the proceedings 
where the defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury make ultimate decisions of guilt on 
every element of the charged crime is implicated. The Gaudin Court did not address, and ex-
pressly distinguished, the pre-trial and other contexts where the defendant’s constitutional 
right to a jury determination of guilt does not come into play. Contrary to the Eighth Circuit’s 
misreading, Gaudin did not discard the long-established and well-accepted practice that allows 
a defendant to seek dismissal of an indictment by showing at a pre-trial evidentiary hearing that 
the government cannot prove one or more elements of the charged offense, a possibility that 
the Eighth Circuit begrudgingly recognized, Ferro II, 252 F.3d at 968 (“possibility [of] pre-
trial determination that no reasonable jury could make the requisite finding of materiality”). 
Moreover, contrary to the Eight Circuit’s assertion (“no decision since Gaudin in which a fed-
eral fraud indictment was dismissed [pretrial],” id.), after Gaudin, courts have continued to 
dismiss indictments prior to trial. E.g., United States v. Adkinson, 135 F.3d 1363, 1372 (11th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Seitz, 952 F. Supp. 229, 238 (E.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. 
Finn, 919 F. Supp. 1305, 1338 (D. Minn. 1995). 
 279. Ferro II, 252 F.3d at 967; supra note 107. 
 280. Id. at 968. 
 281. One other aspect of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion merits a response. The Eighth Cir-
cuit thought that the defendant’s theory in Ferro was “seriously flawed,” and asserted that “the 
critical flaw is defendants’ assumption that a price discount on pharmaceuticals is either exempt 
from the Robinson-Patman Act, or it is unlawful.” Id. at 967. Rather than cite to the record to 
show where defendants supposedly made or relied upon such an assumption, the Eighth Cir-
cuit dropped a footnote that, curiously, spoke to “defendants materiality theory” and criticized 
this author’s testimony as having “little or no support in Robinson-Patman Act treatises and 
judicial opinions.” Id. at 967 n.2. A response is in order. 
The Eighth Circuit’s juxtaposition of Robinson-Patman analysis and materiality only 
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V. CONCLUDING IMPLICATIONS 
This article’s analysis and discussion has produced relatively 
straightforward guidelines for those who design distribution systems 
to come within the Nonprofit Institution Act exemption to illegal 
price discrimination. The supplier should design the price-favored 
channel so that all purchasers are either exempt intermediaries or ex-
empt purchasers. An exempt intermediary is an entity that purchases 
for resale only to exempt purchasers, does not engage in other eco-
nomic activities, and is “not operated for profit.” An exempt pur-
chaser is an entity that purchases supplies for its “own use,” is an eli-
gible institution, and is “not operated for profit.” The supplier has 
ongoing obligations as well. The supplier, who reaps economic re-
wards from an otherwise illegal price discrimination strategy that 
comes within the exemption, should routinely obtain certification 
that all of the purchasers in the price-favored channel of distribution 
are either exempt intermediaries or exempt purchasers. Of course, 
there are specific issues and fact situations that the courts have yet to 
address. Here, the article has identified underlying policy considera-
tions, including the practice of defining antitrust exemptions nar-
rowly and the statutory purpose of the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 
that provide additional guidance. 
This article’s analysis and discussion has also produced relatively 
straightforward guidelines for those who enforce distribution systems 
that come within the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption to illegal 
price discrimination. The discussion focused upon the enforcement 
of “own use” clauses, not only because case law has already ad-
dressed “own use” clauses, but also because the profit opportunities 
of arbitrage or diversion tempt purchasers in price-favored channels 
of distribution to breach “own use” clauses. Here, courts should ex-
amine the “own use” clause at issue in the broader context of the 
overall price discrimination strategy. If that strategy comes within a 
prima facie case of illegal price discrimination and does not come 
within an affirmative defense, the context should be expanded to ac-
count for, first, all of the requirements to be an exempt intermediary 
 
demonstrates the Eight Circuit’s confusion regarding price discrimination. See also supra note 
89. Materiality is not an issue under either secondary-line discrimination or, for that matter, 
the Nonprofit Institutions Act; materiality is an issue under mail fraud. It should have been 
evident to the Eighth Circuit that any discussion of materiality, by this author or anyone else, 
would not find support in Robinson-Patman literature or case law. 
1COR.DOC 3/5/02  8:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1488 
or exempt purchaser and, second, the supplier’s obligation of rou-
tinely obtaining certification of those requirements. Only then will a 
court be able to determine if the “own use” clause is integral to a 
price-discrimination strategy that Congress has prohibited or permit-
ted. If allegations of fraud are at issue, only by expanding the context 
of analysis will a court be able to determine if the supplier was de-
frauded into believing that an otherwise illegal price discrimination 
strategy does not offend the Robinson-Patman Act because price-
favored sales qualify for the Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption. 
What may be less evident in this article’s discussion and analysis 
are implications for those who question the prohibition of price dis-
crimination in light of shifts in the focus of antitrust policy. As noted 
in the introduction, the 1936 amendments of the Robinson-Patman 
Act were meant to counter the market power of large retail chains 
that enabled those chains to extract price favors from manufacturers, 
all to the competitive disadvantage of small retailers who paid higher 
prices for the same commodities. These concerns resonated well with 
the then prevailing antitrust policy which had a populist bias aimed 
at preserving those small retailers. Today, antitrust policy has shifted 
toward the goal of consumer welfare and the concomitant goal of 
encouraging suppliers to expand output. Under this view, price dis-
crimination should not be prohibited because, where a supplier can 
successfully price discriminate by charging different prices to groups 
of consumers with different demand characteristics, the supplier can 
expand output beyond the profit-maximizing output associated with 
a single price. 
Key to the current and favorable view of price discrimination is 
the supplier’s ability to separate consumers into groups with different 
demand characteristics, that is, different elasticities of demand and 
corresponding degrees of price sensitivity. Indeed, the economic 
theory underlying this favorable view of price discrimination presup-
poses that the price-disfavored group of purchasers has a relatively 
inelastic demand and price insensitivity, that is, price-disfavored con-
sumers can and will purchase the same amount at higher prices. The 
other group of consumers, the price-favored group, has a relatively 
elastic demand and price sensitivity, that is, price-favored consumers 
will purchase more at lower prices. To be sure, this theory was de-
veloped in the context of utility industries that are characterized by 
high fixed costs and exceedingly low marginal costs. At the risk of 
oversimplification, the theory is that price-disfavored consumers with 
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a relatively inelastic demand and price insensitivity are willing to pay 
a price that not only covers the total costs of providing the services 
provided to them, but also a price that is high enough to defray or 
subsidize a good portion of the fixed costs associated with the ser-
vices provided to price-favored consumers with a relatively elastic 
demand curve and price sensitivity.282 
Even in industries that are not characterized by high fixed costs 
and exceedingly low marginal costs, a strategy of price discrimination 
that separates consumers should also be based upon identifying 
groups with different demand characteristics. Under the goals of 
consumer welfare and output maximization, it makes no sense for a 
price discrimination strategy to charge a lower price to those who are 
not likely to increase the quantity of goods purchased and, at the 
same time, to charge a higher price to those who are likely to de-
crease the quantity of goods purchased. Put another way, consumer 
welfare and output are not likely increased if price insensitive con-
sumers pay lower prices while price sensitive consumers pay higher 
prices.283 
Following these observations, a consumer welfare interpretation 
of the Nonprofit Institutions Act is that the exemption is an excep-
tion to a general prohibition of price discrimination for one fact 
 
 282. See generally supra note 14 (all cited sources). The price differentials in the pharma-
ceutical industry do appear to shift costs by having price-disfavored purchasers in the “open 
door” channel subsidize or defray costs associated with the “closed door” channel. See Pisone, 
supra note 34, at 65 (“Discriminatory pricing practices, or cost shifting, has made drug manu-
facturing one of the most lucrative businesses in the marketplace.”); Zaretsky, supra note 28, at 
272 (“The losses attributed to these preferred payers are partially offset by inflated charges to 
the dwindling group of retail (i.e., billed-charges paying) payers.”); Patricia M. Danzon, Price 
Discrimination for Pharmaceuticals: Welfare Effects in the U.S. and the E.U., 4 INT’L J. ECON. 
BUS. 301 (1997) (examining price discrimination while incorporating R & D costs as global 
joint costs). If the analogy to utility regulation is followed, the issue is not whether there is cost 
shifting, but whether relatively elastic and price insensitive consumers improperly subsidize 
relatively inelastic and price sensitive consumers. 
 283. Some commentators have suggested that the price discrimination practiced by the 
pharmaceutical industry did not produce the typical result of increased profits. Scherer, Pre-
scription Drug Litigation, supra note 7, at 253–54; Weinstein & Culbertson, supra note 10, at 
259. Weinstein and Culbertson have observed that the current practice of granting discounts 
to managed care organizations is designed to shift market share, that is, to shift sales on other 
branded drugs within a therapeutic class of drugs to the branded drug, also within that class, 
sold by the price discriminating seller. Id. at 262. This suggests that the price discrimination 
strategy does not so much increase total market output by all drug manufacturers but only 
changes the market shares among drug manufacturers. See also Elzinga & Mills, supra note 60 
at 292–98 (evaluating welfare effects of prescription discounts from perspective of elasticized 
demands and non-cooperative oligopolistic reactions). 
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situation in which a price discrimination strategy will likely lead to 
greater output and increased consumer welfare. Under the exemp-
tion, consumers are divided into two groups depending upon 
whether those consumers obtain goods or services from eleemosy-
nary institutions. While this division may be a rough proxy, the dis-
tinctions inherent in the requirements for exempt intermediaries and 
exempt purchasers are consistent with an attempt to separate con-
sumers into groups with different elasticities of demand and corre-
sponding price sensitivities. Consumers who purchase goods and ser-
vices from nonexempt and for-profit entities in the price-disfavored 
channel of distribution are likely to have a relatively inelastic demand 
and to be price insensitive. By contrast, consumers who receive 
goods or services from exempt and not-for-profit entities in the 
price-favored channel of distribution are likely to have a relatively 
elastic demand and to be price sensitive. Thus, the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act exemption can be interpreted as a way to permit a price 
discrimination strategy where that price discrimination strategy 
makes the kinds of distinctions that advance the twin goals of con-
sumer welfare and output maximization.284 
It is in light of these antitrust policies that the failure of courts to 
examine the broader context of the overall price discrimination strat-
egy has led to results that seem illogical and at odds with public pol-
icy. For example, in the cases arising out of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, if reasons have been noted for the design of distribution 
channels that discriminate in price, those reasons are unrelated to the 
traditional consumer welfare and output maximization justifications 
of regulated price discrimination. Lower prices are charged to large 
institutional purchasers,285 not because they are eleemosynary institu-
tions who serve patients with a relatively elastic demand and price 
sensitivity, but because those large institutional purchasers have bar-
 
 284. Those who have a deeply held belief that price discrimination should be permitted, 
or that business rationales should be presumed pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing, may 
urge that the exception of the Nonprofit Institutions Act should swallow the rule of the Rob-
inson-Patman Act. In other words, the presumption against price discrimination should be re-
placed with a presumption in favor of price discrimination that could be rebutted with a show-
ing of anti-competitive effects that harm consumer welfare or restrict output. Such an outcome 
would effectively relegate claims of illegal price discrimination to analysis under the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1994), the situation that existed prior to the Clayton Act and the Rob-
inson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994). 
 285. See supra note 46. 
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gaining power.286 Or, lower prices are charged to institutional buyers 
as a marketing tool to introduce doctors and patients to a pharma-
ceutical product in a low-price, institutional setting with the hopes 
that the same doctors and patients would continue to prescribe and 
purchase the same brand in a high-price, non-institutional setting.287 
While there may be business reasons for these practices, those rea-
sons do not readily appear to be related to the justification of price 
discrimination that hinges upon separating consumers into groups 
with different demand characteristics.288 Unless and until those who 
design and enforce distribution systems under the Nonprofit Institu-
tions Act expand the context of analysis to include the design of the 




 286. United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 659 (8th Cir. 1993) (“One reason that drug 
manufacturers offer institutional pharmacies low prices is that manufacturers recognize that the 
amount that insurance companies and the government, which pay for many of the patients in 
institutions, will reimburse for pharmaceuticals is relatively low.”) Institutional purchasers may 
have the economics of scale to institute accounting or other cost-containment techniques that 
enhance their bargaining power. See LEVY, supra note 33, at 8–9 (“Indeed, until recently, ag-
gressive price competition among drug companies typically was found only in certain segments 
of the industry, primarily in sales to hospitals. . . . [H]ospitals typically negotiated lower prices 
than others, partly because [an accounting] change . . . encouraged hospitals to minimize their 
prescription drug expenditures. Hospitals were also among the first buyers to apply cost-
containment measures to their drug purchases.”). Further, institutional buyers may increase 
their bargaining power by instituting programs that switch purchases from brand-name to ge-
neric drugs. Id. at 20–21 (“Survey evidence indicates that HMOs are expanding their use of 
incentive payments and programs to increase the use of generic alternatives to brand-name 
drugs.”) (footnote omitted). Pharmacy benefit management services, which are used by insur-
ance companies, control prescription drug costs, in part, by negotiating drug price rebates. Id. 
at 51–54. Finally, and with respect to Medicaid and veterans health care, federal and state law 
requires that pharmaceutical companies provide “rebates that are based on the lowest prices 
available to other customers.” Id. at 23–24. 
 287. See supra note 48. 
 288. Of interest here is the fact that, in a 1994 survey concerning prescription drugs, 
“[t]herapeutic substitution programs . . . ranked as the least popular cost-containment strat-
egy” for HMOs. LEVY, supra note 33, at 32–34. While there is evidence that therapeutic sub-
stitution is more costly than other prescription drug cost-containment strategies, the fact that 
therapeutic substitution is the least popular is an indication that a patient’s elasticity of demand 
for the prescription drug component of treatment does not vary greatly depending upon the 
context within which the drug is prescribed. On the other hand, to the extent that institutional 
purchasers have relatively greater abilities to create competition between generic and brand-
name prescription drugs, demand elasticities facing drug manufacturers increase. Id. at 56–57, 
70–71. See also id. at 75 (“[I]nformation technology has permitted these groups of buyers 
[HMOs, PBMs, and Medicaid programs] to substitute more easily among alternative drug 
treatments.”). 
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odds with the goals of antitrust policy to increase consumer welfare 
and to expand output.289 
 
 
 289. As suggested in a debate regarding a recent case involving allegations of price dis-
crimination in the pharmaceutical industry, “[t]he consumers who were most likely to pay the 
higher retail prices were those who were also the most likely be forced to forego medication 
due the cost—the poor and the uninsured.” Harrison, supra note 37, at 268. See also Elzinga 
& Mills, supra note 60, at 288 (“unlike conventional third-degree price discrimination where a 
firm actively sorts its consumers into classes to exploit existing differences in demand elastic-
ities, discounts on prescription drugs are commandeered by managed care organizations who 
intervene between manufacturers and consumers in a way that alters some consumers’ demands 
for drugs.”). 
For an analysis of how true elasticities of demand lead consumers to select different 
kinds of health care plans with, apparently, an assumption that all consumers will, in fact, enroll 
in a health care plan, see Danzon, supra note 282, at 311 (suggesting that “pattern of drug 
price discounts across health plans can be explained by differences in price elasticity of demand 
of consumers”). Of course, if consumers with the most elastic demands for health care cannot 
afford an available health plan, or do not work for an employer who makes one available, and, 
therefore, are left to purchase drugs at high prices from retail pharmacies, the existing pattern 
of drug price discounts is not explained by differences in the elasticity of demand of consumers. 
Further, to the extent that consumer choice among health care alternatives is restricted by em-
ployers who often choose what plans will be available, so too the existing pattern of drug dis-
counts is not explained by differences in the elasticity of demand of consumers. See LEVY, su-
pra note 33, at 75 (noting that higher prices are charged to the uninsured). 
